The Greek Orthodox minority in Turkey is on the brink of extinction, with the community’s population dwindling to just 1,500 people, primarily comprising elderly individuals. This stark decline contrasts sharply with a century ago when the community numbered 1.4 million.
The decline can be attributed to a combination of factors such as forced repatriation, asset seizures, sustained pressure, crackdowns, unfair discrimination, profiling, relentless negative campaigning and decades-long tensions between Ankara and Athens.
The alarm bell for the dire situation of the rapidly shrinking Greek Orthodox minority was sounded in a document circulated in January at the United Nations.
“This enormous population erosion happened because subsequent governances of Turkey throughout the 1923-2003 period, pursued a systematic policy of severe discriminatory measures to force the expatriation of the members of the [Greek orthodox] minority,” the document said.
The Greek Orthodox minority in Turkey is on the brink of extinction, with the community’s population dwindling to just 1,500 people, primarily comprising elderly individuals.
The document, prepared by the Ecumenical Federation of Constantinopolitans, a nongovernmental organization with special consultative status at the UN Economic and Social Council, reveals the serious challenges facing the Greek Orthodox community in Turkey.
The US State Department’s 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom estimated that fewer than 2,500 Greek Orthodox Christians reside in Turkey. Whatever the actual number may be, the pattern is clear: The Greek Orthodox community is shrinking rapidly in predominantly Muslim Turkey and may soon face extinction.
The most severe blow to the Greek Orthodox minority occurred during a population exchange in 1923 as part of the Lausanne Treaty, which resulted in the exchange of approximately 1.2 million Christian Orthodox individuals from Turkey for nearly 400,000 Muslims from Greece.
According to the agreement, individuals residing in Istanbul and the Aegean Sea islands of Gökçeada (Imbros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos) were exempted from the forced exchange. Their numbers totaled 135,000 at the time.
However, successive Turkish governments’ open and secret pressures on the remaining minority, at times amounting to violence and forced labor, further took a toll on the Greek Orthodox minority, slashing their numbers to merely 1,500 people as of today, according to the document.
In June 1932 the Turkish government banned approximately two dozen professions of Greek Orthodox community members holding Greek citizenship, leading to the expatriation of 12,000 members from Turkey. In March 1964 Turkey designated 12,500 community members as “harmful elements” and began confiscating their properties. This process resulted in the departure of around 60,000 members from Turkey. By the turn of the century, the community population had dropped to 5,000.
The document listed some of the repressive measures specifically targeting non-Muslim community members in Turkey. For instance, in May 1941 the government conscripted all members of non-Muslim minorities aged 18-45 years, citing the risk of possible attack from Nazi Germany, whose military had reached the European borders of Turkey. These conscripted non-Muslims were employed in logistics, such as construction projects and building public parks, instead of receiving training in arms.
The most severe blow to the Greek Orthodox minority occurred during a population exchange in 1923 as part of the Lausanne Treaty, which resulted in the immigration of approximately 1.2 million Christian Orthodox individuals from Turkey.
Although the government cited the risk of war as a reason for the conscription, there was speculation that its true goal was to undermine the economic wealth of non-Muslims by depriving money-earning male members from engaging in trade and business. These conscripts were discharged after 18 months.
In November 1942, during World War II, the Turkish parliament passed a wealth tax law (Varlık Vergisi) requiring all citizens to pay a capital tax to subsidize the economy and cover the increased cost of the military, which had grown to approximately 2 million soldiers. Those who could not pay were sent to labor camps. The measure disproportionately impacted non-Muslims in Turkey, leading to the depletion of their fortunes, before it was repealed two years later.
One of the most devastating incidents that took a toll on the Greek Orthodox minority was the urban riots of 1955, believed to have been sparked by government provocateurs amid reports of the bombing of the Turkish consulate in Thessaloniki, which was the house where Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was born in 1881.
The public anger over the incident that targeted the house in Greece of Turkey’s founding father was directed at the Greek minority in Turkey, resulting in looting, vandalism and even murder. The pogrom, as the event is sometimes referred to, accelerated the departure of the minority community from Turkey, especially the Greek Orthodox. An estimated 50,000 minority members left Turkey after the attacks.
In 1962 a secret commission specifically designated for the affairs of minority groups in Turkey was established by decree from the prime minister under the name of Azınlıklar Tali Komisyonu (ATK). Its members were taken from the National Intelligence Organization (MIT), the Office of the Chief of Staff, the National Security Council and the Foreign Ministry.
The work of the ATK became pivotal in the crackdown on the Greek Orthodox community after the fighting between Turkish and Greek Cypriots in 1964. The community suffered from the ATK’s measures, such as the closure of schools, confiscation of assets and properties, forced deportations and boycotts.
The ATK was abolished in 2004 when Turkey started negotiations to become a member of the European Union. Some of the confiscated properties were returned to minority groups beginning in 2008; however, according to the document submitted to the UN, the rate of return remained at 25 percent.
