Turkey to Declare S-400 ‘Inoperable’ to Gain F-35 Stealth Fighter Deal

President Donald Trump met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the White House on September 25, 2025, following the appearance of both leaders at the United Nations General Assembly.

Trump actively seeks to reset U.S. relations with Turkey following years of strain that culminated in Turkey’s expulsion from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program and, nine months later, the imposition of Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) secondary sanction on the wayward NATO member on December 14, 2020 for engaging in “significant transactions” with Russia’s defense sector.

Erdoğan is desperate to regain access to the F-35 for two reasons. First, Turkey reverse-engineers American technology to pollinate its own defense industry and, second, with Turkey’s regional rivals—Israel, then the United Arab Emirates, and Greece each getting the F-35—Turkey fears being left behind qualitatively.

Congress initially passed CAATSA to target Russia, North Korea, and Iran; that Erdoğan pushed Turkey into CAATSA designation was a strategic blunder and a reflection either on the sheer incompetence of Turkey’s politicized Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Erdoğan’s refusal to listen to counsel.

The problem now for Trump is that, as much as he would like to remove sanctions on Turkey, he cannot do so unilaterally.

The president can report to Congress that lifting sanctions is in the “vital national security interests” of the United States, but Congress has 30 days to review the president’s proposed waiver.

The S-400 cannot be waived away and is not easily moved, even if Russia purchased it back.

Consequently, Trump’s technical team has sought to create a loophole, according to 4 sources familiar with discussions on the matter. Turkey will remove a component from the S-400 and declare it ‘inoperable’.

It would be the anti-aircraft system equivalent of rendering a rifle inoperable by removing the bolt or taking the firing pin out of other firearms.

The problem, of course, is that removing the pin does not permanently destroy the firearm; it is reversible.

Suppose Congress allows Trump and perhaps Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth to declare the S-400 neutralized because Turkey removes a single component. In that case, they may enable Trump’s short-term sale of F-35s to Turkey to proceed, but this could create a long-term disaster.

Trump, for example, wants Iran to dismantle its nuclear program. If Iran cites the Turkey precedent, especially with a president in the Oval Office more conducive toward Tehran, then it needs only to remove a few screws or take a step that it could reverse in a matter of days, if not hours. North Korea, too, could deploy new missiles along the demilitarized zone, but then render them inoperable in the same manner that Trump accepts with the S-400.

In short, while Trump may wish to placate Erdoğan by providing him with the F-35s he craves and while he is willing to strong-arm Congress to get his way, much more is at stake than just the U.S.-Turkey relationship.

If Turkey’s desire to have the F-35 is purely about NATO, another compromise is possible. Other European NATO states, not only Greece, but also Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and the United Kingdom, also have or will soon have the F-35. Perhaps Erdoğan can allow these countries to utilize Turkish airfields for the alliance’s common defense. Erdoğan might balk, but he cannot have it both ways.

Just as Trump and Congress called Erdoğan’s bluff during Trump’s first term when Erdoğan cast his lot with Russia, Trump and Congress can call the Turkish leader’s bluff again to show NATO interests and the alliance’s defense are less his interests than having a platform that could kill Kurds, threaten neighbors, or assist Hamas against Israel.