Kaye, an academic who took part in low-level negotiations between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran while at the RAND Corporation and the Wilson Center, here examines U.S. policy toward Iran under the Islamic Republic. While not dismissing Tehran’s record of anti-American behavior, she assigns ultimate responsibility for steady animosity between the two governments in this period to a Washington policy culture overly biased against engaging in diplomacy with Iran.

To this reviewer, however, the facts presented in this book do not substantiate that premise. The Islamic Republic never behaved in a completely aboveboard manner toward Washington, making Kaye’s “what if” scenarios merely speculative, with no evidence that Tehran would have responded like a “normal” state. Further, she shows that some officials in Washington pursued talks with Tehran and that every president sought a peaceful bargain. In 2009, for example, Barack Obama went to great lengths not to appear threatening to Tehran.

The author does not sufficiently engage with the broader question: Why even engage with Iran? Kaye cites U.S. negotiations with the Soviet Union and with Iran under the shah to demonstrate that states with differing ideologies can establish reasonable relations. But U.S.-Soviet détente was predicated on preventing a planet-destroying war. Since the shah did not view the United States as an existential enemy, such comparisons are of limited value. Kaye also fails to address the question of how Washington could attain normal relations with the Islamic Republic without capitulating to it.

That said, Kaye conducted interviews with key players and her book is well sourced. Her interviews with exiled Iranians, however, are limited to leftist figures. Specifically, she did not interview any of the conservative U.S. policymakers she blames for the “enduring hostility.” Indeed, bias creeps into some of her assertions, such as her description of Michael Ledeen—admired by many Iranians for his unwavering support for their freedom movement—as “associated with back-channel dealings with dubious Iranian dissidents with links to Israel.”

That Kaye, who claims to be an Iran expert, does not know the Iranian opposition’s arguments and dismisses its concerns reveals a superficial knowledge of the topic. She incorrectly characterizes supporters of Reza Pahlavi (the shah’s son) as being on the “far right” and expresses surprise at an Iranian dissident’s claim that international human rights organizations avoid criticizing Iran, only to cite reports by those same organizations (Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch) to refute it.

Arguments for engaging with Tehran will surely proliferate in the aftermath of the 2026 U.S.–Iran war, potentially giving Kaye’s book a substantial audience. Readers would do well, though, to pair it with a more skeptical account of U.S.-Iranian diplomatic history, such as The Secret War with Iran by Ronen Bergman or Countdown to Crisis by Kenneth Timmerman.

Sophie Baron
New York City