Iran’s Use of Psychological Warfare Against Its Adversaries and Strategies for Deterrence

The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB)—Iran’s state-controlled media corporation—holds a monopoly over the country’s domestic radio and television services. ¹ Accordingly, it plays a central role in Iran’s psychological operations against political adversaries—operations commonly understood as components of the regime’s “soft war.” ² The IRIB operates alongside news outlets affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as well as a network of IRGC-controlled psychological warfare units and front companies. Together, these entities form the core of Iran’s state-directed influence apparatus that target adversaries. As of March 13, 2025, the IRIB controls approximately 376 million U.S. dollars (about 35,000 billion tomans) that it allocates toward psychological warfare.³ In recent years, the U.S. Treasury Department has sanctioned the IRIB and affiliated media organizations for their involvement in human rights violations. ⁴ However, these sanctions have not significantly impeded the IRIB’s initiatives.

Over time, the regime’s propaganda warfare tactics have evolved into a comprehensive system of influence operations. ⁵ These activities have not only expanded Tehran’s reach beyond its borders but also endangered the national security of its adversaries. ⁶ They range from incitement and orchestrated unrest to the recruitment of foreign nationals who carry out acts of terrorism and sabotage, and engage in espionage across Europe and North America. ⁷

The U.S. Treasury Department’s sanctions⁸ have frequently targeted the financial arms of the IRIB, aiming to impose financial costs on the managers and authorities who oversee the regime’s propaganda apparatus. However, these measures have largely failed to disrupt the IRIB’s operations in any meaningful way. A key reason for this failure has been the active role played by Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in helping these entities to evade sanctions.⁹

Over time, the regime’s propaganda warfare tactics have evolved into a comprehensive system of influence operations. These activities have not only expanded Tehran’s reach beyond its borders but also endangered the national security of its adversaries.

This paper draws on six years of comprehensive research focused on identifying the threats posed by Iran’s propaganda warfare apparatus against regime critics. Its principal goal is to recommend effective strategies to fully neutralize these threats.

The People of Iran: The Regime’s Primary Target in Its Propaganda Warfare

Newspapers and news websites affiliated with the IRGC—such as Fars News, Tasmin News, Masregh News, and Javan Newspaper—along with the IRIB’s news programs and channels, including the Islamic Republic of Iran News Network (IRINN), have employed systematic operation techniques against regime enemies. ¹⁰ These tactics are embedded in nearly every news item produced by the IRGC and IRIB. The overarching objective is twofold: to bolster the morale of Persian-speaking regime supporters and to break the resolve of Persian-speaking opponents.

To maximize the effectiveness of its propaganda operations, the IRGC has deployed signal jammers to disrupt radio and satellite transmissions from international news outlets that deliver unfiltered information to Iranian audiences. These efforts support both IRIB and IRGC-affiliated media propaganda campaigns. For over four decades, radio signals from Radio Free Europe and Voice of America (VOA) have been routinely jammed in major Iranian cities. Farsi-language satellite TV channels, such as VOA Persian, have faced similar disruptions. ¹¹ In addition to jamming, the Iranian regime blocks access to most major Persian- and non-Persian language news websites.¹² Without proxies or VPNs to bypass these state-imposed internet restrictions, access to these platforms is virtually impossible.

During nationwide anti-regime protests, Iran’s security forces launch crackdowns that restrict internet access for the entire population.¹³ These shutdowns prevent Iranians from using VPNs to access independent news websites. At the same time, the IRGC’s state media and the broader Iranian state apparatus intensify their propaganda operations. The key objective is to boost the morale of the security forces and their families while breaking the spirit of the protesting public. The regime’s actions include airing footage of arrests and coerced confessions from detained protesters and political prisoners.¹⁴ They also involve spreading misinformation and disinformation about the protests, falsely linking them to foreign enemy states.¹⁵ Peaceful protestors are routinely portrayed as terrorists or saboteurs to justify Tehran’s extrajudicial killings.¹⁶

The Iranian Opposition: The Regime’s Second Key Target in Its Propaganda Warfare

The Iranian regime’s intelligence and security apparatus utilize the IRIB, along with a cluster of foreign-based and unofficial news websites under its control, to erode public trust in Iranian opposition figures. Their secondary objective is to sow discord within the Iranian opposition,¹⁷thereby weakening its efforts to build a unified front against the regime. To enhance the effectiveness of propaganda campaigns, the IRGC’s Cyber Command operates a soft war headquarter dedicated to psychological operations (PSYOPS). This unit is tasked with planning, directing, and executing PSYOPS that target both the Iranian opposition and foreign adversary governments.

