President Donald Trump’s Middle East tour has reignited an old debate among Iranians: Is economic development more urgent than the pursuit of democracy? Forty-six years after the 1979 revolution that overthrew the monarchy, Iran’s economy is in a state of deterioration. Once a regional development leader, the country now lags far behind neighboring Arab oil monarchies, which have amassed vast wealth and transformed into major players on the international stage.
The clerical establishment that took power with the promise of democracy quickly transformed into a repressive regime while simultaneously mismanaging the economy.
Some Iranians argue that when the revolution toppled Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, the country was on the cusp of becoming an economic powerhouse. Today, however, average workers earn around $120 a month—a dramatic decline in real incomes. The clerical establishment that took power with the promise of democracy quickly transformed into a repressive regime while simultaneously mismanaging the economy. These critics ask: What should have been the priority in 1979—chasing the ideal of democracy or continuing a path of rapid economic expansion that eventually might have laid the groundwork for democratic reforms?
A leading Iranian constitutional monarchist said in an online debate in 2024 that the Pahlavi era is being criticized for pursuing development without democracy. But, he argued, “Germany—as a democratic country and the leading economy in Europe—owes much to the development initiated by Bismarck, the Iron Chancellor. Democracy requires certain preconditions, which in Germany were established through the unity Bismarck created and the industrial development he launched.”
Others counter that democracy is not negotiable and cannot be sacrificed for economic growth. They argue that lasting progress requires political freedom. Yet, during the Cold War, the constant threat of Soviet-backed subversion prompted many pro-Western governments in the developing world to adopt authoritarianism. In Iran, the shah was trying to transform a feudal Islamic society into a modern state—with expanded education, women’s rights, and a thriving economy. But he was simultaneously battling traditional clerics, entrenched landowners, and leftist forces with Soviet sympathies. The pressures were immense.
Some even contend that Western-style democracy may not align with Middle Eastern or Asian cultural norms, which often value hierarchical authority and obey centralized control. Critics of this view, however, see it as an excuse for perpetuating autocracy.
Advocates of strong central governments focused on economic progress argue that parliamentary democracies often lead to political instability, short-term policymaking, and constant infighting—challenges that countries like Iran can ill afford. They point to the decade from 1943 to 1953, when the shah had limited power and Iran experienced political chaos.
Without legal accountability and strong democratic institutions, economic development can flounder.
Yet, without legal accountability and strong democratic institutions, economic development can flounder. Corruption among elites flourishes absent checks and balances. While some view the shah—or Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman—as examples of benevolent autocrats, not every authoritarian leader is a steward of progress. The Islamic Republic is a case in point: It has squandered an estimated $1.5 trillion in oil revenues over four decades through ideological adventures, mismanagement, and systemic insider corruption.
Supporters of strong government often argue that political freedom is meaningless for citizens trapped in poverty. What value, they ask in online discussions, does democracy hold when most people lack economic dignity and stability? In their view, material well-being must precede political freedom.
This echoes the thesis of American political scientist Seymour Martin Lipset, who in 1959 argued that sustained democracy is more likely in economically developed societies. Perhaps this was why President John F. Kennedy, in the early 1960s, pressed the shah to launch land reforms and accelerate modernization—to lay the socioeconomic foundation for democracy as a bulwark against the Soviet Union.
[Some] envision a secular state that permits broad economic and social freedoms while maintaining centralized control to prioritize national reconstruction.
The shah pursued ambitious reforms and oversaw industrial growth, arguably beyond Kennedy’s expectations. Yet the shah failed to allow press freedom and political pluralism. While committed to building a prosperous Iran, he was unwilling to risk political liberalization, possibly believing that continued progress required strong, centralized control rather than the unpredictability of democratic politics. That failure to democratize ultimately contributed to a regime change led by Islamic fundamentalists and anti-Western leftists.
Today, as Arab oil monarchies without democratic institutions thrive, some Iranians have come to view the authoritarian development model as a viable path—at least temporarily. They envision a secular state that permits broad economic and social freedoms while maintaining centralized control to prioritize national reconstruction. Others reject this vision, arguing that only a democratic system can prevent the corruption, repression, and waste that have defined the Islamic Republic.
In the end, most anti-regime voices and activists advocate for a combination of all three goals: secularism, democracy, and economic progress. Whether that balance is attainable remains an open question—but for many Iranians, it is the only way forward.
