Iran Plays Double Game on Hormuz as Factional Narrative Emerges

Factional influences in Iran now dominate the question about whether Iran will reopen the Strait of Hormuz following the ceasefire. Reports and commentary suggest divisions within the leadership, with some favoring reopening to stabilize the situation and others pushing to maintain leverage by restricting the waterway.

While questions over factional disputes are plausible, the internal disagreement appears to be a deliberate projection of division as a tool of negotiation.

Rather than a simple choice between closing or opening the Strait, Iran appears to be moving toward a model of conditional access, allowing selective passage for vessels it deems non-hostile, requiring coordination with its authorities, and imposing financial charges while retaining the ability to disrupt traffic. Even after the ceasefire, shipping has not returned to normal levels: Only a small number of vessels transit, often under Iranian supervision, while many companies remain hesitant to resume operations because of uncertainty and risk. This points to a broader objective—not just short-term pressure, but an effort to institutionalize control over the Strait.

Recent reporting underscores the ambiguity. A senior Iranian official told Reuters that Tehran could reopen the Strait “in a controlled way,” requiring coordination with Iranian forces and tying the move to diplomatic progress. Other signals point in the opposite direction—warnings that Iran could still target or restrict vessels after the ceasefire. Either way, the opening of the Strait of Hormuz remains in limbo.

In Tehran, hardliners and protesters called the negotiators of the ceasefire “traitors” and “compromisers,” reviving memories of the nuclear talks in the past two decades. The Iranian regime always played the “good cop/bad cop” game of allowing nuclear negotiations while allowing hardliners to oppose concessions and agreements. Former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei also invariably sat on the fence, greenlighting talks, while calling the United States untrustworthy and expressing doubts about diplomacy.

Such dual messaging is not accidental. It reflects the central reality of the current crisis: Iran is not deciding whether to open or close Hormuz in a binary sense. It is seeking to redefine the terms under which the Strait operates. If this reading is correct, then focusing solely on whether the Strait is “open” or “closed” misses the point. The real question is who controls access and under what rules. Even a formally open Strait could remain politically constrained, economically burdened, and militarily vulnerable. In that sense, Iran’s objective may not be to close Hormuz indefinitely, but to ensure that it is never fully beyond its control again.

Unless the United States uses force to neutralize Iran’s capability to harm commercial vessels within and in the vicinity of the Strait, Tehran will continue to use it as leverage.

The option of using force has existed since late March 2026, when U.S. Marines and Special Forces arrived in the region, but President Donald Trump has so far chosen not to start a new phase in the war by landing troops on Iranian islands or the mainland. As usual, the president gives conflicting signals. Asked whether he would allow Iran to collect tolls from ships, he told ABC’s Jonathan Karl on April 8, 2026, that “We’re thinking of doing it as a joint venture. It’s a way of securing it—also securing it from lots of other people.”

The narrative of factional infighting in Tehran may contain elements of truth. But it risks obscuring another possibility: that Iran is deliberately projecting ambiguity as part of a coherent strategy.

By appearing divided, Tehran gains flexibility. By keeping Hormuz partially open, it maintains leverage. And by linking maritime access to political conditions, it seeks to convert a temporary military advantage into a lasting geopolitical one.
This is not indecision. It is their strategy.