The emergence of the Board of Peace marks a quiet shift in international assumptions about Palestinian governance. For three decades, diplomats and donors treated the Palestinian Authority as a political fact. Today, that premise no longer holds. The more relevant question is no longer whether the Palestinian Authority governs effectively, but whether it still exists legally in any meaningful sense.
The Palestinian Authority did not arise organically. It came into being through explicit agreements that imposed reciprocal obligations and formed the legal basis for recognition, funding, security cooperation, and diplomatic engagement.
The Palestinian Authority neither prevented the [October 7, 2023] assault nor condemned it in clear terms.
At its founding, the Palestinian Authority accepted commitments that included renouncing violence, preventing terrorism, dismantling armed groups, and resolving disputes through negotiation rather than force. These were not aspirational goals but were the conditions that justified international recognition and sustained financial support. Without them, the Palestinian Authority had no independent legal standing.
Over time, the authority abandoned these commitments. Security cooperation with Israel eroded. Armed factions operated openly. Official media and education glorified violence. Payments to imprisoned militants and families of attackers institutionalized incentives for terrorism. These actions were not deviations at the margins; they represented structural violations of the authority’s founding obligations.
The attacks of October 7, 2023, did not occur in a vacuum. They followed years of erosion in governance, accountability, and monopoly on force. The Palestinian Authority neither prevented the assault nor condemned it in clear terms. Instead, its response reflected political paralysis and moral evasion. That failure carried legal significance. An authority that cannot—or will not—act against mass violence forfeits the claims under which it was recognized.
The problem extends beyond security. The Palestinian Authority no longer functions as a governing entity. It does not reliably police territory. It struggles to collect revenue without external intervention. It lacks electoral legitimacy, having postponed elections indefinitely. Its leadership operates without a clear succession mechanism, further undermining continuity. Governance has narrowed into patronage networks sustained by donor inertia rather than public consent.
International actors continue to behave as if they can indefinitely sustain this arrangement. That assumption now appears detached from reality. The creation of the Board of Peace signals that at least some states recognize the need to bypass a structure that no longer fulfills its legal or political purpose. This is not a diplomatic snub; it is an implicit acknowledgment that the Palestinian Authority no longer meets the criteria under which it was formed.
This recognition matters because legality is not a technicality. It shapes responsibility. If the Palestinian Authority no longer upholds its founding commitments, then continuing to treat it as a legitimate governing body becomes a form of legal fiction. Donor states are not merely funding inefficiency; they are underwriting an entity that has breached the conditions of its existence.
When an authority repeatedly violates security commitments, legitimacy erodes on both sides of the negotiating table.
The regional context reinforces this conclusion. After October 7, 2023, Israeli public opinion and parliamentary consensus hardened against a two-state framework premised on the Palestinian Authority’s return to Gaza or expansion elsewhere. This shift does not represent ideological extremism; it reflects accumulated experience. When an authority repeatedly violates security commitments, legitimacy erodes on both sides of the negotiating table.
The assessment is simple: An authority created by agreement survives only so long as it honors that agreement. The Palestinian Authority no longer does. The Board of Peace did not emerge because the peace process needs rebranding. It emerged because the existing legal framework collapsed under its own contradictions.
History offers many examples of political entities that outlived their legal foundations. They persist through habit, fear of alternatives, or institutional momentum—until a new structure forces recognition of reality. The question now is not whether the Palestinian Authority can be reformed, but whether it has already crossed the point where reform no longer addresses the underlying problem?
If legitimacy derives from obligation, and obligation has been abandoned, then the epitaph may already be written. The Board of Peace may not replace the Palestinian Authority overnight, but it signals that the international system is preparing for a post-authority landscape. Pretending otherwise delays clarity at the cost of credibility.
