As part of their incursions into southern Syria since the fall of the Assad regime, Israeli forces have sometimes arrested individuals for reasons that are not always made clear by the Israelis. The lack of clarity contributes to the impression that the arrests are random and somehow just aimed at intimidating and terrorising the local populations. A recent case of interest in this regard is the reported arrest of three individuals from the locality of Jamla in the Yarmouk Basin region of Deraa, very near the border with the Golan Heights. The individuals listed are Muhammad Turki al-Samuri, Mahmud Mazid al-Baridi and Muhammad Muhanna al-Baridi.
In this post, I will focus on the case of Muhammad Muhanna al-Baridi and show why it is unlikely that these arrests are random or merely aimed at intimidating local populations. Originally, I was disinclined to discuss him in particular but I have subsequently seen that his case has provoked some noise on local social media calling for his release from Israeli custody. For example, as one post puts it:
“Muhammad al-Baridi is being held by the occupation…In the darkness of midnight, the occupation forces assaulted the locality of Jamla where they raised the peaceful homes and arrested the young men Muhammad Muhanna al-Baridi, Mahmud Mazid al-Baridi and Muhammad Turki al-Samuri in a surprising and terrifying way.
Since that day, there has been no news about them at all. Five days have passed without any knowledge of their fate or the place they were taken to, and their cases are shrouded in obscurity until now.
We call on the official and relevant parties to make urgent efforts to discover their fate and demand their safe and sound return to their families, for their mothers are waiting and their hearts are trembling in fear for their sons.”
But what this post and others about him omit is the fact that Muhammad Muhanna al-Baridi was a once a member of the Islamic State-affiliated Jaysh Khalid bin al-Walid (‘Army of Khalid bin al-Walid’) that controlled the Yarmouk Basin in the period 2016-2018, following which the Assad regime took over. I remember having some interactions with him back in 2018 on Facebook and asking my friend Mahmud al-Baridi (not the same Mahmud as the one mentioned above) about him. Mahmud mentioned to me at the time that Muhammad was an amni [member of the security apparatus] of Jaysh Khalid and that he had sometimes seen Muhammad going out to perform ribat [manning of the frontlines]. Muhammad had reportedly been expelled by Jaysh Khalid for misconduct only to return to their ranks.
Shortly after the regime took over the Yarmouk Basin (i.e. late August 2018), I remember Muhammad contacting me. He noted to me at the time that his father (Muhanna al-Baridi) had been arrested by the regime on the grounds of affiliation with Jaysh Khalid, though he claimed that his father had been expelled from Jaysh Khalid some time before the regime took over. Muhammad also mentioned that he himself had become wanted by the regime. Muhammad subsequently fled north and joined the insurgency there, returning back home to Deraa as the regime collapsed. His father was also freed from prison as a result of the regime’s collapse. It would appear that since then Muhammad has been incorporated into the new government’s security apparatus, at least per the photo below (published this summer) in which he is wearing the apparel of the security apparatus that was established by the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham-backed Salvation Government in northwest Syria prior to the fall of the regime.
From what I can discern, Muhammad’s current views are a fairly standard example of the Sunni populist trend that supports the new government and has roots in the Salafi and Islamist trends that were present in the northwest prior to the fall of the regime. For example, this post he put up regarding the ‘banner of Tawhid’ (“the banner of monotheism,” referring to the white flag with the Islamic declaration of faith written on it, a banner that is also used by the Taliban and has been raised and supported by many of those who are part of the Sunni populist trend):
As it happens, I don’t think Muhammad is still a supporter of Islamic State or automatically a sinister figure because he was once in Jaysh Khalid. His case is one example among many of people who switched their allegiances and changed their views during the war in Syria for various reasons such as survival and adaptation. In the Yarmouk Basin in particular, there was a clan-based element to Jaysh Khalid in that one of its constituent groups was the Yarmouk Martyrs’ Brigade that had origins in the Baridi clan in Jamla. Too often, observers and pundits have exploited the issue of people’s former allegiances and views for polemical ends. If the Assad regime incorporated former Islamic State members into its forces, that somehow showed a regime-Islamic State collaboration. If the insurgent groups that fought the regime and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces incorporated former Islamic State members into their ranks, that showed how those groups were supposedly the equivalent of Islamic State. And most recently, if people who were once officers in the Assad regime’s army and/or supported the Syrian Social Nationalist Party are now aligned with Druze spiritual leader Hikmat al-Hijri’s positions, that proves how Hijri’s coalition is supposedly controlled or heavily influenced by ‘Assadists’ and ‘regime remnants.’
It is clear, given the information above, why someone like Muhammad would be of interest to the Israelis.
All that said, it is clear, given the information above, why someone like Muhammad would be of interest to the Israelis. As noted in an earlier interview I did with a person from the al-Qunaytra locality of Kudna near the border with the Golan Heights, the Israelis have adopted a ‘carrot-and-stick’ approach that combines aid distributions but also raids and arrests targeting anyone perceived by the Israelis as a potential security threat: people who are reported to have been involved with Islamic State or Iranian-backed groups (both of whom wish to target Israel) will undoubtedly come within that category. It is also apparent that there are locals providing the Israelis with information. In all likelihood, the Israeli forces received information from a local informant or more than one informant about Muhammad al-Baridi and may have cross-checked it with information they already had on people who had been involved with Jaysh Khalid (despite what some have claimed about supposed Israeli-Jaysh Khalid collaboration, the Israelis did in fact view Jaysh Khalid as a problem and potential threat). In addition, this Israeli approach is not necessarily confined to just Sunnis: a local from the Druze locality of Hadr (located on the border with the Golan Heights) claimed to me in late May that the Israelis had arrested five people in the area on the basis of affiliation with Hezbollah, which did in fact recruit some locals from Hadr during the war.
None of the above should be interpreted as an endorsement of Israeli actions in southern Syria. In my view, the Israeli approach from the outset has been too hostile and a more sound policy would have simply been to signal to the new government a willingness to engage in talks regarding border security arrangements while also making clear that any attacks on Israeli-controlled territory emanating from Syrian territory would be met with severe retaliation, which would not have to involve a ground incursion. But one’s overall views of the Israeli approach should not prevent us from trying to explain the Israeli concerns and motivations in an objective manner.
Published originally on October 13, 2025.
