The dominant view among many U.S. policymakers and lawmakers regarding Syria today is that the United States must support the government of interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa. The rationale behind this view is that only Washington’s support for Damascus could prevent Syria from sliding back into yet another protracted conflict.
The reality, however, is that conflict in Syria did not end with the fall of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024. It has entered a more dangerous stage where ethnic and religious communities fear for their very existence. Al-Sharaa’s government has failed many tests since taking power, including protecting the Alawites and Druze against massacres by Sunni militants, including from his own government.
Backing al-Sharaa’s government in the existing climate will neither change its behavior toward the Syrian population nor reform its governing style.
A U.S. endorsement of the Islamist authorities in Syria risks undermining aspirations for an inclusive, pluralistic, and representative government—a main U.S. objective for the country. Backing al-Sharaa’s government in the existing climate will neither change its behavior toward the Syrian population nor reform its governing style. If anything, it only preserves the current state of affairs.
Syria is a diverse country. Al-Sharaa and his government seek to impose centralized rule under Sunni Arab dominance, relying on force to achieve it. But the recent brutality of groups affiliated with Damascus, including state security forces, combined with al-Sharaa’s own jihadist past have deepened the mistrust of non-Muslim, non-Sunni and non-Arab communities toward his intentions.
Voices are increasingly emerging among some communities such as the Druze, Kurds, and Alawites, calling for autonomy from Damascus. Some Druze are even calling to be annexed by Israel. Regardless of how widespread this sentiment is among the Druze, it reiterates one fact: Minorities do not trust Sunni Arab rule. The recent waves of violence highlight that Syrians cannot coexist without a genuine social contract that guarantees mutual acceptance. And that contract must enshrine a level of autonomy for Syria’s diverse populations. However, if such demands are ignored, fringe calls for full independence would quickly gain mainstream traction within these communities.
U.S. officials insist that Washington is no longer in the business of nation-building, yet they continue to prescribe how Syria should look, dismissing federalism as a viable framework for governance. This is what many in Washington fail to grasp: Self-rule, whether it is federalism or any form of decentralization, for the various regions of Syria is not a disingenuous demand but rather the only path that could preserve what some are fixated on: Syria’s territorial integrity. The paradox of Syria—like many other countries in the region—is that significant segments of society see the country as an artificial construct, even though its unity often has been preserved by those very people. The Kurds and Druze, for example—whom Damascus and other capitals accuse of seeking separatist agendas—have historically defended Syria’s unity during critical junctures. Dismissing their current demands for self-government reflects not only injustice but also a lack of understanding for the historical context.
[T]he United States still has significant leverage to press al-Sharaa into taking practical steps to protect the country’s ethnic and religious communities.
Even after President Donald Trump removed most sanctions on Syria in an executive order in June 2025, the United States still has significant leverage to press al-Sharaa into taking practical steps to protect the country’s ethnic and religious communities. For example, in July, Republican Representative Mike Lawler advanced the Syria Sanctions Accountability Act of 2025—through the House Financial Services Committee—which represents a measured approach toward the new government in Syria. Rather than fully repealing the Caesar Sanctions on Syria, the bill proposes modifying them, which would allow the U.S. government to lift the sanctions in two years if Damascus meets a set of conditions, including protection of minorities. Currently, the Trump administration can only waive these sanctions every 180 days.
Al-Sharaa is aware that without full and permanent removal of U.S. sanctions, his government cannot succeed economically. This is why appeasing Washington remains his top priority. But his rhetoric about tolerance and coexistence is futile and should not be a measure for reform. With many jihadist and extremist elements in his camp, it is clear that al-Sharaa cannot govern in the way he initially sought to portray. Instead of addressing the massive injustices committed during his eight months in power, he recently passed a decree for an interim electoral law that allows him to appoint one-third of Syria’s parliament. Such moves only push away other communities and reinforce their demands.
America’s strategic interests in Syria can be achieved by adopting policy based on realities on the ground, not on wishful thinking. The United States has friends in Syria, such as Kurds and Christians who remain committed to advancing democratic ideals in a country otherwise embroiled in extremism. These people deserve Washington’s full and consistent support. Engaging with Syria doesn’t mean dealing only with the Islamist government in Damacus; it also means addressing the needs and voices of its people. Instead of a government dominated by radical Islamists, it is time for the United States to advocate for the creation of a transitional national governing body that genuinely represent all communities.
