The Case for Decentralization in Syria

Since the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the nature of Syria’s future government and system of governance has become one of the country’s most intensely debated and contested issues. A central question is whether Syria should pursue decentralization of government. The interim authorities in Damascus have been firm on embracing a largely centralized form of governance. However, a growing body of local stakeholders advocate for a more inclusive and locally empowered political structure granting greater autonomy to the country’s regions. This debate reflects Syria’s complex ethnic, sectarian, and local dynamics. In this precarious transitional period, it also reveals the signs of a protracted struggle among the country’s political factions over the future shape of the state.

As Syria enters this new political phase, the United States faces a critical opportunity to help shape a more stable and inclusive future. The lifting of all sanctions offers the U.S. a unique opportunity to initiate a new phase in its diplomatic engagement with Syria. Advancing a policy that supports decentralization – through targeted assistance to local institutions – is not only feasible but strategically necessary. It can facilitate the establishment of an inclusive government and participatory political system in Syria – objectives that have been central to U.S. policy, particularly since Assad’s fall. This model offers a path to mitigate conflict, prevent the return of authoritarian rule, and promote equitable representation. By investing in the foundations of a resilient Syrian state, Washington can transform its current leverage into lasting influence – one that empowers Syrians to rebuild without drawing the U.S. into another open-ended engagement.

Before December 2024, Syria was governed by a highly centralized system under Baath Party rule for over five decades. When Hafez al-Assad came to power in 1971, he implemented far-reaching transformations across the governance structure and other key aspects, of the state all aimed at consolidating his control over the country.

A few months after taking power, the Assad-backed Parliament passed a decree to organize council elections at the provincial, district, and township levels. However, the potential for meaningful local governance was quickly undermined by the adoption of the 1973 Constitution, which concentrated extensive powers in the presidency, effectively ensuring that the central government in Damascus retained control of all state administration and rendering local councils functionally subordinate and politically insignificant. While two articles in the document briefly mentioned local people’s councils, they failed to define any meaningful role in local governance. During his reign, Assad showed little interest in even local autonomy. His three-decade rule was characterized by the intense centralization of nearly every aspect of government. For example, provincial governors were appointed by Assad without input from local constituencies. The budgets of the country’s 14 provinces were centrally allocated by the government in Damascus. As a result, provincial and local councils functioned primarily as administrative arms, tasked with implementing policies determined by the central government.

When Assad’s son Bashar assumed the presidency after his father’s death in 2000, the foundations of a deeply centralized system were firmly entrenched. Despite initial attempts at economic reforms and modernization of some state sectors, Bashar not only maintained but also, in some cases, deepened the centralized governing apparatus. He ensured that decision-making remained concentrated in Damascus, while local governance structures across the country remained largely symbolic and ineffective.

This rigid centralization of power played a key role in fueling the 2011 uprising. One of the underlying grievances contributing to the outbreak of the Syrian conflict was the complete lack of local agency. For example, provincial governors were appointed, and most municipal officials were endorsed by Damascus, with little to no input for the communities they served. This authoritarian approach, coupled with systematic corruption and uneven development, caused a marginalization of local communities, resulting in deep resentment across a wide segment of Syrian society.

Recognizing that direct centralized control could undermine its hold over parts of the country during the height of the popular uprising, the Assad regime introduced a heavily revised constitution in 2012. Though largely symbolic and cosmetic, the new constitution nominally granted provincial governments expanded powers under what it termed the “principle of decentralization of authorities and responsibilities.” Prior to the constitutional amendments, the Syrian parliament enacted Local Administrative Law No. 107, presenting the regime’s vision of administrative decentralization. For most Syrians, however, the gestures were too little, too late.

Both past constitutional frameworks and recent developments demonstrate that a decentralized governance structure is not only feasible but also grounded in historical precedent and political legitimacy.

One of the earliest examples dates back to the short-lived Syrian Arab Kingdom, established following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and before the onset of the French mandate. In 1920, the Syrian National Congress adopted a constitution that explicitly endorsed a decentralized system of governance. This framework divided the country into autonomous districts, each with its own parliament and administrative authority. That document also guaranteed minority representation through a quota system. It was a bold attempt to accommodate Syria’s ethnic and religious diversity and ensure a degree of political pluralism. Remarkably progressive for its time, it stood as a modern constitutional framework established more than a century ago.

