For the fourth time since 2017, Iranians are taking to the streets to demand regime change. As in the previous rounds, it is unlikely that these protests alone will accomplish this objective. The Islamic Republic’s suppression forces, depleted and demoralized, will crack down on protests, and the broader security apparatus will not surrender power to an opposition figure, especially because there is no consensus over the leadership of the opposition.
Resolving the leadership problem looked promising at the outset of the 2022 movement, after Karim Sadjadpour, an Iranian American scholar at the Carnegie Endowment, moderated a conference of opposition leaders at Georgetown University. Its collapse, however, deepened fractures. Such polarization persists and grows. On December 29, 2025, Iranian American journalist Nahayat Tizhoosh tweeted, “In all my years covering Iran and the ever-growing opposition to the Islamic regime in Tehran, I’ve never witnessed this level of polarization within the diaspora in the West.”
The broader security apparatus will not surrender power to an opposition figure, especially because there is no consensus over the leadership of the opposition.
Iranians view revolution through the lens of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, not because they endorse its outcome but, rather, because it lives in memory. The story of the Islamic Revolution in the Iranian mind has three stages: The nationalists, Marxists, and Islamists competed for leadership of the opposition in early and mid-1970s; foreign powers promoted Ruhollah Khomeini as the most acceptable leader to them; and that led the Marxists and nationalists to rally behind him and unite the movement in 1978. After the shah left Iran, early the next year Khomeini returned, and the army surrendered.
Perception means more than reality; Iranians seize upon the idea of foreign endorsement of Khomeini, even though this was more conspiracy theory than real. Still, older Iranians like to talk about how suddenly BBC Radio began talking about Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who was still an obscure figure among the educated and secular class. In autumn 1978, Khomeini moved to France, which these Iranians interpreted as another sign of Western endorsement. Massive and often fawning coverage by foreign newspapers fed into this view then and does so now.
In this analogy, Iran remains in the mid-1970s. Rival factions exist, but they cannot reach a consensus on their own regarding their leadership. They look to Washington to pick a winner, but Americans are too cautious, fearing that such a move would discredit the chosen one as an American stooge. Meanwhile, no Iranian opposition leader has distinguished themself as savvy and charismatic enough. Former Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi is the most prominent figure, but he has the mannerism of an intellectual, more than a revolutionary, and has been too cautious and risk-averse. His camp’s character assassination campaigns against other opposition figures work against his ability to lead a united front. Nonetheless, his family name is chanted far more than anyone else’s on the streets.
Among the reasons that the security forces will not surrender power is that there is nobody to whom to surrender.
Iranians are too conspiratorially minded, wonderfully satirized in the popular novel, My Uncle Napoleon. The main character in the novel, set in the 1940s, is looking for British conspiracies against him in every corner and only finds comfort in believing that there is a rival German hand willing to protect him. Khomeini had the savvy to exploit this mindset and mislead Iranians into believing that foreign powers had selected him. This expanded his support so much so that the other factions had to concede the revolution’s leadership to him. Today, no Iranian leader is so clever. Quite the opposite, Pahlavi’s supporters always form conspiracy theories based on the State Department’s X account to believe that the U.S. government promotes his rivals; recently, monarchists have been upset over tweets concerning the conditions of political prisoners Narges Mohammadi and Mostafa Tajzadeh. His detractors likewise try to discredit him as an Israeli stooge. The Islamic Republic’s influence operations feed into these divisions. X’s new feature recently exposed that many opposition accounts on all sides were operating from inside Iran and without VPN access, suggesting regime consent.
Among the reasons that the security forces will not surrender power is that there is nobody to whom to surrender. Only the U.S. government can end this debate by selecting its favorite. Washington’s fear over discrediting someone by appearing too close represents a bygone era. Fifty-three percent of Iranians view the U.S. favorably; only 36 percent of Iranians see the United States negatively. This latter camp is soft, however. Ironically, many within it cite the soft U.S. approach toward the regime as their reason. To embrace a leader will not work against that person.
Revolutions rarely succeed without foreign support. Americans should be aware of this, given the support they received from France against Britain. The 1979 Islamic Revolution was an exception to this rule because the shah was too sensitive to draw his people’s blood to defend his throne. The Islamic Republic’s cruelty and commitment to staying in power against defenseless Iranians make foreign assistance necessary.
If the U.S. government wishes to see a friendly government in Tehran, it cannot count on Iranians to accomplish regime change on their own; rather, the U.S. government needs to supplement the Iranian people’s efforts, especially by settling their factional debate for them.
