The Choice About Iraq’s Future Rests with Judge Faiq Zaidan

Since 2018, No Prime Ministerial Candidate Has Moved Forward Without His Consultation, Approval, or Intervention

On January 08, 2026, Iraqi merchants and citizens in Basra protest against a 30 percent increase in customs duties and new import taxes that have caused market stagnation and high prices.

On January 08, 2026, Iraqi merchants and citizens in Basra protest against a 30 percent increase in customs duties and new import taxes that have caused market stagnation and high prices.

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On March 17, 2003, George W. Bush gave Saddam Hussein and his sons forty-eight hours to leave Iraq to avoid war. Saddam refused. The invasion began.

Today, after U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and Special Envoy Tom Barrack’s April 19, 2026, visit to Faiq Zaidan, president of the Federal Court of Cassation in Baghdad, the judge faces a choice as momentous. The difference is that, this time, the message is not about leaving power but about its direction. Iraq no longer can afford wasted time or another round of recycling the formulas that brought it to this level of fragility.

Barrack placed his weight behind Zaidan, just as Iranian Qods Force chief Esmail Qaani did before him, and each left the man facing a clear test. The American wants a prime minister who changes course. The Iranian wants a prime minister who keeps the course unchanged. What Zaidan chooses will not only determine the name of the next prime minister, but also the shape of the next phase.

What Zaidan chooses will not only determine the name of the next prime minister, but also the shape of the next phase.

The first results of that test appeared in the U.S. sanctions imposed two days later, confirming that external messages are not rhetorical but real. Zaidan is not the head of state, but for years he has been the most influential man confirming power. Since 2018, no prime ministerial candidate has moved forward without his consultation, approval, or intervention.

That is not only because of his formal position as head of the Supreme Judicial Council, but also because of the political role he has accumulated inside the system, making him one of the central brokers in moments of producing or reshaping power.

Zaidan comes from a conservative military family and, as his neighbors describe him, was an avid reader with a sharp mind. He entered the judiciary during the Baath era alongside Medhat al-Mahmoud. The post-Saddam government later exempted both from de-Baathification in circumstances that remain unclear.

Zaidan followed Mahmoud’s coattails in his rise through the judiciary, a trajectory later reinforced by direct support from Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, culminating in Zaidan’s leadership of the Supreme Judicial Council and his current role as a kingmaker.

That influence grew inside a system built more on managing crises than resolving them, and more on preserving a fragile balance than building a stable state. Within that arrangement, Zaidan was not an outsider. He rose within it and helped sustain it. That makes the question unavoidable: How can Zaidan now be expected to confront, change, or limit the influence of forces that, directly or indirectly, helped entrench his place in the system?

Zaidan had the ability to alter many of the paths that brought Iraq to this point, but he did not. On the contrary, his position helped preserve the existing balance more than correct it. In cases involving the killing of protesters and political assassinations, the judiciary under his leadership did not show enough courage to impose accountability that could convince Iraqis the state could protect its citizens.

The issue is no longer simply who will occupy the premiership, but what kind of state will emerge from this moment.

Corruption cases, confessions, complaints, and public discussion of party economies remained more visible than a judicial track capable of changing the equation. With every case left incomplete or unresolved, the impression deepened that the system not only failed to deliver accountability but also had come to live with its absence as part of its own stability. The judiciary did not impose even a minimum separation between force of arms and electoral legitimacy.

With stalemate and declining public patience in the system, Zaidan no longer has much room to maneuver. The stage when he could postpone the decision or settle for managing the old balance likely has ended. The decisions he now makes will go beyond negotiations over the premiership.

The issue is no longer simply who will occupy the premiership, but what kind of state will emerge from this moment. Will Iraq remain governed by the same formula that has blurred the lines between armed power, politics, judicial influence, and external balancing? Or will there be an attempt to restore institutional boundaries and functions?

This moment may still offer Zaidan a chance to prove he can do more than manage the old balance. It is a defining moment in his own history and in Iraq’s, because it places in him direct responsibility to address economic and political dangers threatening the country.

The U.S. Treasury’s decision to withhold access to Iraq’s dollar accounts affirms that there is no more patience for delays or half-measures. The choice is increasingly clear: Zaidan can facilitate change or he will allow the country to slide toward collapse.

Ali Mahmoud Alabraz is an Iraqi journalist and researcher focusing on armed groups in Iraq and the Middle East. His work analyzes their dynamics and how they shape state authority, institutions, and society.
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