Iran’s Blockade of the Strait of Hormuz Is Destined to Fail

Oil is again over $100 per barrel, gasoline prices have risen up to 40 cents a gallon at the pumps, and the Iranians released a statement in Mojtaba Khamenei’s name declaring, “for certain, the leverage of blocking the Strait of Hormuz should continue to be used.”

Iranian forces have attacked 16 tankers in the Strait and Persian Gulf since the war began on February 28, 2026.

On March 11-12, suicide drone speed boats attacked the Marshall Islands-flagged Safesea Vishnu and the Malta-flagged Zefyros, setting them ablaze. While much of the media conflated this attack with the Hormuz closure, it was actually 350 miles away, close to the Iraqi port of al-Fao.

Some analysts say oil could spike to $200 a barrel. The Foundation for Defense of Democracy’s Mark Dubowitz, long an advocate for regime change, even tweeted, “success would be a militarily decisive victory that leaves the regime in place—but with its deadly capabilities severely degraded,” at least in the short-term.

But this Iranian play is nothing new, and panic is unwarranted.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps first sought to close the Strait of Hormuz, mining both it and the Gulf of Oman four decades ago. President Ronald Reagan responded by reflagging Kuwaiti tankers and, when the U.S. guided-missile frigate Samuel B. Roberts hit a mine, blowing a 15-foot hole in its hull, injuring ten sailors. In response, Reagan ordered Operation Praying Mantis, destroying two oil platforms, sinking Iranian naval ships, and Revolutionary Guards’ speedboats.

A joke from shortly after asked why the Iranian navy had purchased glass-bottom boats. The answer? So they could see their air force.

Oil prices surged but then dropped quickly about two weeks later, on one day falling by 5%.

Iran’s ability to sustain closure is short for two reasons. First, Iran has relied on imports of refined gasoline for decades due to its own lack of investment in its refineries and pipeline networks.

If the closure lasts much longer, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ vehicles will run out of fuel. The clock is ticking, and the men controlling Mojtaba’s avatar simply hope Washington will kneecap itself with a vortex of panic and political warfare rather than assess the facts objectively.

Iran has a limited number of ports, even including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ “invisible jetties.” Iranian docks, jetties, and ships are fair targets. Just as the war has depleted the regime’s missiles and drones, it should now destroy its speedboat fleet, a task in the 21st century for drones.

The Gulf Cooperation Council was formed in 1981 to contain and deter Iran’s Islamic Revolution. Ironically, it never coalesced in more than theory until this month, when the Iranian regime began attacking every Gulf Arab state, including Qatar and Oman, both of which professed neutrality but had long sympathized with Tehran. Utilizing drones and its own manned fighter-jet fleet would be a natural mission for each Gulf state, each of which has an interest in preserving its own freedom of navigation. The Emiratis especially have the capability and motive, given Iran’s attacks on Dubai as well as Iranian occupation of Persian Gulf islands claimed by the United Arab Emirates.

U.S. authorities should clear every island in the Persian Gulf from which the regime targets shipping. This means not only the three disputed islands—Abu Musa, Greater Tonb, and Lesser Tonb—but also Farsi Island from which the regime once seized U.S. sailors, Sirri; and Hengam, Larak, and Hormuz, islands which control the sea lanes off the more populated Qeshm Island.

While Trump does not want to put boots on the ground, he might announce that the Revolutionary Guard units on the islands have 24 hours to evacuate, after which the United States will conclude that any forces and population remaining on the islands are hostile forces subject to carpet bombing. While Trump opposes boots on the ground, subduing and controlling the islands could be a mission for the U.S. Special Forces.

Beyond attacking speedboats and their docks, other targets might include the fuel the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps relies on. Diesel and gasoline storage at Iranian ports is limited, and Iranian forces are not well-positioned to replenish them.

Iranian drones, of course, will also pose a problem, but the Iranian drone fleet is not monolithic. The Islamic Republic uses its over-the-horizon, long-range, and long-endurance drones to attack Israel, the United Arab Emirates, or Saudi Arabia; it reserves its older models for short-range operations that sometimes cannot even operate beyond line-of-sight.

This means operations along a relatively narrow strip of land could significantly reduce the drone threat. Previously, President Donald Trump called on Iranian officials to defect. He should now declare a no-fly, no-drive zone extending over every Iranian island and five miles inland along Iran’s Persian Gulf coast to continue until the regime stops attacking shipping.

Leadership requires attacking the problem head-on and eradicating it, rather than engaging in workarounds that can do more harm than good. The Department of the Treasury’s decision to offer waivers for India to purchase Russian oil not only allows Russia to fuel another war but also creates a moral hazard that could see Russia—or other adversaries in the future—support proxies interfering in energy trade to profit themselves.

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz is a problem, but not one that is either permanent or on the same level as the Islamic Republic’s nuclear, missile, and drone program, or its support for proxies.

America in the age of TikTok is prone to political panic. Some senators might want to score points, but Trump should focus on the long game.

Just like those who criticized the arrest of Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega or objected to the liberation of Kuwait, those who seek to cave to Iranian extortion will find their statements and reputations do not age well.