Recent reporting from Ukrainian and other sources indicates that Russia has substantially upgraded the original Iranian-made Shahed suicide drones—modifications that could pose new and more complex threats, not only to Ukraine but also to Israel, should Moscow transfer the technology or components to Tehran. The most consequential innovation is the replacement of the Shahed’s rudimentary “motorbike” engine with a compact turbojet, increasing its speed by as much as a factor of three.
Iranian government-controlled media outlets, along with anonymous social-media accounts that echo the Islamic Republic’s messaging, have intensified their assertions about a major military build-up to compensate for the setback Iran suffered during Israel’s June 2025 air campaign. Many analysts, inside and outside, Iran speculate that a second Israeli offensive is only a matter of time, prompting Tehran’s insistence that it must demonstrate an ability to respond forcefully.
[In June], Israel established air dominance over Iran, which sharply limited Tehran’s ability to prepare and launch large numbers of missiles.
Claims about an expanding ballistic-missile arsenal now circulate on Iranian social media. Iranian commentators say that Tehran could overwhelm Israeli air defenses with a barrage or sustain a prolonged exchange that eventually depletes expensive U.S. and Israeli interceptor stocks. Some assert implausibly that Iran could launch up to 2,000 ballistic missiles in a single salvo. Given military and logistical realities, such boasts resemble psychological posturing by a defeated state, rather than credible strategic assessments.
The development of faster Shahed drones, however, represents a different challenge. In the June 2025 conflict, Israel established air dominance over Iran, which sharply limited Tehran’s ability to prepare and launch large numbers of missiles simultaneously: Many would be detected during their lengthy launch sequence and destroyed on the ground. Shahed drones, by contrast, require almost no preparation time and can be launched with minimal warning.
If Russia provides Iran with the upgraded jet-powered variant, flight times would drop dramatically. Drones launched from Iran’s western border regions could reach northern Israel in under two hours. Their higher velocity—reportedly 310-375 mph, compared with the Iranian model’s sub-125 mph speed—would complicate interception. During previous Iranian attacks, almost all propeller-driven Shaheds were shot down, often with U.S. and allied aircraft assisting.
The faster Russian variant would still be vulnerable to Western fighter jets, but a larger number might slip through Israel’s air-defense net, especially if Iran launched them in swarms. Even if most are intercepted, Israel still would have to expend interceptor missiles costing hundreds of thousands of dollars each to destroy drones that cost Iran only tens of thousands of dollars to manufacture. The economics of the exchange—premium interceptors versus relatively cheap drones—works in Iran’s favor in any saturation attack.
The central question is whether Russia will share the technology. For two decades, Moscow has been reluctant to provide Tehran with advanced weaponry—especially modern combat aircraft. But Tehran delivered a major boost to Russia’s war effort in 2022 by supplying Shahed drones, enabling Russia to strike deep into Ukrainian cities. Moscow may feel compelled to reciprocate, at least partially.
A more probable scenario is that Russia shares only technical specifications and engineering guidance. In that case, Iran would need to procure suitable small turbojet engines, build prototypes, and conduct flight tests—a process that could take months. If Russia, China, North Korea, or an illicit procurement network decides to supply ready-made engines, Iran could accelerate production dramatically. This is the juncture at which Israeli and Western intelligence services must remain intensely vigilant.
If Russia, China, North Korea, or an illicit procurement network decides to supply ready-made engines, Iran could accelerate production dramatically.
Another concerning development emerged on December 1, when photographs appeared of a Russian jet-powered Shahed variant fitted with a Soviet-era R-60 short-range air-to-air missile. If verified, this would mark an attempt to transform the Shahed from a simple suicide drone into a rudimentary airborne threat to enemy aircraft. Although such a platform would not pose a significant challenge to advanced jets such as the F-16, the addition of an air-to-air weapon complicates the task for forces attempting to counter drone swarms and reveals a technological trajectory that Russia—and potentially Iran—may pursue.
Iranian sources increasingly have invoked the prospect of a multi-front conflict with Israel, should hostilities resume. Israeli and Arab media likewise report that Tehran is preparing its regional allies—including Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, the Houthis, and factions in Syria and the West Bank—for a broader confrontation. U.S. officials have warned Baghdad that Israel will strike inside Iraq if Iran-backed militias intervene. In short, Tehran appears to be positioning its “Axis of Resistance” for synchronized action against Israel.
Iran’s renewed efforts to rearm itself and rally its remaining proxies may herald a prelude to a second Israeli offensive. Tehran’s refusal to make substantive concessions to Washington risks paving the way for expanded U.S. support for an Israeli decision to strike—an outcome Iranian leaders claim to fear yet seem politically unwilling to avert.