Additionally, the IRGC contracts a mix of state-run and privately-controlled cultural organizations to produce propaganda content for its news media.¹⁸ The dissemination of this content is carried out by soft war cyber battalions, primarily made up of Basij members—a paramilitary branch of the IRGC. ¹⁹ The battalions conduct psychological operations, paid or unpaid, against regime critics.²⁰ Their victims include journalists, human rights activists, and opposition figures inside Iran and abroad.

Most members of the soft war army undergo basic and advanced training in psychological operations before deployment. ²¹ Once trained, they are tasked with conducting influence campaigns across social media platforms, such as Telegram, Twitter (now X), and Instagram. These operatives often lead large teams and coordinate operations either from Basij bases in Iran or remotely from homes or offices.²²Additionally, non-Persian speaking soft war agents, selected by the IRGC’s Intelligence agents through Islamic Centers in European and North America, are brought to Iran for training.²³There, they join foreign scholarship students enrolled in government-run seminaries where they receive specialized training in influence and psychological operations.²⁴ Upon completing their training, these agents return to their home countries to carry out assigned operations. Each is overseen by a handler, typically a PSYOPS officer from the IRGC.²⁵ These handlers may be active-duty officers or reservists who oversee cultural organizations or operate companies owned by, or contracted with, the IRGC’s soft war headquarters.²⁶

Most members of the soft war army undergo basic and advanced training in psychological operations before deployment. Once trained, they are tasked with conducting influence campaigns across social media platforms, such as Telegram, Twitter (now X), and Instagram. These operatives often lead large teams and coordinate operations either from Basij bases in Iran or remotely from homes or offices.

In addition to soft war agents who openly identify as pro-regime, the IRGC operates clusters of troll farms and cyber armies whose members pose as ordinary citizens or even as supporters of opposition groups.²⁷ While appearing anti-regime, these members actively manage accounts that produce and disseminate misinformation and disinformation.²⁸ Documented cases show that Iranian security forces managed to identify the individuals behind prominent anti-regime accounts on Twitter (X), arrested them,²⁹ and subsequently coerced them into cooperation in exchange for reduced sentences. In some instances, IRGC PSYOPS officers took direct control of these accounts, using them to conduct espionage and disseminate false or misleading information.

Since 2022, thousands of Persian- and non-Persian-speaking soft war officers and IRGC agents have been deployed in covert PSYOPS against Iranian opposition figures, journalists, and activists while posing as regime opponents. Many impersonate monarchists or supporters of Reza Pahlavi.³⁰Regime- controlled state media picks up and republishes their content, falsely attributing it to the Iranian opposition. This tactic—known as “saying the lie from the mouth of the enemy”—is designed to fracture the opposition by making disinformation appear as though it originated from within the movement itself.

Posing as regime opponents, soft war agents frequently carry out character assassination campaigns against opposition leaders and human rights activists, particularly women. These campaigns typically intensify after targeted activists have been arrested, sentenced to death, or executed. Their goal is to discredit reports on the activists’ prosecution and erode public sympathy. When the campaigns fail or are deemed ineffective, soft war agents pivot to a different tactic: falsely associating targeted activists with the regime itself. This strategy is designed to break their morale and weaken solidarity opposition protests. Under such pressure, some supporters withdraw from activism altogether. In extreme cases, targeted activists have been driven to suicide.³¹

In 2022, a leaked archive from the IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency revealed that Iranian soft war PSYOPS strategists, including Parviz Amini and Pouria Astarki, had been commissioned to train journalists in psychological operations.[³²] Their books and training manuals on PSYOPS were used as instructional materials in soft war training programs at Tehran’s Fars News College.

Incitement to Terrorism and Riot in Europe Through Influence Operations

The majority of non-Persian speaking soft war agents contracted and trained by the IRGC are primarily put in charge of spreading regime propaganda to foreign audiences. However, some agents are based abroad and operate independently, creating original propaganda content supportive of Tehran’s objectives. Their goal is to expand the regime’s influence among local Muslim communities and students who sympathize with leftist and communist ideologies.

These influence agents—also referred to as elite PSYOPS operatives—radicalize and persuade their targets to participate in a range of activities, including anti-Israel protests, university encampments, riots, acts of sabotage, terrorism, and espionage. Elite IRGC soft war agents, who are non-Persian speakers, produce a variety of content—such as news articles, podcasts, and videos—which they disseminate across platforms like Instagram, Twitter (X), TikTok, and Telegram. They build networks by recruiting followers to share and amplify regime news or aligned content. Over time, these followers are gradually influenced to engage in more serious activities, including sabotage, rioting, and terrorism.

