The failure of Gila Gamliel’s Persian-language influence operation represents more than bureaucratic incompetence—it reveals a misunderstanding of how information warfare dismantles authoritarian regimes. Citizen Lab and Haaretz exposed Gamliel’s amateur hour operation against Iran, complete with synchronized bot networks and artificial intelligence-generated deepfakes of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu strolling through Tehran, achieved the precise opposite of its intention. It validated the regime’s paranoia, strengthened its narrative of foreign interference, and provided Tehran’s security apparatus with propaganda victories it could not have scripted better itself.
Information warfare against the Islamic Republic can succeed, but only when executed with the strategic patience and operational sophistication that Israel’s recent debacle lacked. The regime’s vulnerabilities—economic collapse, generational revolt, and ideological exhaustion—create fissures. But exploiting them requires understanding the difference between propaganda and psychological operations, between noise and narrative warfare.
Researchers identified the network within weeks, traced it to Israeli origins, and exposed its connection to a sitting minister.
The exposed operation violated every principle of effective information warfare. Researchers identified the network within weeks, traced it to Israeli origins, and exposed its connection to a sitting minister who could not resist using state resources to amplify her personal social media presence. The campaign’s artificiality—bots opened simultaneously, AI-generated content with obvious digital fingerprints, synchronized posting patterns—insulted the intelligence of its target audience. Most damaging was the campaign’s political illiteracy. Promoting former Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi with hashtags like #KingRezaPahlavi while pretending to be authentic Iranian voices revealed ignorance about Iranian political dynamics. The shah’s son carries toxic political baggage—his father’s SAVAK torture chambers remain living memory for millions. By openly aligning with him, the operation handed the regime golden propaganda material: proof that Israel seeks to reinstall a puppet monarchy.
The timing’s coordination with military strikes, particularly the Evin Prison attack, transformed what could have been plausible grassroots momentum into foreign manipulation. When fake accounts report explosions before Iranian media, when they distribute AI-generated footage during ongoing military operations, they announce themselves as intelligence products rather than authentic voices.
Successful information warfare against Iran requires understanding the regime’s narrative architecture and the specific frequencies at which it resonates. The Islamic Republic maintains power through three pillars: religious legitimacy, revolutionary authenticity, and resistance mythology. Each pillar has enemies within Iranian society—but ham-fisted foreign interference strengthens rather than weakens them. The regime’s vulnerability lies in the chasm between its revolutionary promises and Iran’s reality. When Tehran spends billions on regional proxies while faucets run dry, when Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders drive Maseratis while teachers strike for unpaid wages, and when electricity grids collapse while missile factories expand, authentic rage grows that no foreign campaign could manufacture.
Real influence operations require years of patient cultivation, not weeks of bot deployment. Operators must understand regional dialects, generational slang, cultural references, and the subtle linguistic markers that distinguish authentic Iranians from foreign imitators. This means recruiting actual Iranians living inside the country, not Persian speakers in Tel Aviv. Authentic accounts require authentic histories. Real influence agents spend years building credible online presences—sharing mundane content, engaging in non-political discussions, establishing themselves within communities. They become trusted voices before they become influential ones.
Effective operations do not push narratives; they seed them. Rather than broadcasting messages, they plant ideas that germinate within target populations: a question about fuel subsidies benefiting Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ smuggling networks or documentation of regime officials’ children studying at Western universities while student protestors face execution. These seeds grow into indigenous movements that the regime cannot dismiss as foreign interference. When authentic crises emerge, prepared networks amplify and channel organic rage. But the emphasis remains on amplification, not creation. The 2022 Mahsa Amini protests succeeded because they were authentic, spontaneous, and indigenous.
Effective operations target the regime’s human infrastructure with messages that provide off-ramps, not just pressure.
Modern information warfare demands sophisticated technical infrastructure that the Gamliel operation lacked. Every aspect must be compartmentalized and deniable. Operations run through multiple cutouts, with each layer unaware of the others. Real humans exhibit complex, unpredictable behavior patterns. They post at irregular intervals, make typos, share personal content, have bad days. The Gamliel bots’ synchronized posting patterns announced their artificiality to anyone paying attention.
The regime’s deepest fear isn’t military strikes or economic sanctions—it is the moment when Revolutionary Guardsmen refuse to fire on protestors, when Basij members join demonstrations, and when the security apparatus fractures from within. Creating these conditions requires understanding human psychology, not just deploying technology. Effective operations target the regime’s human infrastructure with messages that provide off-ramps, not just pressure. They need narratives that allow defection while maintaining dignity.
The Islamic Republic will fall when Iranians believe it has already fallen. This requires creating information cascades where citizens realize their private opposition is the majority position. Professional information warfare remains invisible until victory, when historians trace its subtle influences. Amateur hour, like Gamliel’s operation, becomes visible immediately and achieves only defeat. The mullahs should fear the information campaigns they cannot see, not laugh at the ones they can.
