Unlike many Arab states that have issued condemnations of Israel’s preventative strikes against Iran as acts of aggression, Syria’s government has been conspicuously quiet on the matter so far, even as both sides have clearly made use of Syrian airspace in the exchange of fire. The likely reason for this official silence is that the government would have little to gain by issuing a statement condemning one side or the other or generically calling for ‘de-escalation.’ It is not on good terms with either the Israeli government (which has launched an incursion into parts of southern Syria) or the Iranian government (which supported the Assad regime and has tended to make hostile statements about the new Syrian government, seemingly suggesting that it should be overthrown). For the new government, it may be that the two sides’ fighting each other is seen as advantageous for Syria, distracting them from perceived meddling in Syria’s affairs.
A sentiment that is likely more representative, especially among those who opposed the Assad regime, is that both sides should ideally kill each other and damage each other, without harming Syrians and/or Syrian Sunnis in particular.
However, the lack of an official statement by the government so far does not mean that Syrians are not following the conflict with interest. The reactions are themselves varied and this post will provide a brief overview.
While some people who once considered themselves supporters of Bashar al-Assad now no longer like him and believe that he ‘betrayed’ the Syrian people by fleeing without offering an explanation or an apology for his actions, they may still sympathise with the broader concept of the ‘resistance axis’ and Iran’s opposition to Israel. For example, here, the former leader of the Iranian-backed 313 Force, who spoke critically of the regime in an interview with me, highlighted a purported video clip of Gazans rejoicing about Iranian projectiles hitting Israel (see photo below). Similarly, in the Aleppo Twelver Shi‘a towns of Nubl and al-Zahara’, I have seen some cheering the Iranian strikes against Israel and calling on God to protect Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamane’i, even if they no longer sympathise with Assad himself.
There are also some who still support the former Syrian president and are cheering on Iran’s strikes against Israel. For example, this individual from al-Sanamayn (a Sunni town) in Deraa province who worked with the regime’s military intelligence and survived an assassination attempt prior to the fall of the regime.
Similarly, an account supporting the pro-Assad Alawite insurgency under the moniker of ‘Coastal Shield Brigade’ celebrated Iran’s strikes on Israel with the caption: “Israel is burning.”
However, it is probably the case that these sentiments supporting Iran over Israel reflect only a minority among Syrians. A sentiment that is likely more representative, especially among those who opposed the Assad regime, is the idea that both sides should ideally kill each other and damage each other, without harming Syrians and/or Syrian Sunnis in particular. An example of this sort of sentiment is the following post shared by Omar al-Hasan, who previously served as an independent representative in the Assad regime’s parliament, backed by the Iranian-supported Liwa al-Baqir (“Baqir Brigade”), which ended up defecting from the Assad regime and Iran. The post says: “Iran vs. Israel: oh God, strike the oppressors with the oppressors and deliver the innocent in their midst safe and sound.” Those who fall into this camp of sentiment may also happily share scenes of destruction from both Israel and Iran.
As the conflict continues, it is probably within the country’s best interest to avoid making a statement and remain officially neutral.
Finally, a sentiment of note among some Syrian Druze observers in particular is one of hostility towards Iran and mocking it, while not necessarily being hostile to Israel. The hostility to Iran reflects continuity with widespread suspicion of Iran and its intentions among Syrian Druze who were not loyal to the Assad regime prior to its fall. For example, Ziyad Abu Tafesh of the local al-Suwayda’ faction Liwa al-Jabal (aka Liwa Jabal al-Karama) lambasted Iran’s Supreme Leader, writing: “If ruin were a production company, he would be the executive producer, composer and exclusive distributor. He speaks about justice and supports tyrants. He speaks about resistance and his hand is with the hand of those who sold oil and took away the peoples’ decision-making and will. No Arab city has remained without his fingerprint on it: destruction, siege or bloodshed.”
Similarly, Ashraf Jamul of Faz‘at Shabab al-Jabal wrote: “Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah receives a high-level delegation,” mockingly referring to the Hezbollah leader’s assassination and the senior Iranian military and security officials taken out by Israel’s initial strikes on Iran.
In the overall scheme of things, Syria is no longer of great significance in the conflict between Israel and Iran. While some Iranian projectiles appear to have fallen on Syrian territory, the country is no longer a battleground for Israel to hit major Iranian-linked assets as was happening during the days of the Assad regime. As the conflict continues, it is probably within the country’s best interest to avoid making a statement and remain officially neutral.
Documents referenced in this article are available in the original Substack edition.
Published originally on June 19, 2025.
