As Iran’s war with the United States continues, the Islamic Republic faces a threat just as dangerous to its survival: renewed domestic unrest. Since the 1979 Revolution, the regime has portrayed political opposition as a foreign conspiracy orchestrated by the United States, United Kingdom, and Israel, a narrative the current conflict reinforces. Beyond helping the regime recover militarily, negotiations and an agreement also would strengthen its machinery of repression. At the center of this apparatus stand the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the paramilitary Basij, the Ministry of Intelligence, the police, cyber police, the judiciary, and other intelligence and security bodies. Together, they monitor society, suppress dissent, and preserve the regime’s grip on power.
Beyond helping the regime recover militarily, negotiations and an agreement also would strengthen its machinery of repression.
On March 13, 2026, the Intelligence Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps sent text messages warning Iranians not to participate in new demonstrations, declaring that future protesters would face “a blow harder than January 8,” the date on which Iranian security forces massacred tens of thousands of protesters. The message portrayed future demonstrators as a new Islamic State. Regime discourse portrays the Islamic State as a U.S., British, and Israeli proxy. By labeling protesters as Islamic State, Iranian authorities hope to equate political dissent and state-sponsored terrorism.
The regime’s coercive institutions echo the same narrative. Police Chief Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan stated that anyone acting “at the behest of the enemy” no longer would be viewed as demonstrators but as enemies. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander and Parliamentary National Security Committee member Salar Velayatmadar went further, warning that the regime would hold responsible parents who fail to prevent their children from joining demonstrations or aligning themselves with “the enemy,” with penalties extending to execution. Judiciary Chief Gholam-Hossein Eje’i pledged harsh punishment for agents and individuals who weaken national unity. These labels redefine political opposition as treason, espionage, and terrorism, legitimizing violence while reinforcing the regime’s narrative among its supporters.
Action normally follows such statements. According to Amnesty International, the regime has “arbitrarily arrested more than 6,000 people” since the war began, while carrying out “at least 39 political executions,” using forced confessions and lengthy prison sentences. On July 15, 2026, the regime executed Mohammad Amini Dehaghani, a supporter of former Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, after his conviction for “waging war against God” and “corruption on earth.” Together, these measures illustrate that repression remains central to the regime’s strategy for maintaining power.
As a rentier state, the regime has consistently prioritized the elite and their families, patronage networks, coercive institutions, and regime survival over meaningful economic reform.
The implications extend well beyond Iran’s borders. The regime’s campaign against opponents abroad began months after the 1979 Islamic Revolution with the assassination of Prince Shahriar Shafiq in Paris. Since then, dissidents have been targeted through assassinations, kidnappings, and surveillance. I survived an assassination plot in Sweden in September 2025, carried out through criminal proxies. Democratic governments have recently condemned the Islamic Republic’s targeting of dissident Iranians, Jews, Israelis, and Americans. Strengthening the regime would therefore increase risks both inside and outside Iran.
Nor is there reason to believe that additional economic resources, obtained through an agreement with Washington, would benefit ordinary Iranians. Poverty persists despite decades of oil revenues and long-term economic growth. As a rentier state, the regime has consistently prioritized the elite and their families, patronage networks, coercive institutions, and regime survival over meaningful economic reform. Lifting sanctions or providing other forms of economic relief would strengthen repression rather than improve the lives of ordinary Iranians.
An agreement with the United States that enables the regime to recover while strengthening its coercive institutions will not produce lasting stability. It would leave the regime better equipped to suppress Iranians at home, intimidate dissidents abroad, and pursue the regional objectives and Islamic mission its leaders continue to reaffirm.
