On October 28, 2026, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed announced in Moscow that Ethiopia had received 12 Russian Su-35 fighter jets, with four S-400 air-defense batteries to follow, though subsequent reporting suggested Ethiopia received only the first two aircraft and the remaining delivery schedule is unclear. Even two fighters pose an awkward question for Washington.
In 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo warned Egypt that purchasing Su-35s from Russia could trigger sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Cairo eventually abandoned its plans. Seven years later, its principal rival acquires the same Russian fighter. Will Washington apply the same standard?
In 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo warned Egypt that purchasing Su-35s from Russia could trigger sanctions.
The announcement follows a year in which President Donald Trump repeatedly echoed Egypt’s grievances over Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. On January 16, 2026, Trump wrote to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, offering to revive American mediation. At the G7 summit in Évian, France, on June 17, Trump told Sisi publicly that Ethiopia had treated Egypt unfairly and described the Nile as getting emptier than it should be.
Does that mean Washington has chosen Egypt over Ethiopia? Not exactly. Trump’s public rhetoric has favored Cairo, but American institutions have continued engaging Addis Ababa. On August 21, Ethiopia’s government reported Pentagon consultations and an agreement to expand defense cooperation. While the Pentagon has not issued a similar release, it nevertheless suggests there is no uniform American policy against Ethiopia.
The distinction matters. Ethiopia regards the dam as an electricity project and an assertion of sovereignty. Egypt, heavily dependent on the Nile, fears shortages during prolonged droughts. Mediation aims to achieve agreement on rules for reservoir operations, reliable information sharing, and a way to settle disputes. A president who repeatedly endorses one party’s grievances makes that harder. Abiy’s purchase cannot be blamed on Trump alone; Ethiopia reportedly ordered six Su-35s in 2022.
Ethiopia’s immediate security environment is deteriorating. Renewed fighting in its northern regions and escalating tensions with Eritrea raise the stakes of any military procurement. On October 3, the State Department warned that another conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea could destabilize the wider Horn and jeopardize American cooperation with both countries. That warning offers a clearer picture of official U.S. priorities than presidential remarks alone.
For Moscow, the deal promises more than export revenue. Russia gains another defense relationship in a contested region. Ethiopia gains access to equipment that carries political consequences for countries seeking closer ties with Washington. The question is whether those consequences will be applied consistently.
CAATSA Section 231 provides for sanctions over significant transactions with specified elements of Russia’s defense or intelligence sectors, subject to legal conditions, exceptions, and waiver authorities. Pompeo invoked that framework against Egypt’s proposed purchase. Ethiopia’s transaction warrants an assessment under the same law. That does not mean sanctions are automatic, or that an identical outcome is legally required without examining the facts.
Washington faces two risks. Silence without explanation would make its earlier warning to Cairo look selective. A reflexive threat against Addis Ababa could strengthen Moscow’s position and further erode American credibility as a mediator. The answer is a transparent legal review, not an improvised diplomatic punishment.
The United States still has channels of influence. Ethiopia remains under a $3.4 billion International Monetary Fund arrangement. That program serves macroeconomic stabilization; it should not become a substitute for the statutory process governing Russian arms transactions. American security and diplomatic engagement should likewise remain open, particularly as tensions with Eritrea rise.
Egypt needs credible safeguards during droughts. Ethiopia needs recognition of its right to generate electricity and pursue development.
A consistent American approach would also distinguish the purchase from its delivery. Two aircraft displayed in Moscow do not establish the arrival of an operational squadron in Ethiopia. Nor do promised S-400 batteries establish an air-defense network already capable of protecting the dam. The more precise Washington is about what Russia has supplied, the more credible any sanctions determination will be. That discipline matters when regional governments are watching for signs of double standards and when Congress must judge whether the executive branch is applying the law consistently.
Trump should return to the substance of his January mediation offer. Egypt needs credible safeguards during droughts. Ethiopia needs recognition of its right to generate electricity and pursue development. Negotiated operating rules would protect both interests more effectively than an arms race along the Nile.
The Su-35s do not prove Ethiopia has abandoned Washington, but they do reveal the cost of ambiguity. America cannot invoke Russian-arms sanctions against Egypt and then decline to explain its treatment of Ethiopia. Nor can Trump expect Addis Ababa to trust his mediation while speaking as though Cairo’s claims are settled facts. If Washington does not embrace consistency and transparency in its approach, Moscow is waiting in the wings.
