ConocoPhillips’s reported plan to sign a contract with Syria’s transitional government would be a significant step in Syria’s return to international energy markets. If finalized, this deal would make ConocoPhillips the first major U.S. oil and gas company to reach a formal agreement with the new Syrian authorities.
This is not unexpected. In November 2025, ConocoPhillips, Novaterra, and the Syrian Petroleum Company signed a memorandum of understanding to develop existing gas fields, explore new reserves, and increase output by 4–5 million cubic meters per day within a year. In May 2026, ConocoPhillips partnered with TotalEnergies and QatarEnergy in another offshore memorandum of understanding for Block 3 in the Mediterranean.
A rapid increase in gas output would provide Damascus with revenue and credibility while relieving pressure on households and businesses after years of energy failure.
For Syria, the importance does not just rest on one company. Before 2011, Syria produced around 400,000 to 500,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day, met much of its domestic demand, and exported part of its output. War, sanctions, damaged infrastructure, and divided territorial control destroyed that status.
ConocoPhillips would not enter an empty field. The United Kingdom-based Gulfsands has already resumed operations at Block 26, one of Syria’s key assets in the northeast. HKN Energy now runs the Rumeylan fields. These early moves show that upstream activity has started again. However, ConocoPhillips carries more political and commercial influence since it would bring a U.S. major into a sector that Washington has long viewed as off-limits.
Damascus needs gas more urgently than the export headlines indicate. Restored gas production can cut blackouts, stabilize power plants, support industry, and reduce reliance on imported fuel. A rapid increase in gas output would provide Damascus with revenue and credibility while relieving pressure on households and businesses after years of energy failure. Other companies are also positioning themselves.
Chevron has signed memoranda of understandings for offshore exploration with Qatari partners. TotalEnergies, QatarEnergy, and ConocoPhillips are tied to offshore Block 3. ADES, Dana Gas, and Saudi-linked firms like TAQA are exploring technical support, drilling, redevelopment, or future involvement.
Signing a contract may bring attention to Syria, but it will not fix its energy problems instantly. Much of the country’s oil and gas infrastructure still needs repair. Pipelines, processing plants, refineries, storage sites, and power-sector links have all suffered from years of war, sanctions, neglect, and divided control. Security also remains a serious problem around fields and transport routes.
Northeastern Syria, which Kurdish groups previously controlled, will be the hardest issue. Damascus cannot simply treat production there as a prize to reclaim. It will need clear arrangements with local actors over control, revenue, and services.
Since President Bashar al-Assad’s fall in late 2024, the United States has moved away from total isolation and toward a more conditional opening.
The ConocoPhillips deal also says much about Washington’s changing approach. Since President Bashar al-Assad’s fall in late 2024, the United States has moved away from total isolation and toward a more conditional opening. Executive Order 14312 and related licenseseased restrictions on some energy transactions involving the Syrian Petroleum Company and other entities, while keeping sanctions on actors viewed as destabilizing. This gives U.S. firms room to enter the sector, but it does not remove American leverage. Washington can still tighten pressure if Syria’s transition moves in a dangerous direction.
For Damascus, the benefits are clear. It can use the money from oil and gas to pay for essentials like electricity, transportation, water systems, salaries, and basic services. Foreign companies could bring in much-needed equipment, capital, and technical expertise that Syria currently lacks. However, energy revenue is a sensitive topic in Syria. If the contracts are not transparent, and the money flows only to the central government, or if the regions where the energy is produced feel neglected, fissures in state unity could again erupt.
This agreement would also open more diplomatic possibilities for Syria. Gulf Arab counties believe that investing in energy gives them standing in Syria. Turkey hopes to become involved in the power, transportation, and infrastructure sectors. Companies from Europe can bring technical know-how and give the government more credibility. For the government in Damascus, having multiple partners protects them from overreliance on Iran and Russia.
