First, the United Arab Emirates demanded Pakistan repay a $3.5 billion loan, which Islamabad only managed to do with Saudi support. Then, Emirati authorities reportedly deported 15,000 Pakistanis. Etihad Airways, too, has terminated several employees and ordered them to leave the country within 48 hours. Any of these episodes alone would raise questions about the trajectory of the United Arab Emirates’ ties with Pakistan. Taken together, they reflect a real crisis.
Such a crisis has been a long time coming. For decades, Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates maintained deep strategic, economic, and people-to-people ties. The United Arab Emirates was among Pakistan’s closest Persian Gulf partners, repeatedly extending financial assistance during periods of economic instability, investing in key sectors, and hosting millions of Pakistani expatriate workers whose remittances became a crucial pillar of Pakistan’s economy.
The United Arab Emirates was among Pakistan’s closest Persian Gulf partners, repeatedly extending financial assistance.
Military cooperation, intelligence coordination, and labor migration reinforced the partnership, with leaders in both countries routinely describing one another as “brotherly states.” This began to unravel after Pakistan signed a mutual defense pact with Saudi Arabia in September 2025, in which an attack on one is considered an attack on both. The Pakistani move offended Abu Dhabi, whose rivalry with Riyadh peaked after Saudi-backed forces pushed into southern Yemen.
To signal its own strategic autonomy amidst changing regional dynamics, the United Arab Emirates expanded its engagement with both India and Israel. Abu Dhabi signed a Letter of Intent on a Strategic Defense Partnership with New Delhi on January 19, 2026, a largely symbolic move but one which nevertheless sent a message to both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
Gulf Arab tensions with Iran also contributed to the drift. Emiratis believe that Pakistan showed a degree of sympathy towards Iran during and after the recent conflict. Given Emirati financial support for Pakistan over the years, Abu Dhabi had expected stronger diplomatic alignment, especially against the backdrop of Iranian missile and drone attacks.
That the Emiratis believed that Pakistan did not adequately address their concerns during peace negotiations added to the sense of grievance. Pakistan’s decision to open six land routes into Iran while Gulf Arab countries faced an Iranian blockade themselves compounded the problem. Emirati strategic commentary reflects the growing tension with Pakistan.
The Emiratis also resented Pakistani social media and experts commentary, especially after Pakistani Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed mocked the United Arab Emirates on the debt repayment issue, inverting the creditor-debtor relationship. He stated, “Pakistan took the right decision. Our UAE brothers are in need and helpless. We took a loan from them and will repay it in a time of crisis.” Emiratis saw his remarks as ungrateful and condescending. Emiratis also resented broader the Pakistani depiction of the Emiratis as agents of Israel and India. Many Pakistani social media accounts appeared to cheer Iranian drone strikes on Dubai and Sharjah.
Pakistan’s perceived sympathy towards Iran during the U.S.-Iran conflict further damaged Emirati trust, making any near-term recovery unlikely.
The current crisis appears to be more than a minor bump in relations; it now appears the damage to the Emirati-Pakistan relationship is more permanent. The trust that once existed in this relationship, based on the understanding that Pakistan would stand with Abu Dhabi during critical moments, no longer appears to be there. The changing alignments in the Middle East—with the United Arab Emirates moving closer to India and Israel while Pakistan has intensified its engagement with Saudi Arabia—have widened the gap between the two countries. Pakistan’s perceived sympathy towards Iran during the U.S.-Iran conflict further damaged Emirati trust, making any near-term recovery unlikely.
A more permanent rupture would have serious implications for Pakistan. Its economy is already dependent on the International Monetary Fund and external financial support, while millions of Pakistanis working in the Persian Gulf send large remittances back home. Since the United Arab Emirates historically has supported Pakistan during economic crises and remained a major destination for Pakistani workers, any long-term deterioration in relations would deepen Pakistan’s economic vulnerabilities. More broadly, such a shift reflects the changing geopolitical order in Middle East, where traditional “brotherly” ties are increasingly being replaced by strategic and interest-based alignments.
