On December 2, 2025, Turkey signed hydrocarbon exploration agreements through its state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) with six Pakistani energy firms. The announcement came with almost no political theater, but the implications run deeper than a routine commercial transaction. Ankara is not simply investing in energy; it is weaving itself into Pakistan’s strategic landscape and edging further away from the Western-centric posture it claims.
Pakistan’s energy situation gives Turkey an ideal opening. Years of shrinking domestic gas reserves and rising demand have pushed the country into chronic shortages. Blackouts, ballooning import bills, and heavy reliance on costly liquified natural gas shipments pressure both the economy and the public. TPAO offers Islamabad exploration capacity and technical expertise that Pakistan lacks. This help carries weight, because Pakistan has few partners willing to take on offshore exploration with uncertain returns.
Ankara wants to diversify energy access, reduce vulnerability to traditional suppliers, and expand the footprint of its state-backed energy companies.
Turkey, for its part, uses this moment to advance a broader strategy. Ankara wants to diversify energy access, reduce vulnerability to traditional suppliers, and expand the footprint of its state-backed energy companies. TPAO already conducts aggressive exploration in the Mediterranean and Black Sea. Pakistan gives it an opening in South Asia, where Ankara can operate outside the diplomatic constraints and expectations it faces in Western arenas.
The deal also reinforces an already tight political relationship. Turkey and Pakistan cooperate on military training, defense manufacturing, and diplomatic messaging on issues like Kashmir and Cyprus. Adding energy to this list strengthens a partnership that consistently moves outside Western frameworks. If the exploration succeeds, Pakistan could reduce its dependence on expensive imports. Turkey would gain influence over a critical part of Pakistan’s economic security and embed itself in the country’s long-term planning. Even if the exploration underperforms, the political message remains the same: Both governments treat each other as priority partners.
The secrecy surrounding the agreement raises important public concerns. Officials released almost no information about financial terms, environmental safeguards, or profit-sharing structures. In transparent energy markets, states usually disclose basics, so citizens understand the commitments being made in their name. Here, neither government offered clarity. That silence invites doubts. Pakistanis wonder whether the terms protect national interests or tilt toward foreign actors. Such concerns stem from past resource deals that enriched political elites while leaving energy shortages untouched. Without transparency, the public cannot judge whether this new partnership will help or hurt the country.
For Western policymakers, the deal signals something larger than energy diplomacy. Turkey continues to present itself as a bridge between regions, a NATO ally, and a state aligned with Western institutions. Yet its actual behavior suggests a steady pivot toward alternative alliances that offer freedom from Western oversight and conditions. Engaging Pakistan at this level—military, economic, and now energy—demonstrates how Ankara cultivates strategic options outside the West while maintaining formal ties to it. This approach complicates long-held assumptions about Turkey’s place in regional security networks.
If drilling yields results, discussions may expand to pipelines, liquified natural gas partnerships, or joint infrastructure projects.
Energy exploration rarely remains confined to geology. Once a company establishes operational presence, cooperation tends to spill into infrastructure, logistics, and long-term planning. If drilling yields results, discussions may expand to pipelines, liquified natural gas partnerships, or joint infrastructure projects. That kind of integration would tie Pakistan even more closely to Turkey and give Ankara a long-term role in shaping South Asia’s energy landscape. It would also give Turkey leverage in a region where major powers compete for influence and access.
For ordinary Pakistanis, the stakes remain straightforward. A successful exploration campaign could ease shortages, lower costs, and stabilize industries. A failed or poorly structured deal could leave citizens with the same problems while foreign and domestic elites collect profits. The lack of transparency amplifies that risk. Good governance in energy requires clear contracts and public accountability, neither of which these agreements currently offer.
Turkey’s quiet entry into Pakistan’s hydrocarbon sector marks a strategic shift, rather than a technical one. By using energy diplomacy to deepen ties with Islamabad, Ankara strengthens a partnership that stretches across military, cultural, and now economic dimensions. The move shows how Turkey positions itself within an emerging network of non-Western alliances, even as it maintains the appearance of Western alignment. Policymakers who overlook this trend may misread Turkey’s intentions and underestimate the long-term geopolitical consequences of its expanding presence in South Asia.
