Today, the diplomatic corridors of Tunis played host to a familiar performance. The foreign ministers of Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria, joined by UN Special Envoy Hanna Tetteh, convened under the banner of the “Tripartite Neighboring Countries Mechanism” to discuss a “Libyan-led” solution to the nation’s decade-long deadlock. But as these regional powers and UN technocrats drafted communiqués calling for the withdrawal of foreign mercenaries and the scheduling of simultaneous elections, a glaring silence hung over the room: the Libyans themselves were not at the table.
The Tunis summit is the latest example of a “zombie diplomacy” that continues to treat Libya as a project to be managed by committee rather than a sovereign nation. While the international community remains wedded to “roadmaps” and “structured dialogues,” the reality on the ground has moved toward a terminal internal reckoning that no external summit can resolve.
The Tunis summit is the latest example of a “zombie diplomacy” that continues to treat Libya as a project to be managed by committee rather than a sovereign nation.
The most immediate indictment of the Tunis meeting came from Tripoli. The Government of National Unity (GNU) issued a sharp formal reservation, characterizing any consultative meeting held without direct Libyan participation as a “serious violation of national sovereignty” and an attempt to bypass national institutions.
This is not merely a procedural complaint; it is a fundamental rejection of the premise that Libya’s neighbors and the UN possess the mandate to negotiate the country’s future in absentia. Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dabaiba emphasized that while Libya values its “fraternal and historical relations” with its neighbors, the era of external tutelage is over. By attempting to coordinate a regional stance without a seat for the Libyan state, the Tunis Tripartite has inadvertently reinforced the very institutional paralysis it claims to combat.
Central to the Tunis discussions was the UN’s “Structured Dialogue,” a framework intended to bridge the gap between rival administrations in Tripoli and Benghazi. However, as the delegates in Tunis discussed governance tracks and human rights, they appeared to ignore the “judicial divorce” currently tearing through Libya’s foundations.
As of early 2026, Libya is no longer just a country with two governments; it is a country with two irreconcilable legal universes. The Supreme Court is effectively bifurcated, with rival entities in the East and West claiming total legitimacy. Simultaneously, the legislative bodies are engaged in a race to dismantle the High National Elections Commission (HNEC), with the High Council of State in Tripoli and the Parliament in Benghazi each appointing their own heads and legal frameworks.
As of early 2026, Libya is no longer just a country with two governments; it is a country with two irreconcilable legal universes.
When the highest court in the land is a subject of dispute, any “agreement” reached through international mediation becomes a “legal phantom”—unenforceable and destined to be struck down by whichever side feels disadvantaged. The UN’s insistence on an 18-month roadmap in the face of this judicial collapse is not just optimistic; it is “dangerously naive”.
While external actors focus on “hotel diplomacy,” real power in Libya is consolidating around local achievement and social legitimacy. In the East and South, the “National Initiative” launched by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar has articulated a clear alternative: the solution must be Libyan-Libyan, supported by the tribes, and free from “foreign-woven” roadmaps.
Haftar’s message to tribal leaders in the newly established “Military City” was unambiguous: “A map whose threads have been woven behind borders cannot build a free, fully sovereign state”. This sentiment resonates deeply across the Libyan street, where nearly 15 years of transitional governments have bred a profound “disenchantment” with international mediation.
Haftar’s message to tribal leaders in the newly established “Military City” was unambiguous: “A map whose threads have been woven behind borders cannot build a free, fully sovereign state.”
The only legitimate representative bodies in the country today are not those endorsed by the UN, but the municipal councils. In 2024 and 2025, over 50 municipalities successfully conducted local elections—a rare example of organic, democratic practice that occurred despite the national-level deadlock.These local wins prove that Libyans are capable of self-governance when the process is not sabotaged by the high-stakes “elite bargains” that foreign summits tend to encourage.
Libya today stands at a crossroads between a “life of honor and sovereignty” or a future of “subordination and tutelage”. The Tunis meeting, despite its proclamations of regional support, risks entrenching the latter. By continuing to promote a “Structured Dialogue” that lacks the participation of key power brokers and ignores the collapse of the judiciary, the international community is simply managing the country’s decay rather than its recovery.
The path forward requires a radical shift in perspective. Stability in Libya will not be found in a unified budget or a synchronized electoral calendar dictated from Tunis or New York. It will emerge from an internal “social consensus” between the country’s diverse tribal, local, and military components—an “Internal Alliance” built on the “Legitimacy of Achievement” rather than fragile political agreements.
As the old Libyan proverb says, “No one scratches your skin like your own fingernail”. If the international community truly wants to see a unified Libya, it must stop trying to hold the pen. The only roadmap that matters is the one the Libyans draw for themselves, on their own soil, in their own time. Anything else is just a mirage in the North African desert.
