Some hardliners in the Iranian parliament are seeking to impeach Labor Minister Ahmad Meydari and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. This initiative occurs as the regime struggles with its hardline base’s maximalist demands. How the regime handles this episode will be insightful about the direction it is taking.
On October 2 and October 6, 2026, a group of parliamentarians registered Meydari’s and Araghchi’s impeachments, respectively, in the parliament’s portal, pending the executive committee’s approval.
Hardliners in the Iranian parliament are seeking to impeach Labor Minister Ahmad Meydari and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.
In March 2025, hardliners initiated the impeachment of the Economy Minister Abdolnaser Hemmati, and the parliament voted overwhelmingly to remove him. Those hardliners were darlings of then-Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The same group seeks to reassert itself, likely with different results due to its diminishing status.
Meydari is a member of the Reform Front of Iran Party and was a member of parliament between 2000 and 2004, which reformists dominated. Controversially, he, along with 126 of his colleagues, signed—and allegedly drafted—a letter to Ali Khamenei in 2002 after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, encouraging him to “drink the chalice of poison” and accommodate the Iranian people’s desire for domestic reform and drop hostilities to the West. Meydari later expressed regret over his involvement, and the parliament begrudgingly confirmed him two years ago. His future, though, is uncertain.
Araghchi’s hardline critics do not like his current conduct. Raja News, which supports the Paydari faction that has caused trouble for the regime with its nighttime demonstrations, attacked Araghchi over his involvement with reaching the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015 and the recent Memorandum of Understanding. This faction continues to oppose negotiations with the United States. Khorasan criticized him for engaging in diplomacy that lowered the price of oil. Paydari parliamentarian Hossein-Ali Haji-Deligani went further, accusing Araghchi of “lowering the price of oil for America” through his “purposeful interviews.”
While the regime’s security establishment has held a grudge against Meydari, it likes Araghchi, who reportedly has close affinity for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. A conservative member of the executive committee, Alireza Salimi, downplayed his impeachment. Among the considerations for moving ahead, he said, is “whether under the current circumstances . . . it is expedient or not.” Mohammad Rashidi, another principalist, echoed his colleague’s points. Mansour Haghighatpour, who served in the Ahmadinejad administration, quoted the Hidden Imam that “you do not replace the horse’s saddle in the middle of a war.” He said, “I think that impeaching the labor minister is inexpedient.” Khabar Online, close with the security establishment, rebuked Paydari criticisms that Araghchi engaged in unauthorized diplomacy while in New York for the United Nations General Assembly.
The Meydari case is a test for Pezeshkian’s strength, having already lost one minister—Economy Minister Abdolnasser Hemmati—to impeachment.
There are now two questions to watch: whether Meydari will survive, and how the regime will save Araghchi. President Masoud Pezeshkian is an operator who can work with the power brokers. He supported Meydari in his meeting with the members of parliament. If the parliament votes on Meydari’s impeachment, it is possible they will have the votes to remove him. It is almost certain, however, that the parliament’s conservative leadership will whip the votes in favor of Araghchi. The question then becomes whether the executive committee will allow a vote on either man.
The Meydari case is a test for Pezeshkian’s strength, having already lost one minister—Economy Minister Abdolnasser Hemmati—to impeachment. The could be an upside, though: For the Paydari faction to try but fail to win the votes to impeach Araghchi would discredit the faction and allow Pezeshkian and other relative moderates to rein in their domestic extremism. If the establishment snubs Paydari and saves both men, it will be evidence that the reformists and military are coalescing around the regime and toward a new equilibrium.
Nobody has forgotten Meydari’s “chalice of poison” comments to Khamenei nearly a quarter century ago. If Meydari survives, with Mojtaba Khamenei officially the supreme leader, it will almost certainly demonstrate that the phantom supreme leader does not yet have the final say.
