Why Libya’s Water Crisis and Military Exercises Won’t Cure Its Fragmentation

As Libya moves through the early weeks of 2026, a persistent “thirst for unity” is often cited by international observers as the inevitable force that will finally pull the nation’s rival administrations together. The catalyst for this optimism is the “National Integrated Plan for Water Security 2050,” a technical roadmap designed to save a nation whose renewable water supply meets less than 20% of its annual demand.However, an analysis of the ground reality suggests that this “Hydraulic Diplomacy” is more mirage than miracle. In a land defined by institutional necrosis and competing foreign occupations, the existential threat of thirst is more likely to be weaponized than resolved.

The foundational hope for unity rests on the Great Man-Made River (GMMR), a 4,000-kilometer network of pipes and 1,300 wells that transports fossil water daily from the Saharan aquifers to the coastal centers.Proponents of the 2050 Plan argue that the shared reliance on the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System necessitates a “functionalist” convergence. Yet, the history of the last decade proves that in Libya, interdependence is merely a vulnerability to be exploited.

During the civil conflicts of 2014 and 2019, the GMMR became a primary theater of “water weaponization.” Armed groups, including those loyal to the Libyan National Army (LNA), have frequently stormed control stations to shut off Tripoli’s water supply as a means of political coercion.With the GMMR crossing contested zones that are nearly impossible to securitize, the 2050 Plan’s requirement for a unified maintenance protocol and a single electrical grid is a technical fantasy. For the rival elites in Tripoli and Benghazi, controlling the flow of water is a more valuable tool for survival than the long-term sustainability of the aquifer.

The “institutional necrosis” of Libya further undermines any technocratic path to unity. The Central Bank of Libya (CBL) and the National Oil Corporation (NOC) have become “zombie” institutions—entities that are “undead,” incapable of fulfilling positive functions but representing a constant threat to stability. As of mid-2025, the CBL remains in a “catastrophic” state, unable to conduct effective monetary policy while parallel currency markets devalue the dinar.

This economic fragmentation is not an accident; it is a feature of a centralized model where factions compete not for governance, but for total control of oil wealth.The 2024 oil shutdowns, which cost the nation $2 billion in lost production, demonstrate that the “political incumbents and armed groups” are perfectly willing to cannibalize the economy to maintain their specific patronage networks.

The most significant barriers to a unified Libya are the regional “malign actors” who have transitioned from temporary meddlers to permanent stakeholders.

1. The Russian “Africa Corps”: Following the collapse of the Syrian regime in late 2024, Russia has repositioned Libya as its primary military hub for projecting power into the Mediterranean and the Sahel. Through a 25-year tripartite protocol with the LNA and Belarus, Moscow has secured 11.7 square kilometers of the port of Tobruk, including naval logistics facilities and UAV launch pads. Russia is not seeking a unified Libya; it is building a “long-range staging point” for operations in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso.
2. The Turkish “Blue Homeland”: Ankara’s military mandate has been extended until January 2028, granting President Erdogan sweeping authority to protect Turkish interests. While Turkey has engaged in a “pragmatic recalibration” by talking to the eastern administrations, its core goal remains the legitimization of the 2019 maritime deal, which grants it access to a $1.5 trillion energy zone in the Eastern Mediterranean.A unified, sovereign Libyan government might renegotiate or cancel these “legally invalid” agreements, making the current state of “adversarial collaboration” between Turkey and Russia much more attractive to Ankara than true Libyan independence.

The U.S.-led “Flintlock 2026” exercise, slated to take place near the ceasefire line in Sirte, is marketed as a “tangible demonstration” of military unification. By bringing together units from both the western Government of National Unity (GNU) and the LNA, Washington hopes to foster a professional security culture.

However, deep skepticism remains regarding the LNA’s willingness to break its “deeply-vested” ties with Moscow.Critics argue that participation in these exercises without strict ethical conditionality only serves to modernize the strike capabilities of armed groups that remain implicated in human rights abuses, including unlawful killings and the repression of civil society.

The “Thirst for Unity” in Libya is a biological reality for its 7.3 million citizens, but it is a political impossibility for its leaders. The 2050 Water Plan and military training exercises like Flintlock 2026 are technocratic band-aids on a body politic that is being systematically dismantled by local greed and foreign geostrategy. As long as the “zombie” institutions continue to provide rent for militias and the Russian and Turkish militaries maintain their decades-long mandates, any talk of a “unified state” remains a desert mirage. True stability requires not just a technical roadmap for water, but a total dismantling of the conflict economy that makes anarchy the most profitable industry in the Mediterranean basin.

Published originally on January 14, 2026.