“The United States is unable to overthrow the Islamic Republic’s regime.” So spoke Ali al-Zaidi, the Coordination Framework’s nominee for Iraq’s premiership, as he began to reveal his real political position before entering the government palace. The remark appeared in Persian-language and Iranian media accounts of his call with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. It was a clear statement about where al-Zaidi stands in the conflict between Washington and Tehran.
[Al-Zaidi] described Iran as Iraq’s strategic depth, and said Iraq and Iran are two bodies with one soul.
Al-Zaidi reportedly continued by insisting that Iran’s strength “does not belong to Iran alone,” but rather, represents a pillar for Shi’a everywhere. He described Iran as Iraq’s strategic depth, and said Iraq and Iran are two bodies with one soul. Such language suggests al-Zaidi will subordinate Iraqi sovereignty to Iranian interests.
A bigger problem is discrepancy in the readout of the call. In Baghdad, al-Zaidi appeared as a man of mediation. In Tehran, he appeared as a man declaring that Iraq belongs inside Iran’s political and sectarian depth. Al-Zaidi’s supporters may present him as a businessman and centrist, rather than as an ideologue. But the way he reached the nomination says otherwise: He was no outsider; the Coordination Framework chose him because of his connections to them. That bloc is the political camp closest to Iran and most tied to armed factions and political money networks. The real question, therefore, is not whether al-Zaidi is a businessman but whether he can or will defy the forces that brought him to power.
The practical answer is no. Any prime minister who enters office through the Coordination Framework remains constrained by the Coordination Framework. These forces control parliament, armed power, money, and the ability to paralyze the state. If he tries to break from their line, they can surround him politically, administratively, and even militarily. Al-Zaidi’s premiership does not look like a new beginning; he appears to be simply a fresh face for an old arrangement.
In that sense, he may be closer to former Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi than to an independent reformer. Kadhimi entered office as a balancing figure acceptable to both Washington and Tehran. In the end, he accommodated the same forces he was meant to restrain. He could not bring arms under state control, nor did he end militia influence or protect Iraq’s economic decisions from their networks. Al-Zaidi may begin from the same place, but with one important difference: he is showing his direction early.
This should be a test for Washington. The Trump administration says it wants Iraq’s next government to control weapons, stop militia financing, and prevent Iraq from serving as a channel for Iran under sanctions. But how can a prime minister who sees Iran’s strength as a pillar for the Shi’a confront the groups that draw their strength from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps? How can a man who says Iraq and Iran are two bodies with one soul convince Washington, Gulf Arab capitals, or Iraqis that he will give primacy to Baghdad over Tehran?
Will Iraq’s next prime minister be a statesman who tries to restore sovereignty to Iraqi decision-making, or another front for forces chosen by Iran?
Normal diplomatic remarks might focus on Iraq’s desire to have good relations with its largest neighbor, but Al-Zaidi said something else. He promised alignment, not balance.
Al-Zaidi’s case is no longer only about banks, contracts, or Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq leader Qais al-Khazali’s networks. It is simpler and more dangerous: Will Iraq’s next prime minister be a statesman who tries to restore sovereignty to Iraqi decision-making, or another front for forces chosen by Iran and protected by arms and political money?
Al-Zaidi has shown his cards. Washington must now decide whether to treat his words as an early warning or ignore them until Iraq and the region pay the price.
