Turkey is working to modernize and extend the historic Hejaz Railway as it seeks to transform this neglected Ottoman-era line into a tool for infrastructure diplomacy. Built in the early 20th century to connect Damascus with Medina, the railway fell into decline after World War I due to conflict, neglect, and new borders. Now, Ankara wants to restore critical segments through Syria and Jordan, eventually aiming to extend the route through Saudi Arabia to Oman. Turkish Transport and Infrastructure Minister Abdulkadir Uraloğlu has presented the project as more than just a heritage revival.
In June 2026, he stated that Turkey aims to modernize the railway and extend it to Oman as an alternative trade route to the Strait of Hormuz. This goal reflects Ankara’s ambition to place Turkey at the center of regional transit between Europe, the Levant, and the Persian Gulf. The first phase would reconnect Turkey to Aleppo and utilize existing rail networks in Syria and Jordan. Turkey has offered to help complete a missing segment of about 20 miles in Syria, while Jordan is prepared to support maintenance and operations.
Turkey is not just laying tracks; it is promoting a narrative in which Ankara serves as a vital connector.
Turkey, Syria, and Jordan advanced a memorandum of understanding in Amman in 2025, followed by additional transport agreements in 2026. Saudi Arabia has also joined discussions through feasibility studies for connections to its networks.
For Ankara, the railway fits into a familiar approach. Turkey uses transport infrastructure to turn geography into political power. A revived line would connect Turkish industry to Arab markets, boost north-south trade, and complement projects like the Middle Corridor. It would also support tourism and pilgrimage traffic by recalling the Ottoman-era connections to Medina. Turkey is not just laying tracks; it is promoting a narrative in which Ankara serves as a vital connector.
The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates that about one-fifth of global liquefied natural gas trade passed through the Strait of Hormuz in 2024. Meanwhile, oil flows through the Strait are crucial to global energy security. A functioning overland corridor from the Persian Gulf to Turkey and the Mediterranean could transport selected goods, petrochemicals, industrial inputs, containers, and non-urgent cargo. It also would offer Gulf Arab states an alternative route during disruptions in the Persian Gulf or the Red Sea.
A railway through Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Oman would diversify regional trade, but it would not replace the importance of maritime security since most Persian Gulf products flow eastward. The main markets for Persian Gulf oil and liquified natural gas are in Asia, particularly in countries China, India, Japan, and South Korea. Energy Information Administration data indicate that 83 percent of liquefied natural gas transported through Hormuz in 2024 went from Persian Gulf countries to Asian markets. This alone will limit the railway’s effectiveness as an alternative to Hormuz.
Nor can rail manage the scale, direction, or economics of Persian Gulf energy exports to Asia. Turkey’s claim that the Hejaz revival is an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz is an exaggeration.
Building trust among the Gulf Arab states presents another challenge. Turkey has improved relations with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other Gulf Arab states since the early 2020s through economic cooperation, defense partnerships, and shared goals for stability. Gulf Arab states may appreciate new routes that help diversify trade and reduce vulnerability to maritime disruptions, and Saudi involvement in feasibility discussions certainly suggests cautious interest.
Differing standards, customs processes, border checks, and security protocols could delay progress before the first freight train operates.
Yet, suspicion persists. Gulf Arab monarchies remember Ankara’s support for Muslim Brotherhood-related movements, its assertive actions in Syria and Libya, and its efforts to influence Arab politics. Neo-Ottoman rhetoric may alarm Arab capitals that view Turkey’s initiatives as ambition masked in nostalgia.
Practical challenges are substantial as well. Syria’s rail infrastructure suffered damage during the civil war. Rebuilding it requires funding, security, coordination, and political stability. Areas held by Kurds, Druze-majority regions, factional groups, and weak state institutions could disrupt operations. Jordan faces budget constraints and a vocal truckers’ union, and Saudi Arabia and Oman must align the project with their own transportation and port strategies.
Differing standards, customs processes, border checks, and security protocols could delay progress before the first freight train operates. Regional instability adds another complication. Israel will monitor any new Levant-Persian Gulf corridor. Iran and its allies may interpret the project as an effort to bypass their influence. Security issues in the Red Sea, Syrian fragmentation, and shifting Gulf Arab relationships could also impact the project’s feasibility.
A route marketed as a solution to a chokepoint may simply convert maritime risks into land-based political ones. The project’s true value lies not in replacing Hormuz but in broadening options. If carried out carefully, it could enhance trade, support Syria’s rebuilding, strengthen Turkey-Jordan-Gulf ties, and provide Ankara with a platform for middle-power diplomacy. However, the corridor can succeed only if Ankara resists the urge to oversell it.