In 2024, following the German government’s closure of the Islamic Center of Hamburg (also known as the Blue Mosque), and the deportation of its imam to Iran, the regime’s influence agents produced propaganda content to mobilize the local Muslim community and leftist-communist activists to protest the shutdown.³³ The author’s investigation revealed that these agents had received specialized soft war training in Qom, Iran, suggesting a coordinated effort by Tehran to shape and manipulate public opinion in Germany.³⁴ Since 2009, most members of the IRGC-affiliated Basij paramilitary organization have participated in intensive soft war operations training.³⁵Comprehensive courses—often exceeding 100 hours—introduce trainees to specialized topics and techniques in psychological warfare.³⁶ Upon graduation, these trainees go on to direct PSYOPS activities against designated targets, such as Iranian opposition journalists and media outlets, women’s rights advocacy groups, and pro-Israel propaganda campaigns.

Basij members admitted to top Iranian universities through the IRGC’s special admissions quota are often awarded government-funded scholarships to pursue undergraduate studies at prestigious Western universities. While studying abroad, many actively collaborate with anti-Israel and Marxist/Communist groups, some even assuming leadership roles in organizing protests in support of Hamas and Hezbollah.³⁷ The IRGC’s soft war PSYOPS training equips them with the skills to conduct anti-Israel operations beyond Iran’s borders.³⁸

Israel and the United States: Primary Targets of the IRIB’s Non-Persian News TV

The IRIB and the IRGC operate an extensive network of non-Persian-language news outlets specifically designed to produce and disseminate PSYOPS aimed at Israel, the United States, and their citizens. Notable examples include Al-Alam (Arabic), Press TV (English and French), and Hispan TV (Spanish).³⁹ The IRIB employs a combination of Iranian and non-Iranian journalists, producers, and editors to run its international media operations with correspondents and film crews based both inside Iran and abroad. To strengthen its global propaganda operations, the IRIB also relies on non-Iranian journalists and propagandists stationed in Europe, Canada, and the United States.

In 2022, the author obtained a multi-gigabyte archive of internal Press TV materials. This archive proved instrumental in identifying non-Iranian journalists and propagandists linked to Press TV and Hispan TV, and in shedding light on the types of propaganda they produced.⁴⁰

Iranian and non-Iranian journalists and correspondents working for the IRIB’s non-Persian language news channels—particularly Press TV—have frequently been implicated in espionage activities on behalf of the IRGC’s Intelligence Organization (IRGCIO). One prominent case is that of Marzieh Hashemi (born Melanie Franklin), a Press TV presenter who was arrested by the FBI in February 2019 while visiting the United States.⁴¹Hashemi is known to have played a role in recruiting Sergeant Monica Witt, a former U.S. Air Force Intelligence Specialist who later defected to Iran and was charged with espionage.⁴² Beyond this case, numerous other journalists, correspondents, editors, and producers affiliated with the IRIB’s non-Persian outlets have collaborated with Iranian nationals abroad to transfer funds in support of espionage and terrorist operations. ⁴³

The IRIB’s Cluster of Unofficial Non-Persian News Websites

In 2020, Mohammad Marandi, one of the founders of Press TV and a key strategist behind its propaganda operations, authored a proposal advocating for the use of non-Iranian, non-Persian-speaking content writers and creators to establish and manage a network of ostensibly independent news websites.⁴⁴ Marandi’s primary goal was to deploy these platforms as covert instruments to spread disinformation and misinformation while obscuring any connection with Iran’s state media or intelligence apparatus. In an email dated August 31, 2020, Mohammad Marandi formally introduced the idea of creating non-Persian-language news websites with no visible ties to the Iranian regime.⁴⁵ The message, sent to Ahmad Norouzi—then CEO of Press TV—included a detailed proposal and a list of recommended individuals to serve as potential editors for these outlets.

In October 2022, these covert media websites played a central role in publishing disinformation and misinformation in support of Iran’s security forces amid the nationwide protests sparked by the murder of Mahsa Amini. Initially, the outlets denied Amini’s murder had taken place. Later, under growing public scrutiny, they shifted their narrative, acknowledging Amini’s death but falsely blaming it on the Iranian opposition. Protesters killed during the demonstrations were deliberately mischaracterized as foreign agents, justifying violent repression and prosecution. Independent Iranian journalists—including the author of this report—who exposed the regime’s human rights abuses during the crackdown were falsely branded by these outlets as CIA or Mossad operatives to delegitimize their reporting.⁴⁶

How Can Iran’s State-Sponsored Psychological Warfare Be Deterred?

