Following the Trump administration’s announcement this month that it would move forward with an F-35 fighter jet sale to Saudi Arabia, Washington may soon face renewed debate over whether Turkey should be allowed back into the F-35 program — and whether the same standards should apply to both countries.
Turkey lost its chance to join the F-35 program after failing to finalize terms on Patriot systems in 2016.
President Trump defended the proposed sale by calling Saudi Arabia “a great ally,” citing its role in this year’s strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites. It remains uncertain whether the U.S. will approve all 48 jets that Riyadh has requested, but the episode highlights a structural weakness in American policy: inconsistent application of legal standards and strategic risk assessments for the sake of political expediency, risking Middle East destabilization.
Turkey lost its chance to join the F-35 program after failing to finalize terms on Patriot systems in 2016, because Ankara demanded access to source codes and a larger technology transfer than Washington would allow. In 2017, Turkey negotiated a $2.5 billion contract with Russia for the S-400 system, prompting its removal from the F-35 program in 2019.
Acting Defense Secretary Patrick M. Shanahan wrote to Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar: “While we seek to maintain our valued relationship, Turkey will not receive the F-35 if Turkey takes delivery of the S-400.” The Pentagon deemed participation in both programs incompatible and a national security threat. The S-400’s radar can detect, track and profile stealth aircraft like the F-35, raising concerns that Russia could collect sensitive data. Congress codified this restriction in the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), prohibiting F-35 transfers to Turkey unless it divests from the S-400.
Since September 2025, reports suggest Russia may buy back Turkey’s S-400 technology and that Turkey seeks to rejoin the F-35 program. But trust in Washington may be irreparably damaged. The NDAA sets stringent conditions for Turkey’s return: it must not possess the S-400 system or related equipment and must provide “credible assurances” it will not accept delivery in the future, among other requirements. Turkey’s previous decision to buy the S-400 and ally with Russia, in violation of the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, complicates rebuilding confidence between the NATO allies.
Saudi Arabia’s growing relationship with China presents parallel concerns. Riyadh increasingly relies on Beijing for ballistic missile development, surveillance systems and dual-use infrastructure, and Chinese security technology permeates Saudi networks. If Turkey’s integration of Russian systems is a disqualifying risk to U.S. military technology, China’s expanding footprint in Saudi defense and intelligence presents an analogous one. Beijing’s cyber capabilities, industrial espionage and strategic security partnership with Moscow heighten these concerns.
The U.S. cannot treat Turkey’s S-400 purchase as a deal-breaker while downplaying Saudi engagement with the Chinese.
Federal law restricts Turkish access to U.S. technology due to its cooperation with Russia, and successive NDAAs have expanded oversight of Chinese influence. The 2021 NDAA began mandating annual “Public Reporting of Chinese Military Companies Operating in the United States.” The 2025 NDAA further bars citizens of “covered foreign nations” including China, from sensitive national security labs, expands prohibitions on sharing missile defense information, and requires defense contractors to disclose personnel ties with China. The U.S. cannot treat Turkey’s S-400 purchase as a deal-breaker while downplaying Saudi engagement with the Chinese.
Potential F-35 proliferation carries serious implications for Middle East stability. Israel remains the only regional F-35 operator, preserving a Qualitative Military Edge foundational to deterrence. This exclusivity stabilizes the region. Delivering F-35s to Saudi Arabia or Turkey risks shifting the balance of power. Saudi Arabia, with financial resources and regional influence, could alter Arab military dynamics. Turkey, with strained NATO ties and broader ambitions, could leverage the F-35 in unpredictable ways.
Once platforms like the F-35 are delivered, they cannot be easily retrieved. Bilateral trust can often dissolve when politics changes rapidly, especially in the Middle East, and the long-term consequences could reshape deterrence structures underpinning Israeli security for decades.
Historically, U.S. F-35 policy has been cautious. Neither Ankara’s ties to Moscow nor Riyadh’s ties to Beijing should be ignored, yet current policy treats one as disqualifying and the other as manageable, driven more by short-term politics than long-term strategy.
The United States cannot afford a contradictory F-35 strategy that penalizes Turkey for behavior it implicitly tolerates in Saudi Arabia.
A disciplined U.S. approach should enforce uniform security risk evaluations for all F-35 recipients, including analysis of Chinese and Russian influence. It should preserve Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge by limiting transfers to extraordinary circumstances; require verifiable Turkish divestment from the S-400 as a precondition for re-entry; and impose comparable standards on Saudi Arabia, including transparency regarding Chinese partnerships.
The United States cannot afford a contradictory F-35 strategy that penalizes Turkey for behavior it implicitly tolerates in Saudi Arabia. Nor can it maintain regional stability while undermining Israel’s technological edge. Consistent standards would enhance American credibility, strengthen deterrence, stabilize alliances, and safeguard advanced U.S. technology. Without a coherent policy, the U.S. risks avoidable security dilemmas and undermines the strategic principles guiding its most critical defense relationships in the Middle East.
Published originally on November 25, 2025.
