Drones Target Regime Forces in Tehran as Questions Remain About Who Is Running Iran

Drone attacks on Iranian security forces deployed across Tehran’s streets on March 11, 2026, likely signaled a new phase in the Israeli-American war against what remains of Iran’s Islamic regime. After nightfall, drones flying low over the capital began striking security units that had established checkpoints throughout the city to intimidate the population and maintain control.

The same tactic might have saved thousands of lives on January 8-9, 2026, when millions of people poured into the streets to protest but were mowed down by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its Basij paramilitaries. At that time, Washington was still preparing its military for an extended air campaign, and Israel—possibly in coordination—refrained from intervening.

It remains unclear how many checkpoints were hit, but Tehran residents posting on social media identified at least a dozen locations. The government acknowledged dozens of casualties, though some eyewitnesses suggested the number was higher. Two social media posts citing doctors and hospital staff said medical centers in Tehran were filled with Basij members wounded in the drone strikes.

For many citizens, the logic of this new tactic was obvious. Social media posts suggested that Israel and the United States had finally begun targeting the foot soldiers responsible for killing around 35,000 people during the brutal January crackdown. Nevertheless, the situation remains dangerous for anyone challenging the authorities.

One well-known social media activist wrote: “The Basij members who used to carry batons are now armed with guns, making them far more dangerous. Most patrol the streets in plain clothes, using their own motorcycles and cars, with their faces covered or hidden under helmets. At times they violently stop vehicles playing loud music, smashing and damaging the cars.”

This is how the weakened regime attempts to intimidate the population and retain control of the streets. Iran’s police chief, Mohammad-Reza Radan, warned on national television that protesters would be treated in the same way as enemy forces. Other officials claimed that Israel and the United States were attempting to wrest control of the streets from the regime’s religious supporters.

Images circulating online showed families of these forces abandoning their homes out of fear of targeted airstrikes and spending nights in metro stations. At the same time, it has become easier to identify regime supporters who maintain a visibly religious appearance—particularly women adhering to full hijab—while many ordinary women have stopped wearing even headscarves.

Debate continues across Persian-language media abroad and on social networks about who is making decisions within the regime. One widely discussed view holds that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps engineered the appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei as the new supreme leader, while the head of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, supported a different candidate. Within the Revolutionary Guard, its powerful intelligence organization—an entity that effectively mirrors the official Intelligence Ministry but answers only to the Guard’s leadership and previously to Ali Khamenei—has accumulated enormous political influence over the past decade.

Another theory suggests that Larijani and President Masoud Pezeshkian now wield considerable authority following Ali Khamenei’s death, perhaps even exerting influence over the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps itself. At the same time, Tehran appears to be relying heavily on continued turmoil in global energy markets as its primary hope of forcing President Donald Trump to halt the air campaign. Keeping the Strait of Hormuz closed and harassing oil tankers have become central elements of this strategy, openly discussed in the regime’s media. For this reason, it seems unlikely that attacks on shipping or Arab states are simply the work of rogue units. It is far more plausible that Tehran is pursuing a coordinated strategy in which the Revolutionary Guard and political leadership are acting together.

Meanwhile, it remains unclear whether Mojtaba is alive or injured following the airstrike that killed his father during the opening hours of the bombardment on February 28. Reports indicate that he lost his wife, a child, and several close relatives in the attack. Some observers argue that even if he survived, he may be psychologically and physically too damaged to play an effective leadership role or manage critical wartime decisions.

For now, the central question remains unresolved: Which power center is making life-and-death decisions in Tehran?