If Iran’s foothold in Latin America weakens, its space will not remain empty. Turkey is one of the likeliest powers to fill it: a NATO ally on paper, but a revisionist power in practice. Unlike Tehran, Ankara would not need proxies or covert pipelines. It could advance its influence through contracts, arms sales, infrastructure, diplomacy, and elite capture, all packaged as a partnership. That is the danger. Illicit penetration triggers alarms, but respectable penetration flies under the radar.
Turkey’s push into Latin America began with a 1998 action plan and accelerated after its 2006 relaunch. Since then, Ankara’s diplomatic footprint has expanded from six to nineteen embassies and Turkey now places military attachés in five Latin American countries. It has opened commercial offices in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. Trade with South America reached $15.6 billion in 2024, with Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) states accounting for $7.9 billion. Colombia alone reached $1.28 billion in bilateral trade. In 2022, Turkey became an observer in the Andean Community, giving it a formal platform in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.
Ankara’s diplomatic footprint hasexpanded from six to nineteen embassies and Turkey now places military attachés in five Latin American countries.
Turkish Airlines launched service to Santiago, Chile, in December 2024 as its twenty-sixth destination in the Americas. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) reported 172 projects in Latin America between 2008 and 2018, with more added subsequently. Turkey’s Diplomacy Academy trained 128 diplomats and officials from Latin American and Caribbean countries in 2025, including dedicating a program for Colombian diplomats.
The defense sector is where the strategy hardens. Turkey’s defense and aviation exports reached $10 billion in 2025, up roughly 48 percent from the prior year; meanwhile, new defense contracts climbed to $17.8 billion.
Ankara is not only selling equipment; it is building footholds that bundle vehicles, electronics, training, maintenance, and long-term institutional ties. The Turkish defense electronics firm Aselsan opened a regional office in Santiago. Turkish armored vehicle company Otokar used defense fairs in Rio de Janeiro and Bogotá to market its systems throughout South America. Brazil approved a five-year defense-industry cooperation agreement with Turkey covering research, development, production, acquisition, maintenance, personnel exchange, technical-logistical support, and joint sales to third parties.
Colombia shows why such penetration matters. Bogotá announced a $1.68 billion anti-drone shield after 264 explosive-drone attacks between 2024 and 2025 killed fifteen soldiers and wounded 153. In that environment, Turkey offers something politically attractive: capability without Western lectures, prices below top-tier American or Israeli systems, and security cooperation wrapped in the language of sovereign partnership. Sometimes ideology is unnecessary. A contract is enough.
Libya and Syria reveal the template. In Libya, Turkey first secured a legal foothold and then escalated into hard power through training, military support, and drones that helped reshape the battlefield around Tripoli. In Syria, Ankara paired cross-border military presence with training, logistics, arms support, security penetration, and access to Turkish military academies. The sequence is familiar: First comes assistance, then access, and eventually dependency.
Iran corrodes through covert networks. Turkey canadvance through formal partnerships.
The minerals dimension makes the issue even more consequential. Latin America accounts for roughly 40 percent of global copper production, holds more than 40 percent of global copper reserves, and contains more than half of known lithium reserves. Chile’s lithium resources recently increased by 28 percent, adding three million metric tons to its reserves. These materials underpin batteries, motors, wiring, radars, defense electronics, and modern manufacturing.
Thus, Turkish-linked capital is already moving upstream. A Turkish-owned group is taking over Colombia’s Cerro Matoso nickel operation, which produced 40,767 metric tons in 2024. Another deal targeted copper assets in Brazil for up to $465 million. Middle powers do not need control of entire sectors. They need leverage over the arteries or control over the checkpoints that feed industrial and defense production.
Although there is still no public evidence that Turkey has constructed an Iran-style intelligence architecture across Latin America, the scaffolding that could enable one is visible: more embassies, more military attachés, more diplomat training programs, more defense contracts, and more industrial entry points.
That is the real warning. Iran corrodes through covert networks. Turkey can advance through formal partnerships. The danger is not that Ankara will imitate Tehran perfectly. Iran enters through the basement. Turkey can walk through the front door. By then, Latin America may not be confronting a Turkish invasion, but it will be mutating into something worse: states that can no longer buy, build, or defend without an Ankara increasing antagonistic to both Israel and the United States.
