As controversy continues over the preliminary agreement reached between Washington and Tehran, a warning from the conservative daily Jomhouri-ye Eslami in Tehran stands out. The newspaper, which has long criticized the growing influence of hardline factions without directly challenging the country’s leadership, argued in a June 16, 2026, editorial that the public no longer has patience for political extremism and factional infighting. It warned that there is little place for radicals in what it called a “new Iran.”
“Most Iranians reject the record of the country’s political factions and are deeply dissatisfied with the excesses of recent decades. People are well aware of their corruption … and they are determined that once the turmoil of the imposed war has passed, these groups too will face accountability,” the newspaper wrote.
“Most Iranians reject the record of the country’s political factions and are deeply dissatisfied with the excesses of recent decades.”
The editorial is not a fundamental challenge to the Islamic Republic’s political order. Nevertheless, it reflects growing unease within parts of the establishment as debate intensifies over the costs of a confrontational foreign policy and the country’s future direction. For more than two decades, Iran’s political system evolved under Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei toward greater dominance by ideological factions whose influence expanded across parliament and other institutions. The newspaper’s criticism suggests that some establishment figures are beginning to question whether that model remains capable of addressing the economic, social, and strategic challenges confronting the country after the recent conflict.
Overall, establishment figures continue to pay homage to Khamenei’s confrontational worldview, particularly his more recent doctrine that “there will be no negotiations and no war.” The premise was that the Islamic Republic could advance its nuclear program, expand its regional influence, and challenge its adversaries without provoking a direct conventional military response. The events of 2026 shattered that assumption.
The political system Khamenei built no longer has its central pillar. Whatever reverence officials still express toward his legacy, the reality is that Khamenei is gone and the internal balance of power is contested among the surviving factions of the regime. For the moment, Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf and his allies in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps appear to dominate. Yet there is no longer a clear center of gravity comparable to the Bayt—the supreme leader’s political court and decision-making hub—whose Tehran headquarters Israel and the United States flattened on February 28, 2026. In that sense, the debate now unfolding inside the establishment is taking place in a political system that has lost the figure around whom it was organized for more than three decades.
The reality is that [Ali] Khamenei is gone and the internal balance of power is contested among the surviving factions of the regime.
His son, Mojtaba Khamenei, was formally elevated to succeed him, but his prolonged absence from public view has fueled persistent speculation about both his condition and his authority. Since February 28, he has not appeared publicly or delivered a verified speech or message. Iranian officials insist he remains in control and cite security concerns, but observers question whether he is physically capable of exercising power and some even doubt whether he is still alive. Whatever the explanation, there is little visible evidence that he commands the system in the way his father did for more than three decades.
Whether Ghalibaf and his allies are prepared to pursue a meaningful ideological shift in the country’s direction remains far from clear.
Khorasan, a newspaper close to Ghalibaf, suggested that the agreement is tactical respite, rather than a permanent resolution of tensions. The deal, the paper argued, would allow the Islamic Republic to “catch its breath, rebuild its offensive and defensive military capabilities, and prepare for a future large-scale confrontation,” reflecting a view that negotiations can serve as a means of recovery and strategic preparation rather than reconciliation.
A meaningful shift in policy would have both international and domestic dimensions. It would mean moving beyond nearly five decades of confrontation with the United States and Israel, while also allowing greater political and social freedoms, stronger legal institutions, and meaningful accountability at home. Such a transformation appears as distant as ever. Even critics within the establishment, including Jomhouri-ye Eslami, advocate for reform within the existing system, rather than a fundamental reconsideration of the political order that produced the country’s current crises.
