A social media post by President Donald Trump prompted Iran’s remaining leadership to deny any divide and to stress unified loyalty to the supreme leader. The complication is that no one has seen Mojtaba Khamenei, the person holding that position, for nearly two months, raising questions about where authority actually resides.
“Iran is having a very hard time figuring out who their leader is! They just don’t know! The infighting is between the ‘Hardliners,’ who have been losing badly on the battlefield, and the ‘Moderates,’ who are not very moderate at all (but gaining respect!), is CRAZY!” Trump wrote.
“One God, one leader, one nation, and one path—the path of victory for Iran, dearer than life.”
The hardline Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, whom Trump now rebrands as a recently reborn moderate with whom Trump seeks to negotiate, rejected Trump’s remark with a post of his own that other officials quickly followed. “We do not have moderates and hardliners in Iran; we are all ‘Iranian’ and ‘revolutionary,’ and with the iron unity of the nation and the state, and with full obedience to the Supreme Leader, we will make the criminal aggressor regret its actions. One God, one leader, one nation, and one path—the path of victory for Iran, dearer than life,” Ghalibaf wrote.
Despite the Islamic Republic’s long history of deploying “good cop/bad cop” tactics in negotiations to extract concessions from the West, many now argue that a genuine rift has emerged as top officials confront demands from Trump. The U.S. and Israel air campaign in March 2026, combined with the threat of renewed strikes, has strained the system, further fueling perceptions of a split at the top.
However, even if differences exist, they are consequential only when they involve actors who hold real power. At present, that authority lies with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps because Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is dead and his son is reportedly incapacitated. Figures such as Ghalibaf or President Masoud Pezeshkian do not command forces on the ground and have limited leverage. Even if they seek a real agreement with Washington, they cannot negotiate on behalf of others.
While Ghalibaf may signal flexibility, the decisive bargaining power rests with the Revolutionary Guard, which continues to rely on its leverage in the Strait of Hormuz and appears to be betting that Trump will refrain from another round of strikes. A meaningful rift would have to emerge within the Guard itself; absent that, claims of significant internal leadership divisions are overstated. Some within the system may favor concessions to reach a deal, but the central question remains whether the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is prepared to make concessions. For now, the answer appears no.
A perceived “surrender” to Trump could raise doubts about the durability of the system.
Another question regarding the significance of any “moderate” inclinations toward concessions is the issue of the regime’s survival. Those who may harbor such tendencies are, above all, invested in preserving the very system whose ranks they have spent years climbing. A perceived “surrender” to Trump could raise doubts about the durability of the system. Even now, their personal security—and the wealth accumulated amid entrenched corruption and cronyism—remains tied to the continued power of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
The regime’s fragility appears to have reached a point where the Revolutionary Guard has reportedly brought in thousands of Afghan and Iraqi militia fighters to Tehran as a hedge against renewed mass protests. Such forces are often viewed as more willing to use lethal force against civilians—echoing reports from January 2026, when the regime or its proxies killed an estimated 30,000 people. Moderate or not, members of the political and economic elite understand that their survival likely would be measured in days without the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Under Ali Khamenei, the Islamic Republic has spent more than two decades consolidating Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps influence. Khamenei was aware of the risks posed by protests and built a Praetorian guard to safeguard the system. At the same time, he required a force aligned with his anti-West, anti-Israel ideology and capable of enforcing it. For individual Revolutionary Guard commanders, the stakes are personal: Concessions or signs of weakness could threaten their own survival. Unlike a conventional professional military, their power, position, and accumulated wealth are closely tied to the endurance of the religious dictatorship.