Beginning in 1920 under the French mandate, Syria was divided into six autonomous entities, three of which formed the Syrian Federation. This French policy of establishing autonomous regions along sectarian lines contributed to increasing tensions among Syria’s different communities. Driven in part by France’s ambition to maintain direct control, this federal arrangement was soon replaced by a unitary state structure. This transition laid the foundation for the highly centralized governance model adopted by the subsequent nationalist governments, culminating in the Baathist coup in 1963.

As the 2011 uprising escalated into a full-blown armed conflict and the central state began losing control over parts of the country, local councils and grassroots governance structures emerged in rebel- and Kurdish-held areas. This demonstrated the necessity, capacity, and desire of Syrian communities to govern themselves.

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the rebel group that spearheaded the campaign to overthrow the Assad regime, maintained control over an autonomous enclave in northwestern Syria that remained beyond Damascus’s authority for several years. Despite this experience with local governance, HTS leadership – now dominating the central government – has emerged as one of the most vocal opponents of decentralization in Syria. Supporters of centralization argue that adopting this model would help promote territorial unity, strengthen state institutions, and reduce the risk of fragmentation along ethnic and sectarian lines.

Kurds, who make up about 15 percent of the country’s population, are the most prominent proponents of decentralization. Their position is rooted in a longstanding commitment to a decentralized system as a necessary response to both their historical ethnic marginalization and the broader structural challenges within the Syrian state. This argument is supported by over a decade of de facto self-rule in northeast Syria.

The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), formally established in 2014, has evolved into a sophisticated governing body. It now administers nearly one-third of Syria’s territory, including areas previously controlled by the Islamic State. In a recent interview with the author, a senior Kurdish official in northeast Syria remarked: “If our autonomy experiment survived against all odds during wartime, it certainly deserves to be extended into peacetime – not only in our region, but across the rest of Syria.”

In April, Syrian Kurdish groups, which have historically been divided, convened to declare a unified vision for the resolution of the Kurdish question in post-Assad Syria, calling for decentralization as a viable framework for governance. Kurdish representatives argue that decentralization is essential not only to prevent the reemergence of authoritarian rule but also to foster national reconciliation, equitable development, and long-term stability – three key pillars of a sustainable postconflict political order.

The AANES has demonstrated the viability of establishing a semi-autonomous governance model that is both multiethnic and multireligious. Its governing structures have been designed to respond effectively to the needs of local communities. The co-chair system, for example, allows for non-Kurdish communities to be represented at the leadership level. Each senior government position is typically shared between a man and a woman, often from different ethnic groups. This ensures gender and ethnic inclusivity.

Another key initiative was the introduction of tri-language policy enabling communities across northeast Syria to receive education in their native languages, Kurdish, Arabic, or Syriac. In Arab- and Christian-majority areas, for instance, Arabic and Syriac are the primary languages of instruction. This experience with autonomy also shows that this decentralized governance structure can be implemented and adapted to broader regions of the country. However, such a model cannot succeed without broad-based consensus among all Syrians. Given the current transitional and fragmented context, Syria is facing precisely the kind of conditions in which the question of decentralization must be addressed as a national priority.

The political uncertainty following the fall of Assad and the subsequent emergence of HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa in Damascus prompted a growing number of communities to call for decentralized governance in their respective regions. Notably, the Druze community – approximately 3% of Syria’s population – publicly articulated this demand through its spiritual leadership just days after Assad’s departure.

These calls gained momentum following violent incidents targeting the Alawite community in March and were further amplified in May by deadly clashes between Druze militias and factions affiliated with the interim authorities in southern Syria. These demands reflect a perception that local autonomy could safeguard minority communities, many of whom are concerned about the growing influence of Islamist forces now dominating the government in Damascus. Importantly, the case for decentralization is not limited to protecting minority interests in Syria. In fact, the Sunni Arab majority stands to be one of the primary beneficiaries of a decentralized governance structure, which could serve as a mechanism to mitigate longstanding internal tensions among the ideologically, culturally, and regionally diverse population.

Years of misunderstanding among the different groups, compounded by deep-seated mistrust among Syria’s diverse communities, have contributed to the widespread perception that decentralization – or any form of federal arrangement – necessarily entails national disunity and the risk of partition. The outright rejection of decentralization by the elite in Damascus and elsewhere, much of the mainstream Syrian media, and segments of the public is chiefly the product of years of political messaging and deeply entrenched narratives. This perception is particularly salient when demands for decentralization originate from minority groups, often fueling fears of separatism rather than being seen as calls for inclusive governance.

