What Can Washington Learn From Germany’s War on Iran’s Influence Operations?

Ahnaf Kalam

The Islamic Republic invests in and controls a cluster of Islamic centers in major European countries and the United States to spread its ideology and radicalize local Shiite communities. Iran’s Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance has long supervised their operations. Recently, however, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has also joined their efforts.

These Iran-linked Islamic centers have become potent influence operation weapons for both the Iranian regime in general and the IRGC specifically. They not only spread extremist Shiite ideology but also recruit operatives among local populations for the Qods Force and the Revolutionary Guards’ “Soft War” psychological operations headquarters to carry out espionage and terrorism against Israeli and American interests, as well as Iranian dissidents.

On July 24, 2024, the German government closed the Islamic Center of Hamburg, locally known as the Blue Mosque, because of its role in the Iranian regime’s influence operations following Hamas’ October 7 attack on Israel. It was a smart move. Over the past three years, the Qods Force, in collaboration with the IRGC Soft War headquarters, has sent recruits from the Blue Mosque to Qom to train in influence operations. Upon their return, these individuals organized pro-Hamas and anti-Israel protests across Germany.

These influence operations agents also liaised between the IRGC and various German anti-war and peace groups in order to turn public opinion in Germany against Israel and in favor of Hamas. These operatives also produced German-language propaganda that they pushed out in videos and on podcasts and social media platforms. These, in turn, serve as tools to broaden their recruiting base, especially to further espionage against Iranian opposition activists in Germany and elsewhere.

Similar Islamic centers with links to Iran’s Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance and IRGC exist in the United States. The Iranian regime activated them in the aftermath of the Hamas war to organize anti-Israel protests. There is no shortage of evidence, yet the FBI has taken no serious measures to shutter them or charge their leaders with violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

Washington should take a lesson from Berlin. Closure of Iran-linked Islamic centers disrupts and deters regime influence operations in the West. Tehran’s desperation to keep these centers open reflects the value the Islamic Republic assigns to them. After the closure of the Islamic Center of Hamburg, for example, both the Iranian regime and the IRGC sought to compel the German government to reconsider. They first closed two Tehran branches of a German language institute, founded by the German Embassy nearly 30 years ago, on August 20, 2024, and then used other Islamic centers in Germany and their influence operations agents to protest in Berlin four days later against the Hamburg closure. The Iran-backed centers sent participants from across Germany to Berlin.

The German government did not bow to the pressure. Rather than cave to blackmail, they held firm. They not only rejected the demand to reopen the Hamburg Islamic Center but also designated its head, Mohammad Hadi Mofatteh, as persona non grata, ordering him to return to Iran by September 11.

Germany does not always hold steady in the face of pressure, but the evidence in the Hamburg case was too great to ignore. Germany’s firmness pays off and Germans are more secure. The Biden administration and its successor should take note. Diplomats may see moral clarity as inconvenient and an impediment to diplomatic progress, but the opposite is true. The Islamic Republic will use all avenues at its disposal to seize advantage from Western freedoms and to undermine adversaries. Recognizing and standing up to the Iranian threat not only wins security locally, but also advances peace far more than compromise.

Babak Taghvaee is a European-based journalist covering Iranian aviation and defense issues.

Babak Taghvaee is a European-based journalist covering Iranian aviation and defense issues.
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