How Diplomacy Could Strengthen the Islamic Republic of Iran

The ongoing war and the death of its supreme leader did not change the Islamic Republic of Iran’s ideological course. The new leadership has endorsed the revolutionary principles established by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and sustained under Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The question for policymakers is less about an ideological pivot and more how the regime will respond to weaknesses the war exposed. The Iranian leaders’ statements suggest that Tehran will seek to rebuild its military and intelligence capabilities, preserve its proxy network, advance its nuclear ambitions, and deepen cooperation with Russia and China. A future agreement with the United States could facilitate this process by reducing pressure on the regime, providing economic relief, and creating the space needed for recovery.

The regime’s own leaders imply that negotiations are not intended to change the regime’s strategic objectives but to protect them. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi insists that Iran “cannot trust” the United States and argued that Washington cannot achieve through negotiations what it failed to achieve militarily. President Masoud Pezeshkian has likewise ruled out negotiations over the regime’s ballistic missile program, arguing that without its missiles, “Israel and the United States would have ploughed Iran just like Gaza.” These statements suggest the regime accepts diplomacy only if it preserves its core capabilities.

Furthermore, if negotiations produce an agreement that reduces pressure on Tehran, rebuilding the regime’s security capabilities will become a priority. The war exposed weaknesses in the Islamic Republic’s military and intelligence apparatus. The regime proved unable to defend its leadership, infrastructure, and security institutions from airstrikes, while extensive Israeli intelligence penetration enabled effective targeting. These setbacks will encourage renewed investment in intelligence and counterintelligence, ballistic missiles, drones, cyber capabilities, and other asymmetric tools.

The same pattern will apply to the regime’s regional network. It is likely to continue its support for Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, allied Iraqi militias, and other proxy forces. Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf’s statements reflect this. Speaking with Hamas leader Muhammad Ismail Darwish, Ghalibaf confirmed support for the Resistance Front, indicating that the regime has no intention of abandoning its proxy network. Ali Akbar Velayati, a senior adviser to the Supreme Leader, has likewise warned that the Resistance Front has the “capability to lock” both the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, highlighting Tehran’s reliance on proxy forces and strategic pressure beyond its borders.

Moreover, the war appears to have increased the urgency of the regime’s long-standing pursuit of a nuclear bomb. A commentary published by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-linked Fars News Agency argued that Iran has “no choice but to build an atomic bomb.” Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani, a member of Parliament’s National Security Committee, likewise has argued that Iran should build a nuclear bomb. Although these statements do not necessarily reflect official policy, they suggest that the war has increased the perceived value of nuclear weapons within the regime. A nuclear bomb would not only serve as a deterrent against future attacks but also would strengthen the Islamic Republic’s regional position.

Russia and China are likely to play an important role in the Islamic Republic’s post-war recovery. Although neither country intervened directly during the war, both remain important strategic partners capable of providing economic, military, technological, intelligence, and diplomatic support. If negotiations and an agreement buy the regime time to recover, Tehran will have greater opportunities to deepen these partnerships while strengthening its resilience against future military and economic pressure.

Negotiations and any future agreement should be measured not only by whether they reduce tensions in the short term, but also by whether they allow the Islamic Republic to recover from the war and continue threatening the United States, Israel, and the Gulf Arab states. An agreement that gives Tehran time, economic resources, and diplomatic space to rebuild ultimately would leave the Middle East less secure. Policymakers should keep pressure focused on the regime and its coercive institutions while making clear that the Iranian people are not the regime that rules them.

Policymakers also should avoid supporting separatist movements that risk fragmenting Iran. Such policies would reinforce the regime’s narrative, alienate Iranians, and create more instability. A strategy that weakens the Islamic Republic while allowing Iranians to determine their own political future offers a more sustainable path to regional stability.