Such fears could be dispelled through outlining the systematic devolution of administrative, fiscal, and political authority from the central government to local elected governing bodies. This model would empower local authorities to manage essential public services, economic planning, and governance functions in accordance with the needs and identities of their communities. It would also entail the equitable distribution of national wealth and resources, ensuring that all regions – regardless of their demographic and geographic characteristics – receive fair access to development opportunities. At the same time, the central government in Damascus would take responsibility for core sovereign functions such as foreign and fiscal policy and national defense.

Such a balanced framework could help foster local accountability while preserving national unity. Ongoing talks between Damascus and representatives from the SDF and AANES present a window of opportunity to negotiate the future of local governance not only in northeastern Syria but also across the entire country. These discussions could pave the way for a more inclusive political framework incorporating elements of decentralization and power-sharing.

Establishing a coherent governance structure may necessitate a reassessment of Syria’s existing administrative divisions. The civil war produced new political and territorial realities across the country while resurfacing longstanding grievances that had been suppressed during decades of centralized Baathist rule. For example, in the north and northeast, Kurds have long demanded cultural recognition, language rights, removal of exclusionary policies, and political autonomy. In the south, the Druze community has voiced frustration over political marginalization and economic neglect. Christian communities across the country seek the freedom to practice their religion without state interference while maintaining full participation in national politics. Similarly, Sunni Arab-majority areas, which have experienced disproportionate levels of violence and infrastructural destruction, will now push for greater local control and equitable reconstruction. Addressing these grievances through a reconfigured and inclusive administrative structure will be essential to ensuring long-term stability and national cohesion.

After 14 years of conflict, fragmentation, and institutional erosion, it is imperative to consider alternative governance models that move beyond the legacy of centralization in Syria. The collapse of the Assad regime presents a rare and critical opportunity to reimagine the foundations of the Syrian state to ensure inclusive representation and responsive governance at all levels.

This moment should not be viewed merely as a change in leadership but rather as the beginning of a state-building process. It offers a chance to construct a political system in which all components of Syria’s diverse society can participate meaningfully in shaping the country’s future.

For this transformation to be possible, it is essential to critically reexamine the constitutional declaration adopted in March, which falls short of addressing – even in principle – the structural governance challenges Syria faces. While intended as temporary and developed without national consensus, it is likely to serve as a reference point for the eventual permanent constitutional framework. Ensuring that this foundational text reflects inclusive principles, particularly regarding decentralization and power-sharing, will be crucial to building a legitimate and durable postconflict political order. Revisiting previous constitutional documents, particularly the ones adopted before the Baathist era, may offer a valuable foundation for building a more inclusive, representative, and stable political structure. For example, adopting a decentralized model in which each region has its own parliament and government – similar to the framework established in the 1920 constitution – could provide a balanced approach to governance, allowing greater local autonomy while maintaining national unity.

Damascus must resist pressure from regional powers, particularly from Türkiye, whose strong opposition to decentralization in Syria is primarily driven by concerns over Kurdish aspiration for autonomy. The interim government should assert that the structure of Syria’s future governance is a sovereign matter to be determined solely by Syrians through an inclusive national process. Ensuring that domestic priorities are not subordinated to the geopolitical agendas of neighboring states will be critical to establishing a legitimate political settlement in Syria.

For the United States, the recent opening to the new Syrian authorities should be accompanied by genuine engagement to help Syrians build their institutions. Washington should prioritize and advocate for a decentralized governance model as part of its diplomatic and stabilization strategy. As it continues the process of lifting sanctions, the U.S. must also use its leverage to ensure that decentralization is viewed not as a path to partition but as a mechanism for equal representation, conflict mitigation, and long-term state resilience. This approach should combine technical and financial support for local governance structures with promotion of constitutional dialogue during the transitional period. The administration of President Donald Trump has made its aversion to state-building abroad abundantly clear. Support for decentralized governance in Syria, however, doesn’t equate to traditional nation-building. Rather, it is a strategic investment in long-term stability that aligns with core U.S. interests in the broader Middle East.

If Syria has a chance at preventing disintegration and preserving its territorial integrity, it must give serious consideration to building a decentralized system that reflects and embraces the country’s ethnic, religious, and sectarian diversity.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not an official policy or position of New Lines Institute.

Published originally on September 9, 2025.