On January 31, 2026, New Delhi hosted the second India-Arab Conference, attended by leaders from several Arab countries, underscoring India’s intent to deepen its ties with the Arab world. This engagement builds on institutional mechanisms established through the India-Arab Cooperation Forum in 2008 and India’s observer status in the Arab League since 2010.
The first India-Arab Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, held in January 2016 in Bahrain, resulted in the Manama Declaration and an executive program outlining priority areas such as economy, energy, education, media, and culture. The 2026 meeting marked a revival of ministerial-level dialogue after nearly a decade. Foreign ministers or senior representatives from all twenty-two Arab League countries attended. This participation reaffirmed India’s growing role as a partner in the Middle East, with renewed commitments to cooperation in trade, energy, education, and regional stability.
The 2026 meeting marked a revival of ministerial-level dialogue after nearly a decade.
This diplomatic momentum was further reinforced by the recent visit of United Arab Emirates President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan to India on January 19, 2026. Though brief, the visit was significant due to the agreements concluded, including a Letter of Intent on a Strategic Defense Partnership Framework, a $3 billion, ten‑year liquefied natural gas supply agreement, and memorandums of understanding regarding space, technology, investment, and digital infrastructure. The visit also set a target to double bilateral trade to $200 billion by 2032, reinforcing India’s energy security and economic partnership with the United Arab Emirates.
The defense component of the visit signaled institutional deepening rather than reactive alignment. Addressing media queries, Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri clarified that the defense understanding “is a natural evolution of the already considerable cooperation between the two countries and not a response to any specific event in the region.” This emphasis on continuity underscored India’s preference for predictable and long-term strategic partnerships amidst evolving regional dynamics.
These engagements come amid rapidly evolving regional geopolitics. President Donald Trump has intensified pressure on Iran, while tensions between Iran, Israel, and the United States are rising. New alignments are also taking shape. Speculation around a broader “Islamic NATO,” potentially involving Turkey and other Muslim-majority states, has circulated in regional discourse.
At the regional level, intra-Gulf Cooperation Council rivalries have sharpened, most significantly the partnership between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, particularly in Yemen and Sudan. More concretely, the Saudi-Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement signed in September 2025 marks Pakistan’s deeper entry into the Middle East’s competitive geopolitics. While the agreement strengthens Islamabad’s security ties with Riyadh, it has also narrowed Pakistan’s diplomatic maneuverability in a region characterized by rivalries and overlapping partnerships.
This constraint has already produced tangible effects. Shortly after Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed’s visit to India, Abu Dhabi withdrew from the Islamabad International Airport project, signaling a recalibration of its investment priorities. While officially framed as a commercial decision, the timing highlighted the risks associated with over-alignment in a fragmented regional environment. For Pakistan—already economically constrained and dependent on International Monetary Fund support and funding from the Arab Gulf states—such developments underscore the costs of limited flexibility.
India’s Middle East policy thus reflects strategic autonomy and issue-based partnerships, rather than bloc politics.
In contrast, India has adopted a more balanced and multidirectional approach. Following the Emirati Letter of Intent, India held a strategic dialogue with Saudi Arabia on January 28, 2026, even as it maintained close engagement with Israel. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Israel is being prepared, building on his 2017 trip, and the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to India, originally planned for late 2025, is being rescheduled. These steps underscore the continuing partnership between India and Israel, reflecting convergence on security, technology, and regional stability. On the sidelines of the India-Arab ministerial meeting, Modi also met with the Palestinian leadership, reiterating India’s support for dialogue, stability, and a negotiated solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict.
India’s Middle East policy thus reflects strategic autonomy and issue-based partnerships, rather than bloc politics. While all relationships are valued, certain partnerships—particularly with Israel and the United Arab Emirates—carry greater strategic weight because of their economic, technological, and security significance. As Modi observed after the India-Arab League meeting, the Arab world forms part of India’s extended neighborhood, linked by civilizational ties and expanding cooperation in technology, energy, trade, and innovation.
Furthermore, India’s participation in initiatives such as India-Israel-United States-United Arab Emirates (I2U2) and the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEEC) demonstrates that its engagement is both bilateral and collective. There is growing convergence among India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States on connectivity, technology, and regional stability, strengthening India’s strategic positioning in the region.
Looking ahead, India plans sustained ministerial consultations with Arab League countries, follow-up dialogues on trade, energy, counterterrorism, and enhanced political and strategic cooperation across the Middle East. These engagements will further consolidate India’s role as a reliable regional partner while maintaining strong ties with Israel, reflecting a nuanced, balanced, and forward-looking approach.
