Ahmad Sharawi, a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), spoke to a September 22 Middle East Forum Podcast (video). The following summarizes his comments:
In the various locales where the Druze live, they “remain in line with who is currently in government and seek to be part of the national fabric.”
The Druze, an “offshoot of Shia Islam,” are an ethno-religious minority concentrated in the Levant, which includes Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, and Syria. Historically, the Druze in Syria “played an essential role in the creation of the new Syrian state.” Today, some 700,000 Syrian Druze are spread across several areas, with the majority in the southern province of Suwayda (Sweida). A smaller group of Druze in Idlib province had been under the control of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, “the former jihadist coalition run by Syria’s current interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa.” Other sizable Syrian Druze communities are located just south of Damascus and in the Quneitra province bordering the Golan Heights.
Elsewhere, the Druze in Israel serve in the Israel Defense Forces and “played an essential role in the state-building project,” earning respect from and solidarity with Israel’s government and society. The Lebanese Druze “played an important role in Lebanon’s history, whether it’s during the civil war or combating Hezbollah in 2008.” Generally, in the various locales where the Druze live, they “remain in line with who is currently in government and seek to be part of the national fabric.” This strategy stems from a fear that if they form their own state, they will either be persecuted or subject to attack from a stronger neighbor.
Prior to the emergence of the Ba’ath regime in Syria in 1963, Druze had served in the Syrian government, primarily during the 1950s and early 60s, as “prime ministers, ministers of defense and army chief commanders.” Despite this, the relationship between the state and the Druze population was interrupted by “violent episodes throughout the years” against the Druze community. In 1970, Hafez al-Assad came to power and formed a relationship between the regime and the Druze.
Because of a lack of natural resources, Suwayda, where the majority of Syrian Druze live, is the most impoverished region in the country. Members of the Druze community still joined the Syrian army and became part of the regime’s security apparatus, despite the Assad regime’s severe neglect of the province. In 2011, coinciding with the “Arab Spring” uprisings across the Arab world, the Syrian civil war erupted with uprisings against the regime of Hafez’s son Bashar al-Assad. Initially, the Druze remained neutral, following their practice of staying in line with current leadership. As the civil war spread, however, daily protests against Assad grew among the Druze as they experienced crumbling infrastructure and even less government investment. These led to calls for more autonomy in Suwayda and greater separation from central government control.
Sheikh Hikmat-al Hijri, a “vocal opponent of the new government” under al-Sharaa, consolidated control in Suwayda.
As the Syrian civil war descended into sectarianism, the Druze formed militias to defend themselves. Sunni Islamist militias also formed, including the Islamic State and Jabhat-al-Nusra, Syria’s al Qaeda affiliate and the Islamist militia from which Syria’s interim president al-Sharaa emerged. In 2015, Jabhat-al-Nusra militants massacred Druze in Idlib province, and, in 2018, Islamic State led an offensive against Suwayda, killing hundreds of Druze. After the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, Druze militias, among others, celebrated liberation, but it was also the start of “a very tense relationship with the new government in Damascus.”
Lacking official political representation, the Druze leadership was represented by three sheikhs, or community religious leaders. Of the three, Sheikh Hikmat-al Hijri, a “vocal opponent of the new government” under al-Sharaa, consolidated control in Suwayda. Following Assad’s fall, Syrian forces, absent coordination with Druze leaders, attempted to enter Suwayda but were “essentially kicked out.” While some elements in the Druze community were open to integration with Damascus, calls for a decentralized system in which the Druze would govern their own affairs posed a challenge to al-Sharaa’s attempts to consolidate power.
Trust between the Druze and the new government further eroded when the latter shut the Druze out of consultations during the drafting of the interim constitution to govern Syria, thereby widening an already yawning chasm between the two. In March 2025, tensions boiled over between Sunni-Arab Bedouins and Druze militants when the Bedouins committed atrocities against Druze civilians. Although the Syrian army eventually intervened, the relationship with the state had already deteriorated to the point that the Druze were calling for complete autonomy and independence from Syria.
With a fragile ceasefire now in place, foreign ministers and diplomats are meeting to hammer out “a roadmap for stability in Suwayda.” The prevailing position in Suwayda is a demand for a “clear mechanism for accountability for the crimes” and abuses committed against the Druze in the March massacre. The Druze’s priorities are to “preserve their local characteristics and religious distinctiveness, ” along with an increase in humanitarian aid.
The Druze’s priorities are to “preserve their local characteristics and religious distinctiveness, ” along with an increase in humanitarian aid.
The Syrian government has agreed to an international investigation and accountability, but the Druze leadership insists on full autonomy and is willing to defend their territory from Syrian armed forces. In most Arab regions, “ceding territory is a sign of weakness” and akin to a loss of honor. For the Druze, control of their own territory is “a representation of their identity.”
By focusing on economic development and reconstruction in the war-torn country, Al-Sharaa is positioning himself as the only “pillar of stability” for a unified Syria. While he excels in his quest for normalizing and legitimizing his consolidation of power, “he still needs to work more on the domestic side of affairs.” The Trump administration’s support for Syria must be based on “tangible changes on the domestic front, which include giving rights or giving minorities a right in the political process, and accountability for those who have committed crimes against Syria’s diverse communities.”
