Following the Syrian government’s offensive in January that took much of the territory held by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the two sides- through U.S. mediation- subsequently came to a revised agreement on 29 January on terms that were largely favourable to the Syrian government, effectively stipulating the end of the SDF’s existence as an autonomous military and governing entity.
Such a line was reinforced recently by the spokesman for the central government’s team overseeing the merger process in Hasakah province- Ahmad al-Hilali (who previously served as a leading official for Ahrar al-Sham in the province)- in recent remarks to Syrian state TV channel al-Ikhbariya, focusing on the role of the SDF’s Asayish [internal security forces] in Hasakah province and the merger process for them (highlights in bold are my own):
‘The presidential team undertook its mission around a month ago and has completed a number of portfolios. Matters have become noticeable- praise be to God: people have seen a speed-up in events- the speeding up of the merger process, more completed portfolios in Hasakah province, praise be to God. The most recent of these portfolios was accomplished yesterday with the opening of a number of new roads and crucial routes after the opening of the M4 highway which extends from the al-Yaarabiya area that is a shared border point with Iraq up to Jordan, passing through most of the Syrian provinces: Aleppo, Idlib, Homs, Hama, Damascus, Deraa.
What Damascus calls merger remains in Kobani a negotiated coexistence rather than full institutional transfer.
This route was closed from the side of Hasakah and the side of Tel Tamr. This route was opened two days ago. Yesterday also crucial routes extending between Hasakah and Qamishli and other districts as well like al-Yaarabiya and al-Hol. These routes were also closed. They have been opened too and joint checkpoints of the Internal Security command in Hasakah province as well as some of the Asayish [SDF internal security] personnel. Of course we confirm that the existence of the Asayish- the existence of Asayish personnel- the existence of these forces is only temporary until the merger process is completed and these personnel join the Internal Security command in Hasakah province and there are no longer joint checkpoints, nor anything called joint command or something joint. There will only remain the state’s command and checkpoints for the state with these personnel who will join the state’s institutions.’
When asked about whether the merger process was facing obstacles, he added:
‘In truth, I made clear in my statements yesterday that there has been mutual distance between the two sides that has lasted for around 14 years in administration of the area and Syria’s interior. In addition, the existence of the bygone regime was also causing tension in the entire area. But these past 14 years in truth need time so that people can accept the merger process. I mean they have been living in accordance with a specific system for 14 years called the Autonomous Administration and also the Syrian Democratic Forces- SDF- and a specific security system. Now they are moving towards entering into the state and in truth the people of the area there- Kurds and Arabs: their loyalty to the state was weak. Now many of them feel loyalty and belonging to something called a Syria that unites all. Previously, the sense of belonging- whether Kurdish or even Arab- to Syria was weak. Now there is real feeling of belonging to the Syrian state.’
He also gave some more specific details on the attempt to merge the SDF’s military forces into the new army, as well as dealing with the Ras al-Ayn area that in fact had a degree of autonomy from the central state, being under Turkish influence (it was established as an enclave seized by Turkish-backed insurgent groups from the SDF in 2019):
Kobani illustrates how uneven Syria’s reintegration process remains across former SDF-held territory.
‘The priority right now is the military and security portfolios. With regards to the military portfolio, it has been agreed to merge and attach members of the SDF to brigades belonging to Division 60 in Hasakah province led by the brigadier general Qutayba. These three brigades constitute around 4500 fighters who will be merged into the Syrian army. Likewise we also have the security institution which is very important and among the most important portfolios. Indeed, if we deal with these two portfolios (the military and security) and a real merger is achieved and the personnel who were previously in the SDF’s security apparatuses actually merge with the Internal Security and become part of the Internal Security organisation at the level of Syria, this of course will facilitate the merger of the rest of the institutions. Despite this, the rest of the institutions are in a race against time in truth, there are many institutions that have been opened like the central bank branch in Hasakah, the education directorate, the health directorate. I would also like to note something: the merger process in Hasakah province also includes the Ras al-Ayn area. Ras al-Ayn of course was an area subject to Turkish administration- let us say- in a semi-direct sense. There are many institutions, the issue of the hospitals, the directorates of education, military and civilian police. All these institutions were under the supervision of the Turkish state and the supervision of Turkish NGOs providing support. These institutions and these directorates will also be merged with the Syrian state. Today many of the institutions in the Ras al-Ayn area are being handed over. In truth the merger process likewise includes areas that were under Turkish control or influence, if the expression is correct. These areas will also be merged and joined to the institutions of the state.'In contrast, the Kobani in Aleppo province constitutes a separate SDF-controlled enclave and al-Hilali does not cover details for that area. So what is the ‘merger’ process looking like in the Kobani area? Below is an interview conducted on 14 March with a Kurdish media activist from the Kobani area. It is slightly edited and condensed for clarity:
Q: What is the security and civil administration situation in Kobani?
