Haiti Imports Israeli and Turkish Weapons Legally, But Gangs then Divert Them

Haitian Gangs Outgun the State. The United States, Israel, and Turkey Must Take Three Steps to Cut off Their Weapons

Fully armed Haitian soldiers in Milot, the site of Sans-Souci Palace.

Fully armed Haitian soldiers in Milot, the site of Sans-Souci Palace.

Shutterstock

Haiti’s last-minute reversal at Lake Success in November 1947 secured the votes for United Nations Resolution 181 and Israel’s creation. Port-au-Prince recognized the Jewish state in March 1949, becoming the forty-eighth country to do so. Decades later, however, this connection has taken a turn. Haitian gangs controlling most of the capital now deploy Israeli Galil ACE rifles—originally delivered under a contract to the Haitian National Police—alongside an influx of Turkish tactical shotguns and military-grade ammunition.

Firearms from the United States still remain the backbone of Haiti’s criminal arsenal, providing a stream of some 270,000 to 500,000 illegal weapons into the country.

This security leakage began through legitimate commercial channels. Haiti’s government contracted the Israeli company Guardian Limited Israel to supply 1,000 Israel Weapon Industries Galil ACE rifles and tactical training to the Haitian forces. Since 2021, these assault rifles have anchored the black market flooding the country. For example, imagery has exposed Galil ACE 21, 22, and 31 models in the hands of the Gran Grif gang, including an ACE 31 variant captured after the murder of several Haitian National Police officers. Similarly, images show gang leader Jimmy “Barbecue” Chérizier carrying an Israel Military Industries Galil Short Assault Rifle during his press conferences.

Haitian law enforcement officers sometimes recover some of these numbered firearms during shootouts with rival gangs such as Gran Ravin. But traffickers still smuggle some out of the country. In 2017, Jamaican authorities found a Galil registered to the Haitian National Police after a shootout in Rockfort. Investigators also discovered a Galil ACE in the arsenal that mercenaries used to kill President Jovenel Moïse in 2021. Concurrently, footage of these gang attacks shows that they are also using Turkish tactical shotguns and military-grade ammunition.

Jimmy "Barbecue" Chérizier, Haitian gang leader.

Jimmy “Barbecue” Chérizier, Haitian gang leader.

Photo: VOA KREYÒL, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

Firearms from the United States still remain the backbone of Haiti’s criminal arsenal, providing a stream of some 270,000 to 500,000 illegal weapons into the country. Between 2020 and 2022, over 80 percent of the firearms that Haitian forces seized came from the United States, predominantly via the Florida maritime container freight route or the border with the Dominican Republic.

By acquiring Israeli and Turkish platforms sold legitimately to the Haitian government, Haitian gangs outgun the state. These weapons enhance their capacity to hold territory, blockade maritime ports, and challenge the United Nations-sponsored Gang Suppression Force, all while U.S. commercial shipments bypass the United Nations arms embargo. Criminal networks in failed states do not differentiate between American civilian hardware and Middle Eastern military systems. Both pipelines contribute to the gang violence that has displaced over 1.4 million citizens and claimed thousands of lives.

To cut off these supply chains, three actions are needed. First, Israel should suspend all weapon exports if local authorities recover any Galil Rifles from Haitian gangs with a serial number registered under the Haitian National Police. This measure should continue until Haitian officials account for all weapons and dismantle the compromised unit. Second, Turkey must require future military components sold to Caribbean countries to include digital end-use monitoring.

Criminal networks in failed states do not differentiate between American civilian hardware and Middle Eastern military systems. Both pipelines contribute to the gang violence.

This would mean all weapons have manufacturer-installed digital tracking systems that send an alert if an item is removed from the system. And third, the United States must reclassify Middle Eastern military components as priority interdiction targets, requiring that U.S. intelligence agencies and customs task forces rank these components above the bulk of American civilian firearms when it comes to container screening, given their superior battlefield reliability and the increase in gang lethality.

Passing international resolutions has little impact on efforts to restore stability in the Caribbean. Much more important will be recognizing asset diversion from a weak state is as malign as smuggling. Until Jerusalem, Ankara, and Washington realize that gangs are bartering their military equipment on the streets of Port-au-Prince, Western policy will continue to fund both sides of a war it claims to oppose.

Jose Lev Alvarez is an American-Israeli scholar specializing in Middle Eastern security policy. A multilingual veteran of the IDF Special Forces and the U.S. Army, he holds a B.S. in neuroscience with a minor in Israel Studies from American University, three master’s degrees (international geostrategy, applied economics, and intelligence studies), and a medical degree. He is completing a Ph.D. in intelligence and global security in the Washington, D.C., area. In addition to serving as a writing fellow at Middle East Forum, he blogs for The Times of Israel, contributes to the Washington Examiner, and regularly provides geopolitical analysis on Latin American television networks.
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