The recent decision by the social media platform X, formerly Twitter, to reveal users’ locations produced political mini-earthquakes in both the United States and Iran. The change exposed deception by politically active accounts that amplified MAGA messaging or defended the Iranian government.
In the United States, the exposure showed that several high-profile, right-wing accounts that pushed isolationist arguments popular within the MAGA movement operated from Eastern Europe, Africa, Thailand, and Bangladesh. This revelation revived concerns about foreign interference in American politics and renewed suspicions of Russian involvement in elections.
In Iran, the deception unfolded differently but proved just as explosive. Although the Islamic Republic bans and blocks Western social media platforms—including X—hundreds of regime insiders use these same platforms to attack the West and Israel, glorify Islamist militancy, and smear political opponents. Ordinary Iranians also use X, Instagram, and other blocked platforms, but they rely on VPN tools to bypass the cyber police.
Ordinary Iranians also use X, Instagram, and other blocked platforms, but they rely on VPN tools to bypass the cyber police.
A VPN automatically masks a user’s location by routing traffic through servers outside Iran. An everyday Iranian who connects to the internet this way might appear to be posting from Bulgaria or Texas. But once X activated its new location feature, a clear pattern emerged: Hundreds of pro-regime accounts showed their true location inside Iran, because their owners enjoyed unrestricted internet access and did not need a VPN. Security services had quietly granted this privilege to trusted politicians, journalists, and influencers through special SIM cards. In exchange, these users pushed the government’s talking points. Opposition activists quickly labeled these privileged SIM cards the “white line,” meaning unfiltered internet.
When regime opponents began exposing these individuals, many scrambled to defend themselves. One user even claimed he received “white line” access during Israel’s June 2025 air campaign so he could “defend the country.” Others switched their location setting to “West Asia” instead of Iran, and some simply deactivated their accounts. Some even advertised their SIM cards for sale.
Opposition researchers dug through thousands of X profiles and published lists identifying hundreds of known figures. Many of these accounts had repeatedly attacked opposition groups, especially exiled former Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi and his supporters.
According to one Iranian journalist, roughly 50,000 SIM cards provide unrestricted internet access. The beneficiaries include members of parliament, large numbers of officials, their friends and family, trusted journalists, and even some cafés owned by insiders. These cafés attract more customers by offering easy, unfiltered access through their Wi-Fi. Despite the sheer number of privileged SIM cards, the opposition has zeroed in on a few hundred prominent users who quietly defend the regime while posing as dissidents.
According to one Iranian journalist, roughly 50,000 SIM cards provide unrestricted internet access.
Even before X introduced its location-reveal feature, another online trend intensified in early November. A cluster of anonymous English-language accounts with surprisingly high reach suddenly appeared—or became far more visible. These accounts follow several strategies, but their main goal is to trumpet the Islamic Republic’s supposed military achievements. They often warn Israel that another military strike on Iranian targets will trigger severe retaliation. One of these accounts, calling itself “Global Surveillance,” was among the first to declare in mid-November: “IRAN Readies First Retaliatory Salvo of 2000 Ballistic Missiles if ISRAEL and U.S. Attack Again!!”
These accounts regularly amplify belligerent statements from Iranian military officials. On November 19, 2025, for example, these accounts amplified Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani’s threat: “We are much crazier than you think, and if necessary, we are ready to impose war on you.”
They also highlight criticisms in Western media of U.S. or Israeli containment policies, and they try to undermine the notion that Israel favors the fall of the Islamic Republic. In addition, they circulate unverified claims about Israeli military or economic weakness.
The Islamic Republic has sought to use social media to gain the upper hand since repeated waves of protest after 2017 revealed how fast dissent can spread online. The regime also understands X’s global influence and works to inject its disinformation into the platform. The new transparency tools introduced by X are a welcome development, but thousands of fake accounts and bots remain active. They circulate propaganda and use coordinated algorithms to boost engagement for every account within their network sometimes receiving hundreds of interactions within minutes.
The question for Western policymakers is how they will counter Iran’s influence operation. Journalists, think tankers, and academics should also conduct an audit on their previous work to identify any influence these pro-regime trolls might have had on their work.