A: The civil and military situation are entirely in the hands of the SDF and Asayish forces. There are only joint points. The Kurdish villages are all under Kurdish authority. Only the villages where there are both Arabs and Kurds have joint control between the two sides.
Q: By joint points you mean the Asayish and central government forces are cooperating in managing security, for example joint patrols?
A: Exactly. Everything affiliated with the Kobani canton belongs to the Asayish security, with the Public Security [central government’s security apparatus] not having the right to enter it. There are only some limited joint points like the Shuyukh, Sirrin and Qiba districts. There is no entry by Public Security into areas beyond that.
The civil and military situation are entirely in the hands of the SDF and Asayish forces.
Q: Have none of the central government’s institutions entered the town of Kobani? I mean for example the services, health and educational institutions?
A: Health not yet. As for the services institutions, they are working on it and the matter has not yet been finished. At one point inside the town- namely, in the Asayish centre, composed of 27 people- they are working to activate the services institutions, but still there is no activity. By God there is nothing clear, everything is under the table. In contrast, in Hasakah, everything that is done is spoken about. As for Kobani, there is no announcement. There is no entry by the Public Security inside the town, only committees, nothing more. According to my knowledge, after tomorrow they will open a base for the Public Security, only composed of people from the area, and not from outside. All of them will be from Kobani, none from Aleppo or any other place.
Q: The government’s media say that the Asayish presence is something temporary and will later be dissolved. Is there anything about merging the Asayish into the Interior Ministry?
A: I am with the idea of merger, but what form will it take? Only that the employees will take their salaries from Aleppo with their names registered in Aleppo. Some members of the Asayish will be changed per Aleppo’s directorates. But the government in Aleppo [in general] will not intervene with personnel and directives. The directives will come from the town’s governor, and the governor will be from the town and agreed upon by the two sides. They have suggested a governor but this is rejected by the people and the administration in Kobani. This issue is still under consideration and until now no governor has been announced by the two sides. Rather, from the side of Jarabulus [on the Euphrates River, opposite Kobani], they have said the person governing it should be the governor of Kobani, but the government in Damascus has not suggested it. There are some problems but they will be resolved.
The directives will come from the town’s governor, and the governor will be from the town and agreed upon by the two sides.
Q: In general is the security situation in Kobani and the Kurdish villages good? Are the Kurds being harassed by the government?
A: You need to distinguish the government from the army. With regards to the army, it engages in destruction, vandalism and theft. As for the Public Security, there are no problems until now. The Public Security are the opposite of the army forces. The Public Security secures the joint points so that the Kurds and Arabs can work without problems at the checkpoints. As for the army and Amshat and Hamzat forces [Sultan Sulayman Shah and Hamza Divisions], they have robbed, burned and destroyed all the homes they have seized.
Q: Are there displaced people from the Kurdish villages in the town of Kobani because of the army’s actions?
A: Yes, there are many, from Raqqa, Tabqa, Sirrin, Shuyukh’s peripheries (like Zirkutek, Qibba, Kharus). With regards to the Kurds from Raqqa, almost all of them are in Kobani, and there are people from Ayn Issa. Don’t forget there are also many Arab displaced people from Tabqa, al-Raqqa and Ayn Issa, and there are people from Afrin as well and also Alawites.
Q: Finally, in general, are you confident the merger project will succeed?
For the situation in Syria in general, defining the region’s course depends on Turkey and America.
A: For the situation in Syria in general, the people cannot define anything: defining the region’s course depends on Turkey and America, and not the people, the government or the Kurds. Turkey is always creating obstacles. With regards to Kobani, I think the matter will be resolved, but there will be some problems from the side of the Shuyukh district and later they will be resolved per my expectations. As for the military forces, there won’t be a complete merger. For example, there was a withdrawal from Shaykh Maqsud [in Aleppo city] and later there was an attack on the area. This won’t happen again.
With regards to the Shuyukh district, its people don’t have problems and are respected. The people’s homes are destroyed and they are oppressed, I am with you and them, but among them are vandals and those who sow discord so as to wreck the agreement and cause problems between Kurds and Arabs. And there are elements who come among the civilians from outside Shuyukh. They are masked and they regrettably cause problems.
Also don’t forget something more important on the matter. The people in Kobani’s western areas fear a war or problems will break out between Arabs and Kurds on the peripheries of the Shuyukh district, because many photos have spread on social media pages of people of Shuyukh, and individuals are threatened on the basis they robbed their homes. Although some photos have spread that have no relation to the issue of theft, there are people who don’t like each other and they transmit their photos of individuals in order to incite people against them.
Published originally on March 15, 2026.
