Despite the ceasefire between Washington and Tehran having collapsed, President Donald Trump has remained open to talks with the Islamic Republic of Iran. This raises an important question: Can diplomacy and an agreement change the revolutionary ideology that shapes the Islamic Republic’s behavior, or will it simply give the regime more time to pursue its longstanding objectives? The regime’s own leaders provide a clear answer. Their statements since the war show that the regime’s ideology has not changed.
Soon after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s elimination, Trump described the new leadership as “more moderate” and “much more reasonable.” Months later, after renewed fighting, he called them “scum” and “sick.” The Islamic Republic’s own statements help explain why his assessment changed.
For the regime, the United States remains the “Great Satan,” Israel the “Little Satan,” and support for those it describes as “oppressed” a religious duty.
Statements attributed to Mojtaba Khamenei, the new supreme leader, repeatedly have reaffirmed this worldview. On May 26, he—or those speaking on his behalf—called on Muslim pilgrims to pray for “the unity of the Islamic Ummah, liberation of Palestine, the resolution of the great hardships facing Muslims and the attainment of final victory against Global Arrogance,” adding that the slogans “Down with America” and “Down with Israel” “shall become the common chants of the Islamic Ummah and the world’s oppressed, especially among the youth.”
That same worldview was even more explicit on June 4, 2026. Mojtaba stated that “Imperialism, led by the United States, has built a military base called Israel over the past 80 years” and described Israel as “the false, illegitimate geography of Greater Israel.” In addition, he directly linked himself to the ideological legacy of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and Ali Khamenei, saying, “Among the teachings of the school of the dear Khamenei and the great Khomeini is the necessity of supporting the oppressed as an Islamic duty.” These are not the words of a leader seeking reconciliation, but rather, a reaffirmation of the revolutionary worldview that has guided the Islamic Republic for nearly five decades.
The same continuity is visible across the regime. Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said that Iran’s “deep mistrust” of the United States stems from a long history of American “wrongdoing,” repeating the regime’s decades-old narrative that Washington is hostile toward Iran. His remarks suggest that the regime does not view diplomacy as a step toward trust, reconciliation, or normal relations with the United States.
The regime’s approach to diplomacy is perhaps best illustrated by Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, a former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, current speaker of Parliament, and the regime’s chief negotiator with the United States. During a recent meeting with Hamas leader Muhammad Ismail Darwish, Ghalibaf argued that diplomacy could protect what the regime has achieved, provided the regime remains militarily prepared while negotiating. He emphasized that the Islamic Republic is not at peace with the United States, will not recognize Israel, and will continue supporting Muslims and the Resistance Front. Moreover, he declared that “vengeance” for the “martyred” supreme leader would come through the liberation of Jerusalem. Far from signaling moderation, Ghalibaf presented negotiations as a tactical tool while continuing its ideological struggle.
The Islamic Republic is not at peace with the United States, will not recognize Israel, and will continue supporting Muslims and the Resistance Front.
Ali Khamenei’s funeral also offered a glimpse of the political atmosphere the current leadership seeks to preserve. Supporters repeatedly chanted “Death to America” and “Death to Israel,” demanded revenge against the United States and Israel, threatened the life of Trump, and stoned a banner bearing Trump’s image in a symbolic act reminiscent of the Rami al-Jamarat, the ritual stoning of Satan during the Hajj pilgrimage.
The Islamic Republic has negotiated before without abandoning its ideological or strategic objectives. There is no reason to believe a new round of diplomacy would produce a different outcome. Washington should not mistake tactical flexibility for ideological moderation. Policymakers should therefore judge the Islamic Republic not by its willingness to negotiate, but by what its leaders continue to say, and by nearly five decades of consistent behavior. The evidence suggests that negotiations are unlikely to moderate the regime. Instead, they are more likely to give it time to adapt to changing circumstances, recover from the war, rebuild strength, and continue pursuing the ideological objectives that its leaders openly reaffirm today.
