Too many diplomats repeat the mantra that Yemeni unity is a virtue, but repetition does not substitute for reality. Yemeni unity is no more a natural order than unity across the Gulf Cooperation Council states or in the Levant. North Yemen claims to South Yemen are analogous to Syria’s ambition to control Lebanon. Both North Yemen and Syria have a roughly four-to-one population advantage, respectively, over South Yemen and Lebanon. Both North Yemen and Syria also have considerably more conservative cultures than South Yemen and Lebanon. Indeed, both South Yemen and Lebanon have more progressive and cosmopolitan cultures than their neighbors, the ambitions of Iranian-backed militias notwithstanding.
Yemeni unity is no more a natural order than unity across the Gulf Cooperation Council states or in the Levant.
Just as Lebanon’s independence is right and just, so too is South Yemen’s. The unity experiment failed because northern politicians were too provincial and shortsighted in their approach. President Ali Abdullah Saleh, for example, used his multi-decade tenure to strangle the more established Port of Aden and instead to promote the Port of Hodeida in its place, not because Hodeida made more economic sense, but rather out of a northern supremacist desire to undermine and undercut any southern progress.
No outsider to Yemen should underestimate culture. Tribalism exists in both north and south, but decades of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, a nominally Marxist entity, de-emphasized tribal identity. Today, South Yemenis are aware of their tribes, but they embrace them more as good-natured rivalry than an identity to dominate life. The Marxist authorities’ promotion of women’s rights and compulsory education also imbued southern Yemen with a more progressive, modern outlook. The collapse of the Communist regime ended the self-imposed isolation that prevented further modernization.
Across the region, the forces of globalization permeate from the coast to the interior. Beirut is more progressive than Damascus; Alexandria is more worldly than Cairo, let alone Asyut; Jeddah is more cosmopolitan than Riyadh; and Basra is more laid back than Baghdad. The difference between Aden and Sana’a is exponentially more pronounced, largely due to the long influence of the imamate on Sana’a and the interior of Yemen.
Across the region—even in neighboring Oman—there is a growing recognition that Yemeni unity is a fantasy.
While Iranians use the Houthis as a vessel to assert their influence in Yemen, the Houthis are only the latest manifestation of a Zaydi religious order that dates back centuries, if not more than a millennium, in Yemen and are not simply a movement that Yemenis can easily reverse. Neither the Houthis nor the Imamate have support across the South. While the State Department and British Foreign Office repeat the mantra that a unified Yemen is the best way to counter Iranian inroads, the opposite is true: Southern independence would effectively quarantine and contain Iranian influence.
Under such circumstances, rather than try to combine oil and water, the international community might instead calibrate its policy to reality. If Southern Yemenis want their independence, they should have the opportunity for a plebiscite or referendum, much like Bahrainis enjoyed in 1970, when the small island and former Persian province confirmed its popular desire to be independent. South Sudan likewise won its independence after a referendum,
Across the region—even in neighboring Oman—there is a growing recognition that Yemeni unity is a fantasy. Instead of instating on unity, neighboring states instead say they seek only consensus. Under such circumstances, a United Nations-organized referendum can advance security and stability far more than an empty mantra of unity.
Northern Yemenis should not dictate to the south when they do not have their own house in order. If South Yemenis wish to return to the original idea of a Federation of South Arabia, then they should have the right to vote to do so under international supervision.
