Conflicts over control of Mecca and Medina predate the modern Saudi state. Ottoman and subsequent Hashemite governments dominated the Hajj during the early 20th century. When the Saudis took control in 1925, they asserted political and religious authority over the sacred sites. Over time, other countries challenged Saudi authority over administration of the Hajj and the Islamic holy sites. Iran, especially after its 1979 revolution, often complained of Saudi trusteeship. Tehran cited abuse or deaths of Iranian pilgrims, including during the 1987 Mecca stampede, as evidence of Saudi mismanagement and sectarian prejudice. Iran’s insistence on an “Islamic committee” to manage Hajj logistics was part of a broader criticism of Wahhabi exclusionary theology.
Turkey, particularly under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, also has challenged Saudi hegemony on the basis of traditional Ottoman legacy. Pan-Islamist thinkers and liberal-minded scholars from South Asia and North Africa further presented an argument that the Hajj as an international Muslim obligation must have more extensive stewardship. Critics proposed an international Islamic council or rotating stewardship that would better represent the diversity of the Muslim umma.
Saudi Arabia identifies custodianship of the holy sites as core to its legitimacy.
Saudi Arabia identifies custodianship of the holy sites as core to its legitimacy. The monarchy refers to itself as the “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques,” a designation that serves to enhance its religious legitimacy across borders. Any attempt to water down such a mission would undermine the ideological underpinning of the Saudi state. Riyadh also utilizes Hajj diplomacy to construct bilateral relationships, assign pilgrimage quotas, and help control sectarian balances.
The Saudi authorities consider criticism of its custodianship to be a threat to national sovereignty. Following Iran’s demand for internationalization in 2016, Saudi officials charged Tehran with politicizing the Hajj. The Saudi foreign ministry said it can better assure pilgrim safety and coordinate logistics than can any other system. Riyadh also perceives internationalization proposals as attempts by other states or proponents of other ideologies to grab power, especially those motivated by Shi’i clerical authorities in Iran or harboring neo-Ottoman ambitions from Ankara.
An internationalized Hajj would disturb the current Sunni hegemony religious status quo. If such an Islamic council of rotating representation governed the pilgrimage, it would leave space for Shi’i, Ibadi, and other Muslim communities to contribute to ritual, logistics, and interpretation. It might disturb the current hegemony of Saudi-supported clerical networks in world Islamic discussion.
Internationalization also would reduce the influence of Saudi Wahhabi norms on governance of Hajj. For example, gender segregation issues, dress, and calendars of rituals could diversify. These changes might initiate theological strife, especially among conservative Sunni thinkers viewing Saudi rituals as normative.
The Jeddah office of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) would face fresh pressure. An empowered international Hajj council could then bypass or even replace the OIC as the central platform for Islamic solidarity. Iran, Malaysia, and Turkey have already accused the OIC of prioritizing Saudi interests. The new Hajj authority would reorient multilateral Islamic institutions and break Saudi hegemony within the Muslim world.
Such a transformation also would affect intra-Muslim geopolitics. Pakistan walks the tightrope between Riyadh and Tehran; an internationalized Hajj could lead Islamabad to assume religious governance stances on which it now avoids having a position. Smaller Muslim-majority states would welcome increased involvement in decision-making over pilgrimage but dread logistics meltdown in the absence of a central authority.
As yet, no viable state-sponsored movement has emerged to establish an alternative administration framework.
Even after repeated criticism, Saudi Arabia retains the reins of the Hajj. As yet, no viable state-sponsored movement has emerged to establish an alternative administration framework. The scale of the pilgrimage logistics, with millions of pilgrims, also makes experimentation difficult. But events such as the 2015 Mina stampede that claimed more than 2,000 pilgrims’ lives and the politicization of pilgrim visas keep dissatisfaction simmering.
Several Islamic scholars and civil society organizations now aim less at expelling Saudi authority and more at expanding transparency and accountability. They call for improved crowd management, transparent incident reporting, and representative clerical supervision instead of outright delegation of power. Nevertheless, internationalization remains a symbolic counter to Saudi religious and geostrategic claims.
Internationalizing the Hajj is called for, but it represents deeper tensions in the Muslim world—between sect, state, and conceptions of religious authority. There is no mechanism in place to make such a change yet, but the debate signals widespread unhappiness with one state controlling a ritual shared by all Muslims. Saudi Arabia meanwhile remains opposed to change, not just to maintaining logistics but to guarding a legitimacy framework that connects its monarchy to Islam’s most sacred places.
