In the weeks after October 7, 2023, many Western observers assumed the Arab world would snap back into an older rhythm: mass mobilization around the Palestinian issue, coordinated diplomatic punishment of Israel, and a freeze on normalization. Instead, what followed was harsh rhetoric at summits, but limited practical escalation by the governments that have leverage.
That gap between language and action is not an accident. It reflects fatigue among key Arab states with the Palestinian cause as a governing priority.
Even amid a war that generated public anger, major Arab governments still refused to absorb large numbers of Gaza civilians as refugees.
Begin with the simplest, most visible data point: Even amid a war that generated public anger, major Arab governments still refused to absorb large numbers of Gaza civilians as refugees. This was not a matter of capability—wealthy Persian Gulf states, Egypt, and Jordan could have created temporary shelter and resettlement arrangements if they chose. The political will was absent, for reasons Arab officials routinely signal: They fear importing instability, militancy, and permanent demographic burdens; they worry that “temporary” becomes irreversible. Even temporary acceptance is broadly unpopular in at least some polling, including in Saudi Arabia. In other words, sympathy does not translate into intake—and leaders know it.
Second, behind the scenes, the logic that pulled Israel and several Arab states together did not vanish with the Gaza war; it remained, because Iran and its proxies remain. Leaked documents reported by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists describe ongoing, U.S.-facilitated military coordination among Israel and multiple Arab countries over recent years, cooperation framed around shared threats, including Iran and subterranean tunnel warfare. The same governments that denounced Israel publicly still worked with the Jewish state through a U.S. strategic framework. Arab states simply have interests more urgent than the Palestinian issue.
Third, public opinion itself is more complicated than Western activists often suggest. Arab Barometer repeatedly has shown that popular support for normalization with Israel is low across much of the region, but it is not monolithic, and it varies by country and context. More importantly for policymakers, Arab Barometer’s work underscores a broader reality: Publics across the region are preoccupied with governance failures—corruption, economic stagnation, poor services, political instability—alongside identity politics. The Palestinian issue remains potent, yet it competes with daily survival and state dysfunction. That combination creates a predictable pattern: governments can vent outrage rhetorically while prioritizing regime stability and economic strategy in practice.
Put differently, for many Arab leaders, “Palestine” is now a tool they manage, not a mission they live by. They invoke it when useful—against domestic opponents, against rivals, or against Western pressure—then quietly return to what their security elites consider existential.
There are also older political memories that never disappeared. Several Arab regimes still view Palestinian political movements as disruptive—actors who export factional conflict, challenge host governments, or entangle states in costly wars without delivering victory. That history helps explain why, when Gaza became an open wound, neighboring governments chose distance.
Several Arab regimes still view Palestinian political movements as disruptive—actors who export factional conflict, challenge host governments, or entangle states in costly wars.
Even within policy discussion circles, the term “fatigue” is not new. A Brookings Doha Center forum from years ago described the gradual decline of the Palestinian issue as a top priority for Arab publics after the uprisings and the eruption of state collapses across the region. Whatever one thinks of that framing, it aligns with what we see now: In a region dealing with civil wars, economic crises, succession questions, Iranian expansion, and Islamist insurgencies, the Palestinian cause is no longer the single organizing principle it once was.
So, what does “Arab state fatigue” mean strategically after October 7, 2023? Israel’s opponents cannot simply assume an Arab coalition will materialize on demand. Diplomatic campaigns often rely more on Western institutional pressure than on unified Arab state power. Public anger constrained but did not bury manifestations of normalization such as trade, intelligence sharing, and air defense coordination.
Western policymakers should be careful with their assumptions. If Arab governments are signaling limits by refusing refugees, they should not treat the Palestinian issue as the singular “key” that unlocks Middle East alignment. The question is not whether Arab leaders condemn Israel; they can and will. The question is what they are willing to do and what costs they are willing to pay. After October 7, 2023, especially, the answer has been less than the slogans suggest.
