On September 28, 2026, forces loyal to Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen attacked federal positions in Baidoa, capital of Somalia’s South West State. Six months earlier, federal troops representing the central government in Mogadishu had driven him from the city. He went to Kenya, denied resigning voluntarily, and rejected a transition that installed former federal parliamentary speaker Sheikh Aden Mohamed Nur Madobe. When Laftagareen resumed his armed challenge, Mogadishu accused his fighters of operating alongside Al Qaeda-linked Al-Shabaab. His camp denied it and accused Turkish F-16s of striking its positions. While there have been fight jets over Baidoa, Turkey denies conducted the alleged strikes.
Insurgents controlling roads around these towns can isolate garrisons, tax trade, and intimidate communities without occupying every district headquarters.
What is clear, however, is that there were close to 80 skirmishes between federal and opposition forces in the South West State’s Bay region and an almost equal number of separate Al-Shabaab attacks. What this suggests is less that opposition forces work with Al-Shabaab and more that Mogadishu is focused more on its opposition even as Al-Shabaab remains active. On October 13, Somalia’s counterterrorism-financing committee placed Laftagareen and nine others on a financial sanctions list over suspected Al-Shabaab links, freezing their assets, but its announcement did not disclose evidence.
Farther north, Al-Shabaab recovered territory the federal government once celebrated as liberated, Hiiraan and Middle Shabelle from Hirshabelle, a federal member state along agricultural and transport routes north of Mogadishu. By March 2026, Al-Shabaab controlled strategic towns and localities, including Adan Yabaal, Hawadley, El Baraf, Fidow and Nur Dugle. In neighboring Hiiraan, it retook Mahas and Moqokori. Insurgents controlling roads around these towns can isolate garrisons, tax trade, and intimidate communities without occupying every district headquarters. In many ways, it is a replay of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. For civilians, the cost is immediate: renewed displacement, disrupted markets, and the fear of retaliation for having cooperated with government forces.
The government’s retreat has continued this month. In 2022, Xawaadle [Hawadle] fighters helped organize Macawisley. Farmers and shepherds joined the federal Somali National Army against jihadist extortion. Their bargain was straightforward: Help retake your village, and the government will help hold it. In the first week of October, however, some Xawaadle elders reportedly reached an understanding with Al-Shabaab restricting operations of the clan-based Macawisley militia—basically central Somalia’s equivalent of national guards—in their communities. Even if there was no consensus over such a move, the fact that traditional elders considered it should alarm security analysts. Then, on October 9, fighting erupted around Hees in Hiiraan. Local reports said Al-Shabaab seized the town after federal troops withdrew, although whether they were able to hold the town is unclear.
Rather than seeing support for the state, communities facing government offensives may see a foreign ally choosing sides while the insurgency regains ground.
As unrest spreads toward Baidoa, Somalia’s third largest city, Turkey may soon find itself sucked into direct combat. Turkey has invested heavily in Somalia’s security. Its trainers and equipment support the national army, and three Turkish F-16s flew over Mogadishu in April, confirming their deployment. Ankara also has interests in offshore petroleum exploration and plans for a coastal space launch facility. These investments explain Turkey’s interest in securing Somalia, but they do not establish that every opponent of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is a jihadist.
If Turkey uses aircraft against regional opposition without a substantiated counterterrorism justification, Ankara could alienate communities whose cooperation Somalia needs to defeat Al-Shabaab. Rather than seeing support for the state, communities facing government offensives may see a foreign ally choosing sides while the insurgency regains ground.
Washington has reasons to insist on the distinction, as the United Nations winds down logistical support for African Union peacekeepers. Another federal-state war would make counterterrorism coordination harder just as external support faces uncertainty and as the president’s delayed elections reduce his legitimacy. The United States should seek assurances that Turkish aircraft will not be used against Somali political opponents without independently substantiated counterterrorism grounds. American intelligence and military assistance must remain directed at Al-Shabaab, not Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s political rivals.