The Turkish government also continues to dismiss the status of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I as the leader of the world’s approximately 300 million Orthodox Christians.
The UN document states that despite some positive changes, the main issue of the dwindling population impacting the Greek Orthodox community remains unresolved. It said the proposal made by the Ecumenical Federation of Constantinopolitans in 2010, which included the repatriation of members of the younger generation of the expatriated community, is the only way to solve the problem.
Turkey has so far not been receptive to such a proposal but adopted a stop-gap measure in 2011 to address a shortage in the management of the Greek Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate by granting citizenship to foreign archbishops. Turkey only allows Turkish citizens to vote in the patriarchate’s Holy Synod, which administers patriarchate affairs, or to be elected patriarch. The pool of potential future patriarchs with Turkish citizenship has shrunk drastically in parallel with the declining population of the Greek Orthodox community in Turkey.
The Turkish government also continues to dismiss the status of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I as the leader of the world’s approximately 300 million Orthodox Christians. It does not grant legal recognition to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which is forced to operate as a conglomeration of individual religious foundations.
According to the Turkish government’s official position, the patriarch is considered to be the religious leader solely of the country’s Greek Orthodox minority, not the leader of Christianity’s second-largest group of churches worldwide. Despite the patriarchate’s role in appointing metropolitans and bishops around the world, from Canada to New Zealand, acting as a coordination center for resolving internal problems among clergy and churches and issuing directives, the Turkish government does not recognize such authority.
In recent years, negative campaigning against the patriarchate has again gained momentum. In a statement issued by the Fatih District Governor’s Office on August 15, 2022, the use of the title “Ecumenical” by Bartholomew I was deemed illegal. The statement emphasized that under the law, the Fener Greek Patriarchate is merely a religious institution subordinate to the Fatih district governor in Istanbul province. It cited a 2007 ruling of the Supreme Court of Appeals that rejected the Ecumenical title and deemed it illegal.
The statement was issued after Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), an ally of President Erdogan, condemned the use of the Ecumenical title on a Trabzonspor football team jersey presented as a gift to Bartholomew I in Trabzon province. This occurred when Bartholomew I visited the 4th-century Sümela Monastery in Trabzon to conduct a religious ceremony.
“This heart-wrenching display is not only scandalous but also a highly provocative, destructive and harassing challenge [to Turkey],” Bahçeli said. “The provocations that have been staged one after another in recent days, the sabotage aimed at undermining our national unity and spirit of solidarity, will not deter us from our path. One of these provocations is the presentation of a Trabzonspor jersey with the word ‘Ecumenical’ written on it as a gift to Fener Greek Patriarch Bartholomew, who came to Trabzon to lead a ritual for the ninth time at Sümela Monastery,” he added.
The MHP, which has been in an alliance with Erdogan since 2015, wields significant influence in the police, judiciary, military and intelligence, shaping policies on a number of issues within the Erdogan government.
The neo-nationalists (Ulusalcı in Turkish, or Eurasianists), also in alliance with the Erdogan government since 2014, is another group that drives campaigns against the Greek Orthodox minority. This group is particularly effective in disinformation campaigns targeting the patriarchate, utilizing the media outlets it controls. Figures from the group often appear on pro-government networks to criticize the patriarchate.
Some of the leading neo-nationalists have filed criminal complaints against the patriarchate in recent years, listing Bartholomew I and others from the church as suspects who committed crimes against the Turkish constitution.
The Independent Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate, a fake patriarchate linked to Turkish intelligence and run by the neo-nationalist group in Turkey, is another actor driving the anti-patriarchate campaign in Turkey.
One of them is Cihat Yaycı, a retired admiral who had advised President Erdogan in the past and who filed a criminal complaint against Bartholomew I and Greek Orthodox Archbishop of America Elpidophoros (Ioannis Lambriniadis) in September 2023. Bartholomew I and Elpidophoros were accused of undermining the unity and integrity of the Turkish Republic, a crime punishable by an aggravated life sentence.
The Independent Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate (Bağımsız Türk Ortodoks Patrikhanesi), a fake patriarchate linked to Turkish intelligence and run by the neo-nationalist group in Turkey, is another actor driving the anti-patriarchate campaign in Turkey.
Sevgi Erenerol, the self-described media and public relations officer of the independent patriarchate, filed a criminal complaint against Bartholomew I and 12 members of the synod who made the decision to recognize the Ukrainian Church in 2019. Describing the Ecumenical Patriarchate as separatist and divisive, the complaint accused Bartholomew of becoming a tool of the United States.
Both Erenerol and Yaycı, along with dozens of neo-nationalists, were prosecuted, tried and convicted of multiple criminal violations, including plots to murder Greek Orthodox community members and assassinate Bartholomew I. However, they were released after the Erdogan government intervened in the court cases and helped whitewash their criminal activities.
It does not appear that the pressure on the Greek Orthodox community in Turkey will ease any time soon, given the political dynamics in Turkey and the close alliance of the Islamist Erdogan government with nationalist and neo-nationalist blocs.