In recent years, the Iranian regime has effectively employed various tactics to evade sanctions and maintain uninterrupted operations for the IRIB and its foreign language media arms. Non-Iranian journalists and propaganda content producers have been paid either through Iranian diplomats or via money exchange companies that wire funds to their bank accounts in Europe.

To counter Iran’s psychological warfare operations, the U.S. Treasury Department should impose sanctions on propaganda content creators affiliated with the IRIB, whether operating inside Iran or abroad. In addition, money exchange firms—such as Shenzhen Godxin Industrial Co. Ltd.—that facilitate payments to foreign-based IRIB employees, journalists, and propagandists should also be penalized. Companies involved in wiring payments for satellite services used by IRIB media outlets should likewise be included in future sanctions. Moreover, the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Treasury Department ought to combine these measures with diplomatic pressure to compel satellite service providers to terminate their contracts with the IRIB. As of March 2025, IRIB-affiliated channels—including Al-Alam, Press TV, and Hispan TV—continue to broadcast via multiple satellites, most notably Nilesat 201, Express AM, Yamal 402, Arabsat (Badr 5), Eutelsat (Hotbird 13B), Telstar 12, Hispasat 30W-5, Intelsat 20/21, Paksat 1R, and Galaxy 19.⁴⁷

While imposing sanctions on the IRIB remains crucial, deterring the IRGC’s broader media apparatus, such as its soft war PSYOPS armies and operatives, is even more critical. As of March 2025, the United Kingdom has announced plans to confront the regime’s influence agents, including propagandists working for Iranian state media and its non-Persian-speaking soft war PSYOPS counterparts.⁴⁸ In light of this development, the U.S. State Department should pursue coordinated negotiations with European countries and Canada to address the activities of Iran’s influence agents.

While imposing sanctions on the IRIB remains crucial, deterring the IRGC’s broader media apparatus, such as its soft war PSYOPS armies and operatives, is even more critical.

In addition to tightening sanctions on the IRIB and prosecuting PSYOPS agents operating outside Iran, it is imperative that the United States and other Western countries impose sanctions on the news editors, journalists, and producers working for IRIB and IRGC-affiliated media outlets. In October 2022, hackers leaked a list of IRGC-affiliated journalists who had received specialized training as soft war PSYOPS agents. Many of the trainers and PSYOPS strategists that direct these operatives are either active-duty or reserve members of the IRGCIO, or agents of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence, and should therefore be subject to sanctions. These individuals often participate in the interrogation of political prisoners and the extraction of false confessions, which state media then broadcasts for propaganda purposes.

Following the brutal October 7 terrorist attacks by Hamas on Israel, anti-Israel and pro-Hamas/Hezbollah protests and riots erupted in major cities and on university campuses across Australia, Canada, Europe, and the United States. These demonstrations sought to influence Western government policies regarding the conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon. The Iranian regime exploited this unrest by deploying its influence agents—including current and former soft war operatives—to help organize and lead demonstrations. The imposition of stricter sanctions by Western governments targeting Iran’s propaganda warfare tactics would significantly curtail the regime’s capacity to conduct influence operations and help protect the integrity of democratic institutions and media environments.

Babak Taghvaee is a Europe-based defense and security journalist, researcher, historian, and author. As an expert in Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), he has authored hundreds of evidence-based reports and articles for media outlets including Radio Free Europe, Israel Hayom, and the BBC.

¹ https://ircud.ir/fa/content/294487/%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B1%D8%B3%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%84%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AD%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%AC%D9%87-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84-1404-%DA%A9%D9%84

² https://www.tabnak.ir/fa/news/1049735/جنگ-نرم-چیست

³ https://asianews.ir/آسیانیوز---بودجه-صدا-و-سیما

⁴ https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1109; https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=15764

⁵ https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence/the-iran-threat

⁶ https://www.dw.com/en/german-state-bans-islamic-center-over-alleged-hamas-links/a-70202681

⁷ https://therecord.media/iran-britain-kidnapping-murder-plots-dan-jarvis-mi5; https://www.radiofarda.com/a/how-iran-intelligence-use-iranians-abroad-in-favor-of-its-operations/31361571.html; and https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgeke2r6zno

⁸ https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1109

⁹https://x.com/BabakTaghvaee1/status/1833420566629351506

¹⁰
https://farsnews.ir/showcase; https://www.tasnimnews.com; https://www.mashreghnews.ir; https://www.javanonline.ir; and https://www.iribnews.ir

¹¹https://spacenews.com/eutelsat-says-satellite-jammers-within-iran-are-disrupting-foreign-channels/

¹² https://freedomhouse.org/country/iran/freedom-net/2024