On May 19, 2026, the House Armed Services Committee will hold a hearing on “U.S. Military Posture and National Security Challenges in the Greater Middle East and Africa,” featuring the assistant secretary of Defense and the commanders of both U.S. Central Command and U.S. Africa Command.
Each will likely defend the current footprint of U.S. bases, despite recent difficulties such as Iranian missile and drone attacks on U.S. bases or facilities in Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, and British and Spanish refusals to allow the U.S. military to utilize airfields and bases in the United Kingdom, Spain, and the British Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus.
Spain sold dual-use military technology to Tehran to support Iran’s drone program as the Iranian leadership was targeting the United States and Israel.
Sometimes, host country behavior offsets the strategic utility of the U.S. basing presence. Both Qatar and Turkey, for example, have long used their host status as “Get Out of Jail Free Cards” to escape accountability for their terror sponsorship. Spain’s socialist Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, on the other hand, restricted U.S. operations at Naval Station Rota to express his animosity toward President Donald Trump and his sympathy to Iran. Sánchez’s desire to protect the Islamic Republic went deeper, however. Under his tenure, Spain sold dual-use military technology to Tehran to support Iran’s drone program as the Iranian leadership was targeting the United States and Israel.
Trump should not forgive Spain. In Congress, key staff members on the House Armed Services Committee have sought to downplay momentum to abandon Rota, arguing that the base is both essential and irreplaceable.
They are only half right. Rota is important. Personnel and equipment use the airfield to transfer on and off aircraft carriers and other ships about to pass through the Strait of Gibraltar. With Lajes Field mothballed and Souda Bay, Crete, located 1,750 miles further east, Rota represents an essential node in U.S. logistics.
There is, however, an alternative: Gibraltar, a British territory just 65 miles away. Like Rota, Gibraltar has a deep-water harbor and an airfield. Indeed, the British Navy uses Gibraltar regularly. Spain’s animosity toward the British presence in Gibraltar—hypocritical given Spain’s colonization of Ceuta and Melilla on the Moroccan coast—creates dysfunction in Rota, which prohibits British citizens inside the base. Given that some U.S. ships host British navigators and even commodores, an alternative to Rota would ease operations.
As the British navy scales back operations—the future of its two aircraft carriers is increasingly uncertain—a lease on Gibraltar’s British base might be symbiotic and a much better match for U.S. military and diplomatic needs than Rota. The same holds true for the Sovereign Base Areas on Cyprus.
There would be precedent for a withdrawal from Rota. In 1991, after years of diplomatic difficulties with the Philippines and Manila’s unwieldy demands, the U.S. Air Force used the eruption of Mount Pinatubo as an excuse to cut off lease renewal negotiations and end the American military’s 84-year presence at the facility. Only when the U.S. military departed did Manila recognize that they had overplayed their hand and try to reverse the U.S. decision. The following year, the U.S. Navy ended its 94-year presence at Subic Bay.
That Spain despises the British presence in Gibraltar would simply be the icing on the cake should the United States reinforce Gibraltar.
The withdrawal from the Philippines did not mean forfeiting capacity; instead, the United States negotiated an agreement with Singapore to use Changi Naval Base, and relocated other assets to Guam, Japan, or Korea.
Rota is a small town, across the bay from Cadiz. While there is some local Spanish tourism and vacation rentals, much of the economy relies on the U.S. presence. By relocating to Gibraltar, the United States could remind small state politicians more committed to ideological virtue signaling than serious defense that hosting U.S. forces is a privilege rather than leverage for their own diplomatic fantasies. The Philippines’ loss became a gain to more solid U.S. allies.
That Spain despises the British presence in Gibraltar would simply be the icing on the cake should the United States reinforce Gibraltar.
As Spain becomes more a diplomatic adversary and openly seeks to profit from the murder of Americans, Trump would be right to set an example lest other European countries seek to follow Madrid’s lead. Not only should Trump define Melilla and Ceuta as occupied Moroccan territory, but he should also relocate U.S. assets from Rota to Gibraltar and instruct the Pentagon to stop prostrating to Spain and instead stand up for broader precedents and strategic standing.
