Former Iranian Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi’s political activities have led many Iranian pro-democracy activists to question whether the Islamic Republic is manipulating Pahlavi and his followers to sow discord among the opposition. The social media application X’s recent decision to display the origin country of its users reinforces these suspicions.
Most Iranians must use VPNs to bypass regime censors, while accounts operated by the regime use “white SIM cards” to bypass censorship. The pro-Pahlavi regime accounts, revealed by X to be in Iran, amplify Pahlavi’s popularity while creating a toxic social media environment through harassment of non-monarchists.
One of the core messages blasted by these accounts is that Pahlavi is the only alternative to the Islamic Republic and no one else can be trusted. These accounts use this tactic to attack any figure who demonstrates real capabilities. The cyber army targeted Iranian opposition activist Hamed Esmaeilion, for example, after he organized an anti-regime protest of tens of thousands in Berlin at the height of the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising.
The regime’s ability to manipulate Pahlavi should not surprise.
Pahlavi’s real on-line supporters have wittingly and unwittingly abetted the regime’s campaign by engaging in similar attacks against not only Esmaeilion but also other prominent dissidents, such as Nobel Peace Prize winner Narges Mohammadi, journalist Masih Alinejad, and rapper Toomaj Salehi. Pahlavi’s chief advisor, Amir Etemadi, promotes the abuse of non-monarchist dissidents and journalists, labeling them as “leftists,” “separatists,” and “terrorists” to encourage vitriol against them.
The regime’s ability to manipulate Pahlavi should not surprise. The eldest son of the last shah is known for neither leadership skills nor attention to detail. Former regime intelligence chief Ali Fallahian reportedly stated years ago that Pahlavi was “more useful to the Islamic Republic alive than dead.”
Though he lacks leadership or organizational skills, Pahlavi’s profile has risen in recent years due to nostalgia for pre-revolutionary Iran, promotion of Pahlavi by Persian language media such as Iran International, and reported Israel-backed cyber campaigns declaring Pahlavi to be the “leader’’ of the Iranian opposition and even the next shah.
A longtime proponent of tolerance, Pahlavi discarded his political agenda—democracy and freedom for all Iranians—after his departure from the opposition Georgetown Coalition during the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising. Having ditched the concept of unity and democracy, Pahlavi now declares himself as the “father” of all Iranians.
Pahlavi’s inability or unwillingness to control his followers has not only turned some within the pro-democracy movement against him but has also set the monarchist movement against itself, with many of the traditional, constitutionalist monarchists resentful of newer advisors’ grip on Pahlavi and their impact on the Pahlavi brand.
Pahlavi also bragged about his clandestine contacts with regime officials who support him, including members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The regime’s pro-Pahlavi cyber campaign and Pahlavi’s assertions about his contacts with the Guard raise important questions: Are these regime insiders legitimate supporters who are ready to defect, or are some regime plants seeking to dupe Pahlavi to undercut the rest of the opposition? Put another way, exposure of the regime’s cyber activities and efforts to co-opt some monarchists raise questions about who is co-opting whom.
Pahlavi has doubled down on his advisors despite others’ unease about them.
Some of the regime’s opponents, including prominent figures in Iran, now realize that the Pahlavist movement has morphed, as Narges Mohammadi recently stated, into “the opposition against the opposition.” A number of dissidents refuse to collaborate with monarchists because they perceive that the monarchists have become a security threat.
Pahlavi has doubled down on his advisors despite others’ unease about them. The Islamic Republic has exploited the situation by following the maxim of Vladimir Lenin, founder of the Soviet Union, that “the best way to control the opposition is to lead it ourselves.”
The Trump administration’s hands-off approach has been wise. A recent post on X from the State Department’s Persian language site stated that “as Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said, it is up to Iranians to choose their own leaders.” The State Department posting received backlash in its comments from Pahlavi’s followers and, perhaps, also the regime’s cyber army. However, as Pahlavi has faltered, elements of the Israeli government continue to aid his activities, fueling resentment within the rest of the opposition.
X’s exposure that the Islamic Republic’s cyber army is more sophisticated than many analysts previously expected should be cause for introspection among both monarchists and other regime opponents, about how the regime sows dissent and whether blind loyalty to any particular figure has hampered rather than helped efforts to achieve regime change.
