Since military confrontation between the United States and Iran erupted on February 28, 2026, hostilities have extended beyond the Persian Gulf and now reach Yemen’s Tihama coast along the Bab el-Mandeb. Houthi militia intensify attacks on positions held by the Tihama Resistance, loyal to Yemen’s internationally recognized government. Their assaults target points along the coastal strip, including Jabal Ras, a key highland that provides the Houthis with a commanding view of the surrounding roads leading south to Al-Khokha, Al-Mukha, and the Strait itself.
The Bab el-Mandeb is a vital chokepoint connecting the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, serving as the southern maritime entrance to the Suez Canal. Approximately 10–12 percent of global maritime trade passes through the Bab el-Mandeb, including a significant portion of Persian Gulf oil shipments to Europe. Any disruption has immediate international implications, potentially affecting energy markets, shipping costs, and global trade.
Any disruption has immediate international implications, potentially affecting energy markets, shipping costs, and global trade.
While clashes between the Houthis and Tihama Resistance forces occur on a near-daily basis, the attacks on the morning of Eid al-Fitr marked an escalation. The Houthis fortified their positions on the highlands, particularly around Jabal Ras, and deployed missile and drone platforms, granting them enhanced observation and strike capabilities over key coastal routes.
South of these positions lies Al-Khokha, a hub for government-aligned forces. From Al-Khokha, the coastal road continues south toward Al-Mukha and the Bab el-Mandeb, forming the backbone of military deployment along the Tihama coast. Additionally, Hays District, under the control of the Tihama Resistance, sits along the frontlines. While it does not directly overlook the Strait, it is essential: Any compromise here could enable Houthi forces to approach Al-Mukha more easily, threatening the Bab el-Mandeb corridor. This makes Hays a barometer of the conflict’s trajectory along the Tihama coast.
The military escalation coincided with high-profile political signaling. Iranian officials threatened the potential closure of Bab el-Mandeb, demonstrating that Tehran uses the Houthis as part of Iran’s broader strategy. Hours later, the Houthi-controlled Yemeni Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement warning against the introduction of any foreign forces into the region, or the expansion of military operations. The statement asserted that the Houthis would not allow escalation against Iran, and that any Arab intervention “would face appropriate measures,” adding that countries attempting to secure the Strait of Hormuz “would be the first losers in this battle.” The alignment of Houthi and Islamic Republic messaging underscores that escalation along the Tihama coast is part of a coordinated political-military strategy, not merely a local tactical maneuver.
Historically, the Houthis’ approach to the Bab el-Mandeb region has been cautious. During Operation Prosperity Guardian by the U.S. and its partners in early 2024, aimed at protecting shipping after attacks on commercial vessels, the Houthis restricted their operations to missile and drone strikes over water. They avoided advancing toward liberated areas along the Tihama coast or the Bab el-Mandeb itself, maintaining control over only a small portion of the coastal strip and nearby islands.
Today, the situation has shifted. The Houthis demonstrate interest in land-based control close to the Strait, bolstering positions along the highlands, installing launch platforms, and applying pressure on coastal routes—signaling a tactical evolution with broader regional implications.
Control of elevated positions allows Houthi forces to deploy missiles and drones against shipping, complicating the protection of this vital maritime passage.
The Houthis’ military calculations rely on an assumption that Saudi Arabia, which leads the Coalition to Support Legitimacy, will refrain from providing air support to government forces along the Tihama coast. The Houthis would interpret any such support as direct involvement in the ongoing regional conflict. This strategic calculus encourages the Houthis to achieve territorial gains before any Iranian directives expand the Middle East confrontation, leveraging the coastal highlands and fortified positions to maximize their operational reach.
Any shift in the Tihama frontlines, especially near Jabal Ras or along the routes to Al-Khokha and Al-Mukha, could have immediate repercussions on navigation through Bab el-Mandeb. Control of elevated positions allows Houthi forces to deploy missiles and drones against shipping, complicating the protection of this vital maritime passage, with potential consequences for global trade and energy prices.
The Tihama Resistance and government-aligned forces remain the primary barrier preventing a full Houthi breakthrough. Their resilience along the frontlines near Jabal Ras and Hays so far has prevented Iran’s verbal threats to close the Strait from materializing, maintaining a critical balance in the region and thwarting attempts to dominate the maritime chokepoint. However, the Houthis and their Iranian backers now appear set on changing the status quo with implications for international shipping, energy security, and broader geopolitical calculations.
In this context, the Tihama Resistance and government forces remain the last effective bulwark against any Houthi advance toward Bab el-Mandeb. Their endurance, combined with international support and regional political dynamics, will determine whether the Strait remains navigable or falls under the shadow of Houthi-Iranian strategic maneuvering.
