In certain regions of the Middle East, Islamist movements such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt that combine religious and political objectives continue to thrive despite setbacks. Defeat will not erase the ideology of groups like Hamas, Al Qaeda, or the Islamic State. Studies show that programs targeting only violence achieve limited results because they ignore root causes. Unemployment, corruption, and foreign intervention drive recruitment more powerfully than ideology alone. Deradicalization programs are likely to fail so long as they do not recognize how ideologues recruit from social and political grievances.
Deradicalization programs are likely to fail so long as they do not recognize how ideologues recruit from social and political grievances.
Social networks spread extremist perspectives. Counterterrorism practitioners observe that Islamist perspectives often reinforce familial or community ties. One policy assessment on deradicalization concluded that group loyalty outweighed loyalty to the state. Programs that engaged detainees’ families produced more lasting outcomes. Saudi Arabia and Singapore applied this lesson by counseling and offering financial assistance to detainees’ families, which reduced isolation and discouraged martyrdom. By contrast, governments that incarcerate radicals risk reinforcing extremism because prisons are often incubators of ideology. In Egypt, prisons have long served as recruitment hubs. Without community strategies, released detainees typically return to militant networks.
Saudi Arabia’s multimillion-dollar deradicalization initiative seeks to counter jihadist interpretations through religious teaching rooted in state-approved doctrine. While these programs persuade some prisoners, Saudi officials admit they cannot rehabilitate the most radical militants. Once militants fully absorb extremist ideology, even doctrinal counterarguments rarely change their views. Imprisoning militants alone never undermines the wider movement. As long as society sustains grievances, new recruits adopt the ideology. Meanwhile, Morocco trains women through its Mourchidat program to act as religious guides, promote moderate Islam, and counter extremism in mosques, prisons, and public spaces.
Some programs, however, have achieved measurable success. Effective initiatives that respect detainees’ faith traditions and enlist credible local actors to build rapport are most likely to succeed. Singapore offers a strong example. Authorities relied on Muslim teachers and psychologists for dialogue and training. They avoided shortcuts such as “good behavior” releases and instead earned detainees’ trust by involving families. Family support persuaded the detainee to reintegrate, since one wanted to abandon relatives. Scholars find that counseling, dialogue, and vocational skills reduce recidivism more than force does. Yet such programs remain costly and rare.
Case studies across the Middle East illustrate these patterns. The collapse of governance in Iraq during the 2010s left youths without order, and the Islamic State exploited the vacuum by promising both order and identity. Even after bombings, grievances such as Sunni disenfranchisement and foreign occupation allowed Islamic State remnants to adapt. In Yemen and Libya, state fragility allowed radical preachers to dominate schools and mosques. By contrast, countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia that expanded schooling and gave moderate Islamic voices space in public life saw less violent extremism.
Governments that incarcerate radicals risk reinforcing extremism because prisons are often incubators of ideology.
These outcomes support evidence that Islamist militancy attracts followers from marginalized groups or communities without opportunities to address grievances. Governments effectively disrupt the “grievance-driven” type of extremism when they provide viable alternatives through civic empowerment and economic development. However, these routes have no effect on the “ideology-driven” type of extremism, in which the prerogative toward action becomes a religious duty. This was the case with the September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda hijackers. Thus, counterterrorism strategy must take a multi-layered approach that addresses both of these types of pathways as well as ideological vulnerability, recognizing that extremists often exploit religion. One size does not fit all.
Still, the persistence of Islamist ideology shows the limit of technical fixes. Deradicalization can reduce violence, but only when it both changes minds and meets everyday needs. Experts argue that ideology serves as a tool of identity and an effort to rectify injustice. Policies that view Islamism solely as a security concern only serve to reinforce the type of oppressive rhetoric extremists use. In response to the challenge of Islamist extremism, governments should act on all four fronts: fair policing, economic opportunity, community engagement, and credible religious argumentation with true religious scholars.
