As the U.S. and Israel war with Iran erupted on February 28, 2026, the Houthis began escalating their position silently, following a calculated strategy. The group controls the majority of Yemen’s western Tihamah coast, including Kamaran Island and the surrounding islets, as well as the port of Al-Salif. Their positions extend along the coast near the frontline with government forces controlling Al-Mokha, Al-Khokha, and up to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Their strategy aims to wait for the right moment to engage in a way that makes a visible impact on public opinion and influences the course of the war, particularly by threatening maritime shipping lanes and energy sources to apply economic and political pressure without direct confrontation with major powers.
What distinguishes the current phase is that preparations are no longer confined to closed military environments—they are partially visible to the public, signaling their seriousness.
The Houthis do not behave as a hesitant actor, but rather, as a calculated force, ready to act but keeping their cards close to their chest. What distinguishes the current phase is that preparations are no longer confined to closed military environments—they are partially visible to the public, signaling their seriousness. In Houthi-controlled areas, particularly in Sanaa and along the western Tihamah coast, tangible indicators of a silent state of emergency have appeared, including heightened hospital readiness, civil defense drills, and the preparation of government facilities as potential shelters, alongside organized public demonstrations reflecting both societal and organizational mobilization.
Militarily, the Houthis have redistributed capabilities to ensure continuity and minimize losses in case they weather a first strike. They have moved missile and drone launchers to fortified mountainous areas, especially in the mountain ranges overlooking the Red Sea in Al-Hudaydah and Hajjah, including the districts of Al-Luhayyah and Al-Zahra, as well as coastal rear elevations. These highlands give the Houthis visibility over the Red Sea to facilitate reconnaissance and targeting, while simultaneously providing protection against airstrikes, allowing launch platforms to relocate quickly. They have also deployed capabilities to unconventional sites not previously used, with minimal reliance on digital communications to avoid exposure, reflecting awareness of targeting risks.
After the decapitation of the Islamic Republic, the Houthis have isolated executive and operational leaders, minimizing their public exposure and movements. In parallel, they have built a multi-layered command structure, consisting of three tiers, distributing decision-making among senior strategic leadership, mid-level operational command, and semi-independent field cells, ensuring continuity and preventing rapid systemic collapse.
The Houthis do not limit their focus to external action; they also have launched internal operations to reinforce positions in Marib and Taiz.
At sea, the Houthis have concentrated readiness in the port of Al-Salif, Kamaran Island, and the surrounding islets, in addition to deployment along the western Tihamah coast near the frontline with government forces. In addition to more traditional mines, the group is developing unconventional capabilities, including low-cost suicide drones, unmanned maritime vehicles akin to small torpedoes, and adopting the concept of intensive, synchronized attacks relying on numerical saturation more than precision. The objective is not full control of the Red Sea, but disruption of shipping, increased maritime insurance rates, and economic pressure on international actors, granting the Houthis strategic influence. The Houthis do not limit their focus to external action; they also have launched internal operations to reinforce positions in Marib and Taiz.
Nevertheless, there are limitations to Houthi capabilities. They do not control the Bab el-Mandeb or international shipping lanes and lack advanced air cover or defenses, making any direct confrontation with the U.S. Navy risky.
The most likely scenario for Houthi engagement will be limited and intermittent escalation, focusing on targeting vessels passing through maritime corridors while seeking to avoid direct confrontation with major powers. This could involve repeated strikes on shipping lanes using low-cost boats and unmanned maritime vehicles. A broader escalation targeting strategic land or naval assets is less probable.
