The Promise and Perils of Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea Port of Yanbu

Yanbu May Relieve Immediate Pressure, but It Does Not Remove Geopolitical Risks for Saudi Arabia

The iconic control tower and harbor at the Port of Yanbu, Saudi Arabia.

The iconic control tower and harbor at the Port of Yanbu, Saudi Arabia.

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While cargo passage through the Strait of Hormuz is hampered, Saudi Arabia can benefit from the Red Sea port of Yanbu to export oil. The East-West Petroline pipeline allows Saudia Arabia to divert oil from fields in the Eastern Province to export through the Red Sea. However, Yanbu’s capacity remains limited, and its use means both higher shipping costs and congestion.

Aramco runs the 800-mile pipeline at a capacity of 7 million barrels per day, of which it exports 5 million barrels per day, and western refineries can process the remaining 2 million barrels.

When the war in Iran disrupted access to the Strait, Aramco ordered that buyers of Arab Light crude utilize Yanbu to allow exports to continue.

Prior to the 2026 disruption, Riyadh exported most of its crude through the Strait of Hormuz. In February 2026, the Kingdom exported 6.4 million barrels per day through the Strait and only 800,000 barrels per day via other routes. When the war in Iran disrupted access to the Strait, Aramco ordered that buyers of Arab Light crude utilize Yanbu to allow exports to continue.

For crude buyers, reliable delivery is as important as production. Aramco’s ability to change loading points allows the company to maintain buyer relationships and most of its contractual obligations.

In March 2026, Kpler estimated that bypass systems employed by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates could move a combined 7–8 million barrels per day, though this represents less than half the export volume that they previously sent through Hormuz. Even if Yanbu cannot completely replace the Persian Gulf port of Ras Tanura, it does allow the Kingdom to moderate price spikes and delay production shut-ins. Yanbu also can help European customers bypass the Houthi-threatened Bab el-Mandeb, leaving the stable Suez Canal as the only strategic chokepoint through which ships need pass.

Saudi officials now discuss expanding pipeline capacity by 1–2 million barrels per day. This would allow the country to offer access to neighboring states such as Kuwait or Bahrain who have no natural means to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. Aramco’s exports are not determined solely by the capacity of its pipeline. In addition, crude quality, western refinery demands, storage, shipping schedules, and berths all impact Yanbu’s utility. While there is discussion of a new pipeline to transport refined products, this idea remains in its infancy and is several years—and tens of billions of dollars—away.

Nor will Yanbu resolve the problem for Asian customers. Exports to Asia from Yanbu must either take a longer route around Africa or cross through the Bab el-Mandeb, both of which incur additional costs. Since March 2026, tanker rates from Yanbu have more than doubled, with some tanker owners choosing the longer route despite greater fuel and insurance expenses and an extended average time for each run, making that ship unavailable for other cargo.

Tankers heading to Asia must pass the Bab el-Mandeb and Yemen, areas at risk from Houthi attacks against commercial shipping.

Yanbu may relieve immediate pressure, but it does not remove geopolitical risks for Saudi Arabia. The port facilities are lit up like a Christmas tree against the backdrop of the desert at night, and should terrorists divert a plane from the civilian traffic corridor to crash into the port, Saudi air defense would have only moments to decide whether to down the plane. Tankers heading to Asia must pass the Bab el-Mandeb and Yemen, areas at risk from Houthi attacks against commercial shipping; in July 2026, the Houthis announced a blockade against Saudi ships.

Even if no suicide attacks occur, the distance between Yanbu and Port Sudan is only 312 miles. Sudanese Armed Forces commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan reportedly has allowed the Houthis to launch attacks on shipping from dhows operating out of Port Sudan. Although Burhan also cultivates Saudi ties, risks of ship-launched drone attacks remain. The Petroline itself also poses as a fixed target traversing Saudi territory.

With the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Houthis both threatening international shipping, there are no magic remedies. Yanbu helps to diversify the risk, but it will not alone resolve the problem.

Umud Shokri is a Washington, D.C.-based energy strategist and foreign policy advisor with more than two decades of experience in energy security, climate policy, and global energy transitions.
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