Between July 19 and 25, 2026, Bangladesh Army Chief General Waker-Uz-Zaman staged an official visit to Turkey, during which he met with Turkish Defense Minister Yaşar Güler and Chief of the Turkish General Staff Selçuk Bayraktaroğlu. He also visited Turkish defense industry facilities, including the MKE Gazi Ammunition Factory, to gain firsthand knowledge of the country’s defense capabilities, military technology, and defense production. Discussions focused on strengthening bilateral defense, military industrial and intelligence cooperation, as well as technology transfer, drone acquisition, small arms co-production, and electronic warfare systems.
Erdoğan hopes to cement an Islamic bloc to counter New Delhi, especially as India makes inroads into the Eastern Mediterranean.
Significantly, Waker’s visit came just a few days after Pakistan’s Army Chief Asim Munir visited Turkey. Such back-to-back visits suggest a trilateral alignment taking shape between Pakistan, Turkey, and Bangladesh.
Turkey has a longstanding strategic relationship with Pakistan, reflected in defense, security, and intelligence cooperation, as well as ideological solidarity. For Turkey, Bangladesh has become important for its outreach and influence under its Asia Anew Initiative, advancing President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ambition of pursuing Islamic leadership. Erdoğan hopes to cement an Islamic bloc to counter New Delhi, especially as India makes inroads into the Eastern Mediterranean. A strong foothold in Bangladesh also gives Turkey a strategic presence on the Bay of Bengal, extending its reach from the Black Sea to the Indian Ocean.
Over the past several years, Bangladesh has strengthened defense ties with Turkey through acquisitions of Turkish military hardware, including artillery guns, artillery ammunition and shells, small arms, and Bayraktar unmanned aerial vehicles. In 2019, for example, the Turkish company Roketsan sold multiple TRG-300 Kaplan medium-range rocket systems to Bangladesh. While Dhaka signed an agreement with Ankara in 2022 to purchase Bayraktar drones, the two countries now appear ready to take the relationship further with the establishment of a Turkish-built drone factory in Greater Bogura, close to India’s northeastern border and the strategic Siliguri Corridor.
On June 6, 2026, both countries moved to institutionalize those ties with the launch of a joint ministerial-level mechanism on defense and foreign affairs. The two sides have concluded defense deals for Bangladesh to purchase the SIPER air defense missile system and will soon likely finalize an agreement for Bangladesh to acquire Otokar Tulpar light tanks. Turkey and Bangladesh also plan defense industrial complexes in Chattogram and Narayanganj for localized weapons manufacturing, and Turkish shipbuilders plan to begin work at the Khulna Shipyard.
Beyond defense cooperation, there is ideological convergence among these countries in terms of political Islam. Reports suggest that Turkish-affiliated non-governmental organizations and civil society organizations—such as the Turkish Youth Foundation (TÜGVA) and the İHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation—have expanded their activities in Bangladesh through student scholarships, ideological leadership programs, and religious outreach.
China’s cultivation of ties with Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Turkey could augment the threat the bloc poses even further.
Indian authorities have flagged concerns over ideological narratives linked to Turkey’s outreach, including the activities of groups like Saltanat-e-Bangla, which advocates a vision of a “Greater Bangladesh” encompassing parts of India’s northeast and Myanmar. In July 2025, Members of the group displayed a map encompassing parts of India’s northeastern states and West Bengal during an exhibition at Dhaka University.
While China does not support overt Islamism and, indeed, commits genocide against Uyghur Muslims at home, China’s cultivation of ties with Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Turkey could augment the threat the bloc poses even further. While such an arrangement may not take the form of a formal military alliance, convergence in defense cooperation, strategic interests, and geopolitical coordination suggests Turkey’s activities in South Asia deserve far greater policy attention.
